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Abstract 
The Natal Indians' pOlitical path, in the latter half of the nineteenth century, was an 
interactive process amongst the Indians, the Governments of Natal, India and Britain as well 
as Natal colonists. 
The Indian community consisted of indentured and free Indians. The indentured 
Indians had been brought to Natal from the 1860s onwards to work as contract labourers. 
The free Indian population included ex-indentured Indians and 'passenger' Indians. The 
'passenger' Indians came independently and they started to arrive in Natal in the 1870s. The 
indentured and free Indians did not form a unified community as they were separated socially 
and financially as well as in terms of their independence. The indentured labourers' rights 
within the colony were defined in part by the colonial structures but were also controlled by 
their employers. 
The free Indians' political actions were generally a reaction to the anti-Indian agitation 
that developed in the colony. The Indians were in a unique position where they were 
members of the British Empire but also an unwanted foreign, non-white group. White 
Natalians feared the actual and potential economic competition from Indians and they were 
anxious about the growing Indian population. Many whites believed Indians could pose a 
threat to their political and economic domination. Free Indians had to be cautious with how 
they presented their political concerns. At times, they emphasised the so-called social 
distinctions between themselves and indentured Indians in an attempt to be received as an 
elite, 'desirable' group, whilst on other occasions they presented themselves as a more 
homogenous group which did not support discrimination. Gandhi arrived in Natal in 1893 
and played an integral role in defining and motivating free Indian political activity. He initiated 
and organised the free Indians' support for the South African War, 1899 - 1903. The 
Indians' contribution to the war was an attempt to prove their loyalty to the colony and the 
Empire which they hoped would be reciprocated with better pOlitical treatment. 
The Indians struggled to have their offer to serve in the war accepted mainly because 
the British intended to restrict any non-white participation. Yet when the need for additional 
help became urgent, the Indians were called upon and at this stage indentured I ndians were 
also sent up to the front by their employers to work as stretcher bearers. These indentured 
Indians were incorporated into the Indian Ambulance Corps which was led by Gandhi. Other 
free Indians also contributed to the war by supporting general war collections as well as by 
caring for the stretcher bearers' families and Indian refugees from the Transvaal. Some 
Indians who were situated in the war zones were directly effected by the war, however, many 
Indians remained fairly removed from the events of the war. The work performed by the 
Indian Stretcher Bearer Corps was given very little recognition and after the war, Indians 
were generally incorporated into the growing racial discrimination of the Union of South 
Africa and their efforts in the war had little effect. However, the bravery and sacrifices of 
those involved deserves acknowledgment, and recognition should be given to Indians' 
attempts to have an impact on their own political future. 
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Introduction 
J. J. Doke has stated that 'it is not often that men persist so doggedly in pressing their 
help upon unwilling people when help means, to those who offer, danger, suffering 
perhaps death.,1 He is referring to the efforts that the Natal Indians made in getting their 
offer to serve in the South African War, 1899 - 1902, accepted. 
This study of Natal Indian involvement in the South African War is both an attempt to 
participate in the growing discussion regarding black involvement in the war, as well as 
to use the war as a focal point for an analysis of the political position of various sectors 
of the Natal Indian society at the turn of the twentieth century. This will entail looking at 
which Indians involved themselves in activities related to the war, what tasks they were 
able to perform and what factors motivated or forced their participation. The Indians 
could generally be described as an oppressed group but one should not overlook their 
attempts to counter their oppression, nor should one ignore the socio-political 
complexities within their own community. In certain respects, this research has adopted 
a rnicrohistory approach, by choosing the war as a point at which to 'reduce the scale of 
observation' and to increase the intensity of analysis of specific actions.2 Nevertheless, 
it has not assumed strict micronarrative methodology in that the thesis outlines the 
development of political trends that impacted on Indians' experiences and progress in 
the colony and then hones in on the war to see how these trends were either acted out 
or deviated from during the war effort. The racial hierarchy into which immigrant Indians 
entered had been fashioned under the influences of the Natal Government and 
colonists, as well as the British authorities. As rightless immigrants, the Indians were 
largely dependent on how the colony chose to receive and perceive them. The 
development of whites' attitudes towards the different groups of Indians in Natal became 
increasingly discriminatory towards the end of the century, and these attitudes were 
manifested in the proposed and implemented legislation that was aimed at ordering the 
life of particular sectors of the Indian community. The study examines how the different 
sectors of Indian society were able to, and chose to respond to their situations, and then 
1 Doke, J.J. MK. Gandhi, An Indian Patriot in South Africa. (New Delhi, 1994), p. 54. 
2 Levi, G. 'On Microhistory', Burke, P. (ed.), New Perspectives on Historical Writing, (Cambridge, 1991), 
p.95. 
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aims to assess if their actions were opposed or supported by the relevant colonial 
structures and parties. 
On the whole, this thesis is chronological and looks at the progress of the political 
interaction amongst firstly, Natal colonists and authorities, secondly, British and Indian 
authorities and thirdly, Natal Indians. At the same time, the responses of these three 
broad groups towards Indians' treatment in Natal prior to the war is dealt with in 
separate chapters. This is intended to acknowledge that in the process of implementing 
anti-Indian laws, each group played a role in advancing or defending these laws or at 
least responded to the decision-making process. This approach has the shortcoming of 
not exposing the interactive process as clearly as a purely integrated style would have 
done, but it does allow the developing stance of each group to be highlighted. 
Indians were first introduced to Natal on a mass scale from the 1860s onwards as 
indentured labourers. They came on contracts and on the termination of their contracts, 
many labourers chose to settle in the colony. They were termed free Indians and this 
group was added to by independent Indian immigrants known as 'passenger' Indians. 
The factors that would impact on Indians' reception in the colony had been partly 
developed prior to the Indians' arrival. The background chapter offers a brief 
introduction as to how the white Natalians established themselves, and how the 
economic changes brought about by the sugar industry necessitated the introduction of 
indentured labour. In the nineteenth century Natal was a young colony, and combined 
with the whites' concern of being greatly outnumbered by the black population, they 
were not yet economically powerful enough to be able to decisively assert their 
dominance. This insecurity meant racial tensions became prevalent in the colony and 
Indians were often incorporated into this prejudice rather than being seen as British 
subjects. 
Natalians' responses to Indians became increasingly agitated towards the end of 
the century, however, there were differences in how the free and indentured Indians 
were received. Initially colonial tensions regarding Indians pertained to the indentured 
Indians. Some colonials who were not to benefit directly from the labour scheme 
resented the fact that another non-white group was being introduced to Natal when 
whites were already greatly outnumbered by Africans. They also disagreed with the 
large financial input from state coffers into a private venture. The early 'passenger' 
2 
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Indians, who came independently to Natal, were generally not regarded with disfavour 
when they first started to arrive and some even enjoyed a period of relative equality. 
The majority of ex-indentured Indians continued to provide the colony with labour or else 
they ran smallholdings which did not interfere with white commercial activities. However, 
the Indian population grew at a rapid rate and this became a central factor in anti-Indian 
agitation. This population growth was a result of an increase in the indentured labour 
supplies, an emerging ex-indentured population and, from the 1870s onwards, the 
arrival of 'passenger Indians'. Despite the concerns of the growing population, the 
employers of indentured labour were not prepared to consider ending the system. 
Initially, they petitioned through government agencies to be able to manipulate the 
system more to their advantage. The free Indian population then became the focus of 
attack, especially from the white trading and labouring class. The independent Indian 
immigrants were often successful traders, and even though they comprised only a small 
percentage of the Indian population, they were perceived as a major threat to white 
trading activities. These fears were extended to the whole free Indian population which 
came to be seen as competition by white labourers and traders. Apart from the 
economic competition that free Indians were seen to offer, their presence as an 
independent foreign group was seen as a political threat. Whites were worried about a 
reaction from the African population, if Indians were offered rights of which blacks had 
been deprived. They also expressed concerns about eventually being outvoted at the 
polls, even though the number of Indians able to vote was very few. The Natal 
Government, especially after it had achieved Responsible Government in 1893, was 
pressurised to pass discriminatory legislation and the main areas of attack became 
Indian immigration, Indian trading rights and the Indian franchise. 
The Imperial authorities were obliged to respond to Natal Indians' treatment. The 
colonial Indian Government had to consider the demands of the British Government and 
whether the indentured system was advantageous to India. The British Government 
needed to choose between looking after the rights of its Indian subjects and adhering to 
the demands of colonials who were able to develop Natal as an economic resource for 
the Empire. When Natal gained Responsible Government, this impacted on the British 
Government's ability to defend the Indians' rights. There are clear discriminatory trends 
that can be highlighted in the colonial response to Indians from the white Natalians, the 
3 
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British authorities and the British Indian authorities but divisions, inconsistencies and 
variations occurred over time and a well-defined picture does not always emerge 
The situations that indentured and free Indians found themselves in differed greatly. In 
examining how Indians fared within Natal, one must take into account the context in 
which they found themselves and incorporate this understanding into the assessment of 
their attempts to assert themselves politically. With no representation in the Natal 
political structures, indentured Indians were dependent on their employers' goodwill and 
the limited protective structures that the colonial authorities established. The free 
Indians' experience was also impacted upon by the laws and structures in Natal. Yet 
through their independence and the financial and educational advantages of some, they 
were better able to appeal to the colonial government against increasing discrimination 
as well as to the British and British Indian Governments and concerned citizens in both 
countries. Frene Ginwala claims that the international dimension that exerted pressure 
on Natal, and in lesser measure on the Transvaal, allowed Indians to follow a path 
different from that of Africans, permitting them to develop as an oppressed but 
nonetheless comparatively less underprivileged group.3 Indians were aware of their link 
to the British Empire and it was the main reference point of many when trying to defend 
their rights. However, whites in Natal increasingly chose to see Indians as inferior and 
emphasised their non-white status. 
Gandhi arrived in Natal in 1893. The more affluent sectors of the Indian 
community had started to organise themselves politically by then, but Gandhi played a 
major role in advancing early Indian political development in Natal as well as in the 
Transvaal. Yet, one must allow space to discuss how pivotal was Gandhi's role against 
the notion that the free Indians had already defined their political priorities. A clear 
impression does not necessarily emerge as to whether the actions of the Natal Indian 
Congress, the political organisation established by the free Indian community, reflected 
the broad concerns of free Indians, or if they were constructed primarily by Gandhi. 
Gandhi's political convictions also displayed ambiguous elements, possibly due to his 
ideas still being in a formative phase. He seemed to have some empathy for the free 
Indians' class-based attitudes, but also showed concern for the plight of the indentured 
Indians and at times promoted the need for mutual co-operation. At the same time, 
3 Ginwala, F. N. 'Class, Consciousness and Control, Indian South Africans 1860-1946' (Ph.D. thesis, 
Oxford University, 1974), p. 54. 
4 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
w
historians have recently dispelled any notion of the Natal Indian community as being 
uncomplicated and homogenous. There are examples of efforts on the part of the free 
Indians to support the indentured Indians as well as to marginalise them. The free 
Indians mainly campaigned against the legislation that would impact on free Indians but 
they also objected to colonial attempts to restrict indentured Indians from becoming free 
Indians. 
Gandhi certainly played a vital role in promoting Indians' involvement in the war. 
The war effort was openly linked to free Indians' political concerns of gaining better 
treatment in the colony. Consequently, it is important to look at the efforts that the 
Indian leadership made to get its offer to serve the British accepted. The issues of how 
to view colonial rule, whether to defend the indentured Indians' cause and how to 
campaign for their own rights, were central to the free Indians' political decisions just 
prior to the war, and were incorporated into their decision-making discussions regarding 
their response to the war. One has to try to outline Gandhi's views on these issues 
within the context of the general opinions of the free Indians, and then consider how 
closely aligned their feelings were, as well as which ideas took precedence when they 
were transformed into action. Thereafter, one should consider if the Indians' war efforts 
made any impression on the colonials and the colonial and Imperial authorities. 
Natal Indians' various contributions to the South African War, 1899 - 1902 have been 
given comparatively little recognition in the general writings on the war. 4 Even in much of 
the writing that focuses on Natal Indians' history, the war contribution is often bypassed 
or only given brief attention. This, in part, reflects the overall lack of discussion of black 
involvement in a great many of the war texts. Yet, in recent years, this has started to be 
redressed and there has already been a major revision of the war picture with particular 
historians highlighting the significant role that various black groups played. For example 
Peter Warwick in his Black People and the South African War, 1899 - 19025 and his 
chapter 'Black People and the War' in The South African War: the Anglo-Boer War; 
1899 - 19026 deals with general black participation in the war and makes some speCific 
references to the Natal Indians' service. Bill Nasson, in Abraham Esau's War: A Black 
4Thomas Pakenham only pays brief reference to the Indians in The Boer War. (London, 1992) as is the case 
much earlier with Hobson, J.A. The War in South Africa, It's Causes and Effects. (London, 1900). 
5 Warwick, P. BlackPeopie and the South African War, 1899 -1902. (Cambridge, 1983) 
6 Warwick, P. "Black People and the War', Warwick, P. (ed.), The South African War, the Anglo-Boer 
War, 1899-1902. (London, 1980) 
5 
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South African War in the Cape, 1899 - 19027, provides a valuable and extensive 
discussion of some of the war experiences of coloureds in the Cape. However, the fact 
that the Indians' involvement has been given limited attention or been largely overlooked 
in Natal Indian history research also suggests that the Indians' work should not 
necessarily be over-emphasised. Their involvement in the war was brief and their 
communal sacrifice was less than that of many other societies involved in the war. It 
also represented but one of several, possibly more important, Indian political campaigns 
during the period when modern South Africa was establishing itself and its racial 
policies. Nevertheless, the war was a well considered political demonstration of free 
Indians' commitment to the British Empire. It was an effort to prove that they were 
worthy of being seen as British subjects and this makes their endeavors to serve an 
engaging subject. 
Despite having highlighted the point that Indians' war involvement has received limited 
coverage, there are a number of texts that discuss the Natal Indians' contribution to the 
war and how the free Indians str~ggled to have their offer of war work accepted. 
Needless to say, Gandhi himself, in his various publications described their war work 
and considered how successful it had been. One has to take into account that his writing 
on any particular event involving the Indian community was linked to his broader political 
objectives and that he might place more emphasis than some on their relative 
achievements. Yet, as the leader of the Indian Ambulance Corps, his reflections are of 
great importance. Pyarelal writes about the efforts of Gandhi to have their service 
accepted and the work of the Indian Ambulance Corps in detail, as part of his extensive 
discussion on Gandhi in Mahatma Gandi, Vol. II: The Discovery of Satyagraha.8 This 
text has become a valuable reference point and whilst it is an acknowledgement of 
Gandhi's achievements, it also shows the reluctance of the British authorities to accept 
the Indians' offer and the lack of positive repercussions for their work. This critical 
perspective is less evident in Tichmann's article, 'We are sons of the Empire after all: 
The Indian Ambulance Corps during the South African War, 1899 - 1902'9, This piece, 
which pays homage to the Indians' participation, was published in 1996, making it of 
7 Nasson, B. Abraham Esau's War: A Black South African War in the Cape, 1899 -1902. (Cambridge, 
1991) 
8 Pyarelal, Mahatma Gandhi, Vol II: The Discovery ofSatyagraha On the Threshold. (Bombay, 1980) 
9 Tichmann, P. 'We are sons ofthe Empire after all: The Indian Ambulance Corps during the South African 
War, 1899 - 1902', Soldiers of the Queen, 87,1996. 
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timely importance to the centenary and to the process of reassessing black involvement 
in the war. It also brings some new details to this study but in its attempts to honour the 
Indians, it does not stress sufficiently the difficulties that the Indians faced in being 
included in the war, nor does it show how little their service really achieved. A recent 
seminar paper of Vahed's, 'Natal's Indians, the Empire and the South African War, 1899 
- 1902' offers insight into how the indentured labourers,1o came to be involved in the war 
and the complex relationship between the indentureds and the free Indians. This article 
also elaborates on the experience of refugee Indians. Chandramohan in "Hamlet with 
the Prince of Denmark left out'?: the South African War, Empire and Indiat11 makes 
interesting comparisons between the objectives and experiences of Indians from India 
and those from Natal who served in the war, concluding that Indians from both places 
had similar frustrations in having their willingness to offer a valuable service to the war 
accepted. 
This thesis has made extensive use of secondary sources. This was due in part 
to the broad and diverse subject matter that needed to be drawn together, and also 
because extensive research has been done on specific aspects of Natal Indian and 
colonial history. In addition, many of the primary sources that were used, such as 
legislative discussions, speeches, letters, and other documents all to be found in already 
published sources. Yet the Bhana Collection, for example, provided interesting primary 
sources on free Indians' responses to proposed legislation. With regard to the Indian 
war experiences, there was more scope to include primary reports which add detail to 
the discussion of the war experience. The correspondence between Gandhi and the 
colonial authorities who were organising medical support for the war, exposes Gandhi's 
diligent and committed approach as well as some of the difficulties experienced by the 
Indian stretcher bearers. Further sources offer insights into the experiences of other 
Indians who were affected by the war in various ways. Finally, the letters that passed 
between Gandhi and colonial authorities after the Indians' war service add to an 
understanding of how Gandhi, as well as other Natal Indian leaders, tried to gain 
recognition for their volunteer work. 
10 Vahed, G. Natal's Indians, the Empire and the South African War, 1899 - 1902', unpublished seminar 
paper, (University of Durban-Westville, 1999) 
11 Chandramohan, B. "Hamlet with the Prince of Denmark left out'?: the South African War, Lowry, D. 
(ed.), The South African War reappraised. (Manchester, 2000) 
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1 
Arrival of Indians in the Colony and their Reception 
Background to the Economic and Political Environment into which Immigrant 
Indians would Enter 
Establishment of Natal 
After two British interventions in Natal in 1838 and 1842, the British Government 
decided to annex Natal in 1843.1 However, the formal annexation of Natal to the Cape 
was not proclaimed until August 1845.2 Natal was a district of the Cape Colony and fell 
under the authorities in Cape Town as well as the Secretary of State in London.3 The 
Colony had a governor or lieutenant-governor who reported directly to London.4 The 
Charter of Natal, promulgated by Letters Patent 15 July 1856, gave Natal the status of 
being a separate colony with a limited form of representative government. 5 The 
government departments included the Executive Council, the Legislative Council, the 
Colonial Office, the Judicial Establishment, the Resident Magistrates' Department, the 
Magistrates of Native Locations and the Field Cornets.6 The members of the Executive 
Council were officials selected by the Imperial authorities. There were sixteen members 
of the Legislative Council, with twelve of these being elected by the colonials and the 
remaining four coming from the Executive Council. 7 The franchise was available to 
males over 21, who owned immovable property valued at £50 or more or else those who 
annually rented property worth £10.8 
When Natal became a British colony, it was decided that slavery was not to be 
allowed and that the laws should be colour-blind.9 The latter agreement reflected the 
official British policy towards their colonies. However, this was to be challenged and in 
many respects rejected during the establishing decades of Natal, where the white 
I Davenport, T.R.H., South Africa, A Modern History. (London, 1991), p. 99. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Porter, B. The Lion's Share, A Short History of British Imperialism 1850 - 1970. (London, 1975), p. 211. 
4 Davenport, South Africa, A Modern History. p. 103. 
5 Brookes, E.H. and C. de B. Webb. A History of Natal. ((Pietermaritzburg, 1965), p. 75. 
6 Holden, W.C. History of the Colony of Natal. (Cape Town, 1963), p. 161. 
7 Brookes and Webb, A History of Natal. p. 75. 
8 Ibid. 
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population felt that its domination was threatened by the other indigenous and foreign 
populations within the colony. 
The Growth of the Sugar Industry and the Need for Indentured Labour 
In its first decade as a British colony Natal progressed slowly, but the economy was 
stimulated both by the internal development of the sugar industry and external 
interaction with the Southern African colonies and republics. 1o Sugar was first produced 
in the early 1850s and by the 1860s it was successfully established and had developed 
into one of the colony's major industries.11 The sugar mills in Natal in the latter half of 
the century were concentrated in the hands of a small number of people.12 
Despite the wealth that the sugar industry generated, the cost of labour was 
always a concern. Sugar, unlike wool, was a crop that required relatively little land but a 
great deal of capital and labour.13 The first pioneers were considerably handicapped by 
the fact that Africans could not be induced to work for white-owned agricultural and 
industrial activities in sufficient numbers. This was partly attributed to the state's inability 
to undermine the self-sufficiency of African homesteads in the 1850s.14 Many Africans 
were reluctant to sell their labour15 and forfeit their independence. Combined with this, 
the colonials were insecure about the threat of the large African population in the colony 
and to their north. 
Pachai also highlights the problem that whites felt that manual labour should be 
performed by non-whites and they could not be persuaded to work for the plantation 
owners.16 As a result, the contemporary Natal administration needed to persuade both 
the British and the Indian Governments to allow Indian indentured labour to come to the 
colony for the purpose of working the sugar plantations. 17 
9 Davenport, South Africa, A Modern History. p. 103. 
10 Spooner,F.P. South African Predicament. (London, 1960), p. 55. 
11 Beinart, Twentieth Century South Africa. (Oxford, 1994) p. 43. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Spooner, South African Predicament. p. 55. 
15 Guy, J. The Destruction of the Zulu Kingdom: The Civil War in Zululand, 1879 - 1884. (Johannesburg, 
1982), p. 41. 
16 Pachai, B. The South African Indian Question 1860 - 1971. (Cape Town, 1971), p. 3. 
17 Spooner, South African Predicament. p. 55. 
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Development of Colonial Racial Attitudes and Policies within Natal 
Davenport states that Indians' presence in Natal gave rise to a reinforcement of white 
racial attitudes.18 By the middle of the nineteenth century, the institutions of Natal were 
recognisably British, as was its domestic ethos, save for the northern districts where 
Afrikaans-speaking communities set the tone. 19 The first Natal settlers were faced by 
both large numbers of Africans and a powerful military state to their north, which 
provoked a defensive reaction. Around the middle of the nineteenth century 10,000 
whites lived amongst 100,000 blacks in Natal.20 Inevitably, the whites' anxieties about 
being a minority group impacted on their actions and policies towards other population 
groups and they tried to create economic and political structures that would ensure their 
dominance in the colony. Furthermore, the Natal white population was virtually 
homogenous so that there was never any temptation for white politicians to look to the 
non-white population for political support as to some extent they did in the Cape.21 
Hobson explained that the ideal policy of British Imperialism towards its non-white 
populations was that of a Radical Liberal opinion which professed consideration and 
humanity for all.22 However, the strong deep-rooted g'eneral sentiment of inequality 
could not be over-ridden by philanthropic Imperial edict.23 Hobson concluded that the 
British majority of settlers in Natal would no more dream of allowing political power to 
accrue to blacks than would the Dutch settler majority in the Transvaal or the Free 
State.24 Furthermore, Guy has more recently argued that the official attitude of Britain 
towards the Natal region was based primarily on the region's strategic position in a 
world-wide commercial network. Their policy tended to be erratic as different solutions 
were tried in an effort to solve local problems with the minimum amount of expense.25 
This is relevant to this study as it implies that Britain could not always be relied upon to 
demand the implementation of non-racial policies in Natal if they were at the expense of 
other economic and political interests. 
18 Davenport, South Africa, A Modern History. p. 107. 
19 Ibid. p. 105. 
20 Porter, The Lion's Share. p. 56. 
21 Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, the 1906 - 1908 Disturbance in Natal (Oxford, 1970). p. 14. 
22 Hobson, lA. The War in South Africa: Its Causes and Effects. (London, 1900), p. 238. 
23 Ibid. p. 291. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Guy, The Destruction o/the Zulu Kingdom. p. 44. 
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The Introduction of Indentured Indian Labourers to Natal 
White Natalians debate the Merits of Introducing Indentured Labour 
The Natal planters petitioned for the introduction of Indian labour as early as October 
185126 and even prior to this, J.R. Saunders, a planter, had made a special appeal in the 
Natal Mercury when he wrote that 'for our sugar growing prospects, they [the Indians] 
are indispensable.,27 
The discussion about whether or not to introduce indentured labourers caused 
great debate among the Natal colonists. Whites wanted to consolidate political control 
and advance themselves economically, but they still were in an insecure position as the 
minority race group. Consequently, many whites were opposed to the proposal to 
introduce another non-white population into the colony. The initial conflict over Indian 
labour became one between large landowners with international finance, and local 
settlers who, besides being farmers, were establishing themselves as traders and 
artisans. The resentment of these latter colonists was later added to when ex-indentured 
and 'passenger' Indians started to settle in the colony, offering a degree of economic 
competition. The plantation owners had heavy financial commitments, required labour 
quickly, and did not care much where it came from, so long as it was immediate, 
plentiful and cheap.28 The farmers who lived further inland did not need such large 
quantities of labour as the tea and sugar plantations required. Furthermore, due to 
closer proximity to the African reserves, they found that they 'had access to certain 
avenues of labour not readily available near the coast', 29 and were better able to entice 
small sectors of the African population to work for them.30 These farmers believed that if 
the Government dealt 'properly' with the Africans, there would be no need to introduce 
an outside labour source with the potential problems a foreign population would bring. 
An article in the Natal Witness of 8 January 1865, reflected this opinion: 'Coolies are not 
regularly introduced to any country, except those devoted to th.e growth of sugar and 
coffee where obtaining money is of greater importance than the moral health of the 
people. ,31 
26 Henning, C.G. The Indentured Indian in Natal (1860 -1917). (New Delhi, 1993) p. 7. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ginwala, 'Class, Consciousness and Control', pp. 40,41. 
29 Ibid. p. 38. 
30 Spooner, South African Predicament. p. 55. 
31 Natal Witness cited in Ginwala, 'Class, Consciousness and Control'. p. 41. 
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The plantation owners increasingly pressed the Natal Legislative Council to introduce 
Indian labour.32 A significant contribution to their plea was that the matter received 
favourable attention from figures in various sectors of the British colonial governments. 
Sir George Grey, Governor of the Cape Colony, when visiting Natal in 1855, expressed 
his support, as did both Chamberlain and Rhodes approve of the idea of utilizing all of 
the Empire's labour resources.33 
Those who opposed importing indentured labour resented the fact that public 
money was to be spent on a project that benefited only one group.34 However, since the 
government-nominated members of the Legislative Council were at the time political 
allies of the planters, the government subsidy was allowed.35 Ginwala raises the relevant 
pOint that the inter-relationship between the employers, the state and the outside 
investments in the sugar industry was central to ensuring that indentured labour was 
brought to Natal. This relationship continued to playa major role in determining that the 
policies regarding the indentured Indians were advantageous to the employers.36 
Approval by the British and Indian Governments 
Pachai points out that by approving of the emigration scheme, both the British 
Government and the Indian Government committed themselves to monitoring the 
Indians' treatment in the colonyY 
Sir George Grey, as newly-appointed Governor of the Cape, sanctioned the 
introduction of labour from the East in November 1855.38 He advised the Colonial 
Secretary to inform the Governor of India that 'opportunities were present for constant 
employment for Indian labourers and for their becoming petty proprietors of land when 
they chose to retire.'39 Great Britain and India, through their appropriate agencies, 
sanctioned Grey's request for labour but each asked for safeguards to be introduced 
which would protect the interests of labourers.4o In her famous proclamation of 1858, in 
announcing the commencement of her rule in India, Queen Victoria proclaimed that 'We 
32 Henning, C.G. The Indentured Indian in Natal, p. 7. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ginwala, 'Class, Consciousness and Control'. p. 42. 
35 Stein, Z.A. 'A History of Indian Settlement in Natal from 1870 - 1893', (MA thesis, University of Cape 
Town, 1942), p. 16. 
36 Ginwala, 'Class, Consciousness and Control'. p. 43. 
37 Pachai, The South African Indian Question. p. 5. 
38 Thompson, Indian Immigration. cited in Pachai, The South African Indian Question. p. 4. 
39 Polak, The Indians o/South Africa. cited in Pachai, The South African Indian Question. p. 4. 
40 Pachai, The South African Indian Question. p. 4. 
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hold ourselves bound to the natives of our Indian territories by the same obligations of 
duty which bind us to our other subjects, and these obligations by blessing of Almighty 
God, we shall faithfully and conscientiously fulfill,.41 By this declaration, the British 
Government ostensibly pledged itself to safeguard the interests of its subjects 
everywhere on the basis of a single imperial standard.42 This rhetoric was often tested 
and invariably found wanting, not least by the Indian labourers of Natal. 
Despite Grey's initial promises of the opportunities for Indians to become 'petty 
proprietors', many of the plantation owners did not seem prepared to consider what 
would happen to the Indians or the colony following the end of the indentureds' 
contracts, and later attempted to keep the Indians as labourers for as long as possible 
for their own benefit. The Friends of India, an organisation which had campaigned 
against the indentured labour system, declared with considerable foresight in 1839 that 
in any trade in slaves or serfs there would be a race 'between abuses and legislation. ,43 
Indians' Motivations for Indenturing Themselves 
The Natal white community was not alone in debating the merits of Indians coming to 
the colony. Their own motivation or need to indenture themselves is a key indication of 
their relationship to the British and Indian governments and colonists. 
Since the decision to emigrate would have largely been an economic one, the 
impact of British rule on Indian economic structures is important. Whilst many Indians 
had always known poverty, from the 1830s onwards until the end of the century, both 
natural disasters and the disruption of the agricultural and craft industries caused 
greater economic distress.44 This encouraged thoughts of overseas work and the 
colonial planters offered promises of new opportunities to numbers of depressed and 
oppressed people.45 
British interference with the social and political structures in India also caused 
frustration, and Moodley is one of those who claims that in the second half of the 
nineteenth century, British Indian rule may have played a major role in persuading 
41 Polak, The Indians of South Africa cited in Pachai, The South African Indian Question. p. 5. 
42 Pachai, The South African Indian Question. p. 5. 
43 Tinker, H. A New System of Slavery: the Export of Indian Labour Overseas, 1830 - 1920. (London, 
1974), p. 236. 
44 Smith, VA The Oxford History of India, Part 1. (Delhi, 1958), p. 702. 
45 Moodley, P. 'Indentured Indian Immigration to Natal, 1860 1870 with special reference to the Hindu 
Caste System and its Implication', (Honours thesis, University of Durban-Westville, 1981), p. 18 .. 
13 
Un
ive
rsi
ty
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Indians to enlist for indenture.46 Equally, the arrogant and patronising attitude that the 
British had often displayed in India did not bode well for their support of Indians in any 
other parts of the empire. 
While general dissatisfaction with British rule prevailed, it was not the only factor 
that encouraged emigration. The closely-woven fabric of joint family and village 
community life would have made the prospect of emigration very difficult for some, but 
for others it imposed controlling regulations which they found intolerable,47 so emigration 
was also a form of flight from local pressures. 
Indians' Need for Adaptation in a New Colonial Environment 
The 'first Indian indentured workers arrived at Durban in the Truro in 1860.48 The 
indentured Indians were properly known as 'girmitiyas' or 'grimitkaran', a derivation from 
the term 'agreement'.49 They came to be referred to as 'coolies' from the word 'Kuli', 
meaning porter or labourer,50 a term with derogatory overtones. The majority of Indian 
indentured labourers served on sugar or coffee plantations. The Natal Government 
Railway became the second largest employer of indentured labour and the industries 
and corporations of Durban and Pietermaritzburg also began to take increasing 
numbers.51 When the coal mines in Northern Natal opened up there was a demand for 
labour, and indentured Indians were also employed in up-country districts by private 
employers and small companies. 52 Note should also be made of a group of indentured 
labourers who were hand-picked for particular tasks, such as working as chefs, waiters, 
carriage drivers or dhobies (laundrymen) and who were known as 'special servants,.53 
46 Moodley, 'Indentured Indian Immigration to Natal', p. 11. 
47 Ibid. p. 17. 
48 Malherbe, and Mesthrie, Not Slave, Not Free. (Pietennaritzburg, 1992), p. 31 
49 Brain states that this tenn was fIrst used by Hindi-speaking people, Brain, 1. 'Natal's Indians, 1860 - 1910 
from co-operation, through competition, to conflict', Duminy, Andrew and Bill Guest (eds.), Natal and 
Zululandfrom Earliest Times to 1910: A New History. (Pietermaritzburg, 1989), p. 249. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Bhana, Sand J. Brain, Setting Down Roots, Indian Migrants in South Africa, 1860 -1910. (Cape Town, 
1971) p. 31 
52 Ibid, p. 33 
53 Brain, 1. 'Indentured and Free Indians in the Economy of Colonial Natal', Guest, B. and lM. Sellers. 
(eds.) Enterprise and Exploitation in a Victorian Colony: Aspects of the Economic and Social History of 
Colonial Natal. (Pietennaritzburg, 1985), p.226. 
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They also assumed civil service posts such as interpreters, postmen, and pOlicemen.54 
These 'special servants' were paid considerably more than the indentured labourers.55 
The early immigrants had little idea as to what to expect. They had no say in the 
selection of their first employer, nor in the locality in which they would work. 56 The 
indentured labourers encountered a cultural environment that had no understanding or 
empathy with the social systems which organised Indian society. 
According to the Wragg Commission of 1885-87, five times more indentured 
Indians lived in the coastal districts than 'upcountry', the major three coastal districts 
being Alexandra, Victoria and Durban Country (including Durban).57 Since the 
indentured labourers were scattered so far apart and had no access to transport, 
communication and political discussions would have been severely hindered. It was only 
when they finished their contracts and moved closer to Durban and other commercial 
centres that they would have been able to communicate in larger groups. 
In terms of their religious inclinations, most of the workers were Hindus but 
some, perhaps 10 per cent, were Muslims and about 2 per cent were Christians.58 Since 
the majority of the indentured Indians were Hindu, the caste system would have been 
the pivotal social structure out of which they would have emerged. The extreme 
discrimination and poverty that the lowest groups experienced would have been a strong 
force driving them to pursue opportunities elsewhere, and it is not surprising that the 
pariahs (outcasts or 'people without caste) were more numerous than people from other 
castes who indentured themselves. 59 Workers who spoke the same Indian language 
were not necessarily kept together and had to find a means of communicating with their 
employers and co-workers.60 The Zulu-, English- and Afrikaans-speaking of Natal had 
already fashioned a common language called Fanaga/o which used words from all the 
languages. Tamil- and Hindu-speakers also came to use Fanagalo to speak to each 
54 Guest, B. 'Indians in Natal and Southern Africa in the 1890s', Brown, J.M. and M. Prozesky (eds.) 
Gandhi and South Africa: Principles and Politics, (Pietermaritzburg, 1996), p. 14 
55 Bhana and Brain, Setting Down Roots. p. 22. 
56 Brain, 'Natal Indians, 1860 - 1910 from co-operation, through competition, to conflict', p. 253. 
57 Beall, J. 'Women under Indenture in Natal', Surendra Bhana (ed.) Essays on Indentured Indians in Natal. 
(London, 1991), p. 98. 
58 Malherbe. and Mesthrie, Not Slave, Not Free. p. 68. 
59 Sookdeo A., 'Indentured Indian Immigration into Natal with Special Emphasis on the 1890s and the 
Caste-Structure amongst Indians', (Honours thesis, University of Durban-Westville, 1982), p. 34. 
60 Malherbe and Mesthrie, Not Slave, Not Free. p. 68. 
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other as well as to their employers and African fellow-workers.61 However, their inability 
to use more formal English was later to become an economic and political hindrance. 
In spite of developing a basic communal language, Morrell asserts that 
assimilation between Indian labourers and Africans did not occur. On the sugar estates, 
Indian labourers were housed in compounds and the effect was that Indians retained a 
cultural and religious distinctiveness. This was consolidated by the constant influx of 
indentured workers.62 
Women's Experience 
Brookes and Webb indicate that indentured Indians were 'the only part of the population 
of Natal which came by special and urgent invitation,.63 The invitation, however, was not 
extended to women as they were deemed to be of little use in the sphere of production. 
They were imported into the colony only grudgingly as the Government of India insisted 
on a female quota of 29 per cent (although this figure continued to change in 
subsequent years).64 
Beall argues the case that indentured women in Natal had a very specific 
experience of exploitation that was grounded in history, culture and class and should be 
dealt with beyond any universal Marxist-feminist study of women's oppression under 
capitalism.65 Indentured women experienced many forms of oppression: as workers, in 
the form of sexual abuse from both their employers and within the indentured 
community itself, and, in a SOCiety which was becoming increasingly raCially hierarchical, 
as Indians. As child bearers, women were also blamed for creating a permanent Indian 
population.66 However, this attitude diminished towards the end of the nineteenth 
century through an increaSing need for labour, as resistance by Africans to 
proletarianisation seemed undiminishing.67 
The obvious question arises as to whether women resisted their oppression and 
exploitation or whether they remained silent. Women were precluded from tasks which 
enabled them to develop the skills that would have given them any bargaining power, 
61 Malherbe and Mesthrie, Not Slave, Not Free. p. 68. 
62 Morrell, R., Wright, 1. and S. Meintjes, 'Colonialism and the Establishment of White Domination 1840-
1890', Morrell, R. (ed.) Political Economy and Identities in KwaZulu-Natal: Historical and Social 
Perspectives (Durban, 1996), p. 41. 
63 Brookes, and Webb. A History o/Natal. p. 85. 
64 Beall, 'Women under Indenture in Natal'. p. 92. 
65 Ibid. p. 89. 
66 Ibid. p. 92. 
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and cultural constructs excluded Indian women from the limited education facilities that 
became available to the male immigrant children. These factors, together with the 
biological constraints of the responsibility for childbearing, reduced their potential for 
finding alternative forms of employment. The only route out of indenture for the majority 
of women, therefore, was either through repatriation or through a dependent relationship 
with a male partner who could make the break.6s The lack of formal education would 
also have impeded women in politically representing themselves. Furthermore, they 
would have been aware that physical assault and wage and ration deprivation might well 
have been the consequence of speaking out. 69 However, there are examples of women 
expressing their complaints, such as when the Deputy Protector was 'besieged' during 
his visits to the railway stations by starving women, begging him to do something for 
them.?O 
Since women had very few personal means of protecting themselves, one must 
ask if the political consciousness of the free Indian community took women's issues into 
account. The clear answer in terms of public political discourse seems to be: no. 
It is true that as Gandhi later embarked on a life-long fight on behalf of the 
'untouchables', he also adopted an enlightened attitude towards women. This involved 
a personal recognition of how men tended to dominate women, with the result that 
women developed a sense of inferiority.?1 He assigned for women a very relevant role in 
the process of liberating the Indian population and in developing their moral 
conscience.72 Gandhi may well have started to formulate these attitudes whilst in Natal, 
yet there is no real evidence that he was acting upon these convictions at that stage. In 
the discussions held by Gandhi and the Congress regarding the indentured labourers 
and free Indians' conditions, women remain unseen and unheard. 
Protective Structures for Indentured Labourers 
As foreigners with no political rights or financial security, indentured labourers were 
entirely dependent on the Natal authorities for protection, with this being monitored by 
the Indian and British Governments. One needs to look at what systems were set up for 
67 Beall, "Women under Indenture' p. 92. 
68 Ibid. p. 91. 
69 Ibid. p. 11 L 
70 Deputy Protector to Protector (19 May 1895) cited in Beall,.'Women under Indenture'. p. 96. 
71 Richards, The Philosophy o/Gandhi, A Study o/his Basic Ideas. (London, 1982). p. 89. 
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indentured Indians' protection and the opportunities or restrictions they created. This in 
turn, will contribute to analysing how or if indentured Indians attempted to improve their 
conditions. 
The laws that governed the indentured emigration to all British colonies had been 
laid down in 1842 by the British government,73 and the Indian Government then 
approved of Natal's plan for indentured labour in 1860. The organisations that were 
initially set up by the Natal government to oversee indentured immigration were 
concerned with financial issues, rather than with the protection of the Indians.74 
Immigration to Natal was terminated for a period in 1866, in part due to financial 
problems in Natal, but later the Indian Government in 1872 also insisted that 
immigration be brought to a halt. This was in reaction to hearing about the harsh 
conditions in Natal from the first returning party of indentured labourers on the Red 
Riding Hood in 1870 and subsequent returning ships. The I ndian Government prohibited 
further labourers from being sent until the conditions were improved?5 The Natal 
legislature therefore took special steps in 1872 to try to put right the abuses which had 
been alleged, such as '!'logging of workers and excessive pay deductions for 
absenteeism. Provision was also made to allocate land to Indians who had completed 
their contracts, on the ground that such people had skills to contribute to the welfare of 
the Colony and should be encouraged to remain.76 When immigration resumed again in 
1874, the Indian Emigration Act No. V11 that had been drawn up in 1871 was 
introduced. This was a comprehensive piece of legislation governing all stages of the 
emigration system.77 Despite these attempts to monitor the indenture's condition, the 
immense distance and at times con'mcting interests with the Natal employers would have 
limited the Indian Government's control. 
Natal set up two bodies to oversee the indentured labourers: the Trust Board and 
the Protector's Department. Owing to the abuses that were disclosed by the 1872 
Commission of Enquiry, and following on the recommendations of the report, the 
responsibilities of the Protector were enhanced. The holder's title was changed to 
'Protector of Immigrants', and the Indian Emigration Act of 1871 stipulated that the 
72 'All Men are Brothers' from Selections from Gandhi, cited in Richards, The Philosophy o/Gandhi. p. 
89. 
73 Malherbe, and Mesthrie. Not Slave, Not Free. p. 44. 
74 Stein, 'A History of Indian Settlement in Natal from 1870 ~ 1893'. p. 14. 
7S Malherbe, and Mesthrie. Not Slave, Not Free. p. 44. 
76 Davenport, South Africa, A Modern History. p. 105. 
77 Stein, 'A History ofIndian Settlement in Natal from 1870 - 1893'. p. 11. 
18 
Un
iv
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Protector would investigate complaints.78 The Protector's responsibilities were many 
and varied, but it can be said briefly that he was concerned with everything connected 
with Indian immigrants, from the time they arrived in Durban until they returned to India, 
and even ex-indentured Indians who settled in the colony were to an extent his 
responsibility.79 Thus, both the colony and the Government of India recognised the 
Protector as an official whose first duty was to the immigrants, although it should be 
noted that until 1876 he sat as a member of the Natal Legislative Council and on the 
Executive Council.80 The Trust Board was described as being purely official, however as 
the planters considered that as they contributed two-thirds of the Immigration Fund, they 
should be represented on the Board.81 Theoretically, the Protector was 'advised and 
assisted', not controlled by the Board, but usually they co-operated closell2 and after 
1881, the Protector's Department's personnel became employees of the Trust Board, 
with their salaries paid out of the Immigration Fund.83 
Since there is a lack of written sources from the indentureds, the Protector's reports are 
the main form of understanding as to how Indians felt about their conditions and 
treatment. Stein records that the Protector usually reported that everyone seemed fairly 
satisfied and that this was also the view held by the Legislative Council. 84 Yet, it is 
highly unlikely that this was an accurate reflection of their feelings. The indentures' 
actions often indicated a deep unhappiness, and their available outlets to register 
complaints were highly questionable. Due to lack of literacy, many Indians were 
deprived of the more discrete forms of sharing their experiences such as letter writing, 
and were dependent on the structures the Natal authorities established. 
The employers on the bigger estates were generally reputed to be treating their 
labourers with greater consideration, but quite often cases of cruelty and neglect were 
reported from small employers.85 Possible explanations for this are, firstly, that the 
smaller farmers were likely to be poorer and so resorted to greater exploitation of their 
workers in pursuit of profitability; and, secondly, the bigger farms may have been more 
78 Stein, 'A History of Indian Settlement in Natal from 1870 - 1893', p. 12. 
79 Ibid. p. 17. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Ginwala, 'Class, Consciousness and Control', p. 16. 
82 Stein. 'A History of Indian Settlement in Natal from 1870 - 1893'. p. 16. 
83 Ibid. p. 17. 
84 Ibid. p.21. 
&5 Ibid. pp. 20, 21. 
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prominent in the government and public's eye, and if they practised ill-treatment it may 
have been more easily exposed. Brain contends that the numerous complaints from 
Indian labourers about non-payment of wages, unsatisfactory living conditions and food 
can, with some exceptions, possibly be explained through the financial insecurity of the 
more marginal estate owners as much as by deliberate disregard of regulations or 
negligence.8s Malherbe and Mesthrie give examples of the forms of resistance used by 
the Indian labourers: desertion for days was commonplace and occasionally, they 
damaged the employer's property as an act of revenge. 87 Drugs, suicide and gambling 
were other desperate measures of escapism to which some indentures resorted. Bhana 
and Brain also highlight that even though obtaining the status of 'free Indian' and the 
social progress this might bring was a great motivation for Indians to endure their 
contracts, there were some who found their conditions intolerable and fled the estates.88 
Not only do these activities indicate unhappiness, they also expose the lack of remedial 
channels through which to address their grievances. Sometimes groups of workers on 
individual estates went on strike,89 but it was not possible for indentureds to organise 
themselves politically on a large scale. 
Although in theory the indentures could complain to the Protector, there were 
numerous factors that limited the Protector's effectiveness and indicated a split loyalty 
on his part with the employers.9o Estates were seldom visited more than once a year,91 
so that on a day to day level, labourers had no state protection. By the mid-1860s the 
immigrants were scattered among 57 estates between Umhlali and Ifafa and the 
Protector pOinted out that he could hardly get to all of them on horseback.92 
Furthermore, Brain underlines that the employers received sympathetic support from the 
local courts and the police, so that the powers of the Protector became progressively 
weaker.93 
The immigrants' other option was to find their way to the Protector's office in 
Durban in order to discuss their complaints. 94 Yet this was accompanied by exceptional 
difficulties. They had to get a pass to leave the estate and they stood the risk of being 
86 Brain, 'Indentured and Free Indians in the Economy of Colonial Natal', p. 203. 
87 Malherbe, and Mesthrie. Not Slave, Not Free. p. 67. 
g8 Bhana and Brain. Setting Down Roots. p. 60. 
89 Ibid. 
90 Stein, 'A History of Indian Settlement in Natal from 1870 1893', p.2l. 
91 Ibid. p. 22. 
92 Malherbe, and Mesthrie, Not Slave, Not Free. p. 66. 
93 Brain, 'Natal Indians, 1860 - 1910, from co-operation, through competition, to conflict', p. 255. 
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fined or arrested by the magistrates, without their complaints being heard.95 Apart from 
the practical problems of limited funds for transport, there were statutory bars preventing 
immigrants from moving freely about the country.96 Admittedly, Law 25 of 1891 Clause 
30, exempted immigrants who were on their way to the Protector from laws restricting 
movement. However, if their complaints were then found to be 'frivolous or vexatious', 
they could still be proceeded against on the usual grounds by employers.9? Finally, 
there was the obvious problem of retribution from the employers on returning to the 
estates. 98 
Despite these major problems, recognition should still be conceded that in 
certain instances. the Protectors did record quite detailed descriptions of what occurred 
on the estates.99 Initially, the Protector was given jurisdiction in all civil cases and in 
cases between Indian Immigrants and their employers. In 1874, the Protectors' 
jurisdiction was extended to cases of assaults on Indians whether by other Indians or 
Europeans. Though magistrates were given concurrent jurisdiction in all civil and 
criminal cases, except seduction, adultery, abduction and elopement, the Protector 
could refer any decision of the Magistrate to the Lieutenant-Governor for revision and 
this provided in effect for a special court of appeal for Indian Immigrants.10o Thus, while 
the outlets of protection were not particularly effective they were equally not non-
existent. 
Another major problem impairing the labourers' ability to defend themselves was 
language barriers. The immigrants were faced with a situation where they spoke a 
foreign language, were ignorant of the law, often were illiterate and without financial 
protection. By contrast, the employers were normally educated, wealthy and understood 
the legal and political structures which placed the labourers in a position where they 
were vulnerable to exploitation.101 Again, it must be acknowledged that these issues 
were not completely overlooked. The Select Report of 1872 102 as well as practically 
94 Stein, 'A History of Indian Settlement in Natal from 1870 - 1893'. p. 34. 
95 Malherbe, and Mesthrie, Not Slave, Not Free. p. 65. 
96 Ibid. p. 65. 
97 Stein, 'A History of Indian Settlement in Natal from 1870 - 1893'. p. 35. 
98 Malherbe, and Mesthrie, Not Slave, Not Free. p. 65. 
99 See for example Bhana Collection (University of Durban-Westville Documentation Centre), 957/759, 
Complaints from indentured labourers on Mr Meikle's Estate to L.H. Mason, Protector of Immigrants, 19 
February 1884. 
100 Ginwala, 'Class, Consciousness and Control'. p. 50. 
101 Stein, 'A History ofindian Settlement in Natal from 1870 - 1893'. p. 26. 
102 Ibid. p. 59. 
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every Protector's report from 1872 to 1895 made some reference to the matter of 
interpreters in the court. 103 
Establishment of a Free Indian Community 
At the end of their indentured period, Indian labourers had various options: reindenturing 
to the same or another employer, finding alternative forms of employment or leaving 
Natal for other places in Southern Africa. Many moved to the diamond fields in the 
1870s and later to the Transvaal gold-fields.104 Over time, Indians came to be spread 
around other places in Southern African including the Orange Free State, Port 
Elizabeth, Kimberley, Rhodesia, Basutoland and Bechuanaland. 105 
The colonists attempted to make it increasingly difficult for indentured Indians to 
get out of their contracts, but if the labourers wished to be independent they could not 
be kept under contract indefinitely, and a population of ex-indentured labourers started 
to emerge in the colony. Some indentureds returned, but over half of the immigrants 
decided to make a new life in their adopted home. lOS They were aware of the potential 
for social marginalisation that would face them back in India, especially the Hindus who 
had broken caste rules in leaving. Furthermore, most of the Indians were sure that dire 
poverty would await them back home and that Natal at least offered the prospect of a 
degree of social mobility. Gandhi complained about the complacency that many free 
Indians showed in their lack of attempts to improve their social and political position in 
Natal. However, the knowledge of potentially harsher circumstances back in India may 
help to explain why these Indians did not offer much resistance to their conditions in 
Natal because it was an improvement on what they had known. 
Bhana and Brain describe well what the status of being 'free Indians' meant. On 
completion of their indenture contracts, Indians were issued with discharge certificates. 
This allowed them to move around the colony and to purchase or rent property, to set 
themselves up in business, to practise a trade or to engage in an agricultural pursuit. 107 
They became engaged in a wide range of occupations but became identified with 
several in particular: hawking the fruit and vegetables which they grew in their 
103 Stein, 'A History of Indian Settlement in Natal from 1870 - 1893' p. 59. 
104 Brain, 'Indentured and Free Indians in the Economy of Colonial Natal', p. 210. 
105 Guest, B. 'Indians in Natal and Southern Africa in the 1890s', p. 14. 
106 Malherbe, and Mesthrie. Not Slave, Not Free. p. 44. 
107 Bhana and Brain. Setting Down Roots. p. 43. 
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productive market gardens; and 'fishing and working in the service sector.10B The early 
traders were ex-indentured Indians and their businesses were usually small, presumably 
because they did not have the capital to invest in larger ventures. 109 These small traders 
were know as dukawallahs and they often lived a hard life pedalling on fOOt. 110 By the 
early 1880s, the dukawallahs had penetrated far and wide into the Natal hinterland. 
There, often on the fringes of 'native locations', their customers were mainly African.111 
Some small traders' businesses grew by degrees and they became part of a commercial 
and professional class. 112 In addition, there were a few who were able to enter the 
professional sector in occupations such as accountants, bookkeepers and teachers.113 
From the 1870s onwards, a new class of Indians reached Natal under their own 
initiative. 114 They frequently came from regions in close proximity in India where they 
had heard about opportunities in Natal and the Transvaal. 115 There were significant 
differences between them and the ex-indentured Indians. The 'passenger' Indians 
mainly spoke Gujarati and were predominantly Muslims, although some Gujarati-
speaking Hindus also came. Malherbe and Mesthrie explain that 'passenger' Indians 
had often been previously established as merchants, and could afford to open large 
shops and import a wide range of goods. 116 The white colonists called the new traders 
'Arabs' because of the way they dressed, although, they were naturally not Arabs.117 
The 'passenger' Indians followed a tradition of pursuing trade opportunities 
outside of India118 and they came to Natal primarily to satisfy the consumer needs of 
other Indian irnmigrants. 119 Many prominent traders, beginning with Aboobaker Amod in 
1872, relocated from Mauritius to Natal on the basis of 'better' business prospects in the 
colony. Thereafter, many Indian traders and shipping merchants took the 'more direct 
route to Natal.,120 They showed 'undoubted trading ability', according to the Wragg 
Commission and very soon ousted the ex-indentured immigrants from their position.121 
108 Malherbe and Mesthrie. Not Slave, Not Free. p. 31. 
109 Bhana and Brain, Setting Down Roots. p. 59. 
110 Padayachee, V and R. Morrell, 'Indian Merchants and Dukawallahs in the Natal Economy, c1875-
1914', Journal of Southern African Studies, 17, 1, 1991.p. 77 
III Ibid. p. 88. 
112 Smith, The Oxford History of India. p. 703. 
113 Bhana and Brain. Setting Down Roots. p. 41. 
114 Davenport, South Africa, A Modern History. p. 105. 
Il5 Bhana, 'Indian Trade and Trader in Colonial Natal', p. 240. 
116 Malherbe, and Mesthrie, Not Slave, Not Free. p. 59. 
117 Ibid. 
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The 'passenger' Indians also often had access to credit and a range of financial 
facilities. This placed them in an advantageous position within the realm of banking and 
money lending,122 especially since formal banking and credit institutions in the colony 
had largely excluded Indian traders. 123 Meer claims that the early free Indians were a 
highly frugal people and some became wealthy.124 By 1885, over half the Indian 
population resident in the borough of Durban (approximately 4000) had market gardens 
on land which they had leased or had bought on hire purchase terms.125 
IJ8 Bhana and Brain. Setting Dawn Roots. p. 34. 
119 Stein, 'A History of Indian Settlement in Natal from 1870·1893', pA3. 
120 Padayachee, and Morrell, 'Indian Merchants and Dukawallahs in the Natal Economy', p. 74. 
121 Stein, 'A History of Indian Settlement in Natal from 1870·1893'. p. 43 
122 Morrell, Wright, and Meintjies, 'Colonialism and the Establishment of White Domination 1840 - 1890', 
p.42. 
123 Padayachee, and Morrell, 'Indian Merchants and Dukawallahs in the Natal Economy', p. 77. 
124 Meer, Portrait of Indian South Africans. p. 24. 
125 Ibid. 
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2 
Development of White Natalians' Reactions to Indians 
When looking at the colonial reaction to Indians, a pattern of increasing discrimination 
emerges in which the growth of anti-Indian antagonism was directly linked to the growth of 
the overall Indian population. The resentment caused by the population increase was added 
to the other factors that were causing agitation. Certain colonials wanted to end the 
importation of indentured Indians altogether, whilst the employers were seeking ways of 
extending their contracts and thereafter to force Indians to return to India. Along with the 
population growth, free Indians were resented for their economic competition and their 
potential impact on the whites' control over Africans. The popular resentment came largely 
from the urban labouring class and pressure was put on the Natal Government to meet the 
demands of these various sectors of white society. When Natal achieved Responsible 
Government, it was in a stronger position to accommodate the colonists' demands with 
discriminatory legislation. 
Colonial Response to Indentured Labourers 
The planters and other employers of indentured labourers were dissatisfied that they were 
not able to exploit this system even more to their advantage. White property owners wanted 
to force the unindentured Indians into labour contracts through the expropriation of land, 
taxation and squatting laws.' They resented having to import more labour and they did not 
object to prejudices displayed by other whites towards free Indians. 2 Ram claims that the 
delight at the acquisition of Indian labour blinkered the planters and the colony against the 
sociological implications of the venture and indeed against showing the most elementary 
human feelings and understanding towards the immigrants. 3 
Response to Free Indians 
The antagonism towards free Indians varied in its extremity. The first free Indians were 
generally accepted into white society and for a brief period the status of free Indians was 
1 Ginwala, 'Class, Consciousness and Control'. p. 43. 
2 Ibid. p. 44. 
Ram, P. 'Indentured Indian Immigration into Natal with particular reference to their social and economic 
conditions during the period 1870 -1905'. (Honours thesis, University of Durban-Westville, 1984), p. 44. 
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almost identical to that of other white workers.4 Historians offer a variety of dates between 
the 1870s and 1893 (Natal gained Responsible Government) when white hostility first 
became evident. The 1890s were a time of political stress and commercial depression in the 
colon/ and it was during this decade that colonial agitation against Indians was reflected in 
legislation. Increasingly, Indians became a touchstone or scapegoat for political and 
economic frustrations on both official and popular levels.6 
The size and the rate of growth of the Indian population caused anxiety amongst the whites 
who were aware of their vulnerable position as a dominant minority. In the last quarter of the 
nineteenth century the Indian population grew at a rapid rate. In 1876 the white population of 
Natal was18,846; the Indian population: 6,787; and the African population: 281,797. By Y 
1891 the white population was 46,788; the Indian population: 27,206 and the African 
population: 455,983. 7 In terms of understanding white fears about being a minority 
population, these figures as significant as firstly they illustrate that the white population at the 
beginning of the 18905 was approximately only one tenth of the size of the African 
population. Secondly, they show how the Indian population growth was much greater than 
the white population and during the decade of the 1890s the Indian population came to be 
greater than the white population. Swanson explains that the towns emerged as the 'cockpits 
of communal conflict,.8 The growing Indian population was central to the attacks made 
against Indians. Urban growth was dramatic from the 1870s onwards and by the 1890s 
Durban alone contained nearly a third of the colony's white inhabitants. 9 By contrast, only 
22% of Indians were urbanized by the mid-1890s with the majority being indentured, free 
labourers or smallholders.10 Yet it was their growing potential to offer economic and political 
competition that made them a target of anti-Indian attacks. 
Indian antagonism was concentrated in urban areas but it also operated on an occupational 
level. One of the major factors that caused anti-Indian aggression was their apparent threat 
4 Ram, 'Indentured Indian Immigration into Natal" p. 48. 
5 Swanson, M. "The Asiatic Menace': Creating Segregation in Durban, 1870 - 1900', International Journal of 
African Historical Studies, 16,3, 1983, p.4l3. 
6 Ibid. p. 405. 
7 Calpin, G .H. Indians in South Africa. (Pietermaritzburg, 1949), p. 23 
8 Swanson, "The Asiatic Menace', p. 421. 
9 Swanson, 'The Durban system: roots of urban apartheid in colonial Natal' cited in Wyley, C.H. 'The Natal 
Dealer's Licenses Act of 1897 and Conflict between Indian and White Capital in the Borough of Durban, 1897 
1909', (Honours thesis, University of Natal, Durban, 1986), p. 6. 
10 Guest, 'Indians in Natal and Southern Africa in the 1890s', p. 12. 
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to white commercial activities, especially, in trade, as well as the perceived competition they 
provided to the white labouring class. The Indian trading community can be divided into two 
relatively distinct groups. The first was the wealthier Indian merchants who established 
themselves in predominantly urban areas, particularly Durban. The second was the class of 
Indians, described as dukawallahs who built up small holdings and trading stores, often in 
rural areas. 
The growth of the Indian trader class gathered momentum with the coming of the 
'passenger' traders. Whilst the 'Arab' sector of the Indian population was small they were 
resented for the direct competition they provided. They tended not to hire themselves out as 
labour, as many ex-indentured labourers had done, but entered commerce as proprietors of 
general businesses. 11 Initially, they came to supply the consumer needs of their Indian 
compatriots, but when opportunities to expand their activities to black and white customers 
arose, they took full advantage of them by diversifying their stock and extending their trade 
into the inland districts.12 Bhana explains that it was particularly the small and medium white 
trading class in the countryside who felt the impact of merchant traders. 13 White 
storekeepers with only limited capital found it difficult to compete with their lower prices. 14 
However, this resentment was not shared by all within the colony. Swan points out 
that there are complications in analysing the dynamics of hostility. While certain whites felt 
threatened by Indian commerce, others benefited from the generally lower prices. It is 
equally clear that the cheap Indian labour benefited employers but threatened the position of 
white labour in Natal. 15 A member of the Natal Legislative Assembly, Archibald asked 'but 
who have been the greatest sinners? Not the planters, not the farmers - those who brought 
the Indians here to labour and cultivate the soil - but the men living in the towns who by 
higher wages induced them to leave the farms and settle in the towns.' He accused these 
people of encouraging Indian traders.16 
II Huttenback, R.A. Racism and Empire: White Settlers and Coloured Immigration in the British Self-Governing 
Colonies 1830 -1910. (Ithaca, 1976), p. 139. 
12 Bhana, S. 'Indian Trade and Trader in Colonial Natal', B. Guest and J.M. Sellers (eds.), Enterprise and 
Exploitation in a Victorian Colony, Aspects of the Economic and Social History of Colonial Natal. 
(Pietermaritzburg, 1985), p. 238. 
13 Bhana, 'Indian Trade and Trader in Colonial Natal', p. 238. 
14 Lambert, J. 'The Labour League and the Franchise Question in the Struggle for Responsible Government in 
Natal', Pachai, B. (ed.) South Africa's Indians: The Evolution of a Minority. (Washington, 1979), p. 74. 
15 Swan, M. Gandhi: The South African Experience. (Johannesburg, 1985), pp. 43, 44. 
16 Natal Legislative Debates, 3rd Session, May 11 - August 28 1899, Vol XXVIII, p. 553. 
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There are indications that this racial tension went beyond a more rational explanation of real 
economic competition and it was suggested that 'to a considerable extent perceptions of the 
scale of their economic threat were exaggerated.,17 During the period 1875-85, white hostility 
was very vocal even though the actual levels of competition were on a scale too small to give 
natural rise to the level of fear and hostility that arose towards Indians of all classes.18 
Huttenback is just one of those who describes the violent anti-Indianism that grew in which 
Indians were frequently insulted with labels such as 'black vermin,.19 The Natal Mercury in 
1895 reflected the social agitation amongst colonists when it spoke of the 'evils of 
immigrating 'coolies' with their low standard of living and morals,.2o Swan suggests that 
notions of Indians carrying epidemic diseases often seemed to function not simply as 
rationalizations but as active motives or forces tending to shape perceptions and behavior in 
those who ruled. 21 
The antagonism towards the growing number of free Indians gradually took the form of 
demonstrations. In 1886, the Natal Working Men's Association petitioned the Governor, Sir 
Arthur Havelock to stop all future importation of Indians on the ground that 'artisans [and] 
small tradesmen would suffer from unfair competition.'22 They expressed their fears about 
being swamped by Indian immigrants. The artisans among them were concerned about 
losing their jobs to free Indians, or about other Indians who had been specifically imported to 
do skilled work over which they believed they should have some kind of monopoly.23 
However, Lambert indicates that this was largely perceived competition, having observed 
that Indians were proving to be formidable rivals to the white traders and storekeepers of 
Durban, the mechanics and labourers of the city began to fear similar competition. 24 
On 30 December 1896, the famous 'anti-immigration' riot took place, where 
demonstrators marched to the Point, the main shipping centre at the Durban docks, to 
17 'Report to the Indian Immigrants Commission, 1887' cited in Ginwala, 'Class, Consciousness and Control'. p. 
49. 
18 Ginwala, 'Class, Consciousness and Control'. p. 48. 
19 Huttenback, Racism and Empire. (Ithaca, 1976), p. 206. 
20 Brown, J. Gandhi, Prisoner of Hope. (New Haven, 1989). p. 32. 
21 Swan, 'The Asiatic Menace', p. 402. 
22 Petition ofthe Natal Working Man's Association (23 April 1886) quoted in Brain, 'Natal Indians, 1860 - 1910 
from co-operation, through competition, to conflict', p. 257. 
23 Bhana, S. Gandhi's Legacy, the Natal Indian Congress, 1894 - 1994. (Pietermaritzburg, 1997) p. 14. 
24 Lambert, 'The Labour League and the Franchise Question in the Struggle for Responsible Government in 
Natal'. p. 74. 
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protest against the landing of Indians from two steamers. 25 About 2,000 people, many being 
of the artisan class, participated.26 The demonstrators were protesting against the arrival of 
free Indians in general and Gandhi in particular. 27 The Natal Government sympathised with 
the demonstrations but could not legally prevent the landing of British subjects. In response 
to the demonstration, Escombe addressed people at the Point on 12 January 1897. He 
assured his audience that the Government would introduce legislation to meet the people's 
wishes, although he also emphasised that free Indians in Natal would be safe. This 
announcement was reported to have been 'coldly received' by the whites.28 The Government 
was called upon to discuss the importation of the free Indians, pending the sanction of a 
permanent law by the Imperial Government.29 The Natal Working Men's Association thought 
that the campaign for Responsible Government and the Indian question could run together. 
Robinson, who at that time was a leader of the pro-Responsible Government movement, 
disagreed.30 The Association was, however, determined not to allow the question to be 
dropped and increasingly insisted that the question of Indian immigration be given 
precedence even over constitutional reforms. 31 The Association's continued struggle will be 
discussed along with Natal's campaign for Responsible Government. 
Perceived Impact of Free Indians on Whites' Relationship with Africans 
Some historians have argued that one of the whites' major concerns about the free Indians 
as opposed to indentured Indians was their perceived potential to disrupt the colonials' 
relationship with blacks. 
Ginwala claims that the status of indentured Indian labour provided no challenge to 
the existing system of keeping Africans out of the colonial economic and political structure. 
With the introduction of indentured labour, a new set of labour laws was brought into being 
and the two systems operated and developed in parallel and had much in common. 32 Even 
though in terms of the law there was to be no discrimination on racial grounds, this had no 
25 Vane, M. 'The South African Indians, A Plea for Better Understanding', South African Affairs Pamphlets, 17, 
third series (no date). p. 9. 
26 Ibid. p. 10. 
27 Brookes and Webb, A History a/Natal. p. 183. 
28 Vane, 'The South African Indians' p.9 
29 Vane, 'The South African Indians' p.9. 
30 Lambert, 'The Labour League and the Franchise Question', p. 76. 
31 Natal Mercury. 29 July 1890 cited in Lambert, 'The Labour League and the Franchise Question', p. 77. 
32 Ginwala, 'Class, Consciousness and Control'. p. 44. 
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force in practical terms and the indentured Indians were not in a position to really question or 
affect this. 33 
The white-African relationship in Natal, however, was not particularly stable, 
especially towards the end of the century. Welsh emphasises that in the 1890s and early 
1900s, Natal showed every sign of being a society that was running headlong into a major 
racial conflice4 Ginwala stresses that whites were aware that unfettered Indians could 
challenge the ideological justification of racial discrimination. This could have led to a 
disruption of the existing patterns and thus threaten the entire exploitative system in 
Southern Africa, although this is probably an overstatement. Indians, who naturally could not 
belong to the dominant class, had therefore to be placed into the same category as African 
workers. For indentured workers, this was obvious, but for non-indentured, it proved less 
feasible. 35 Non-indentured Indians constituted an anomaly within the pattern of economic 
relations and their more fluid position contributed to the growth of anti-Indian prejudice. 
The Wragg Commission 
Growing hostility towards Indians and irregularities in the employment of Indian workers 
increased to such an extent that the Natal Colonial Secretary was compelled to address 
these issues.36 A commission was appointed in 1885, chaired by Judge Wragg, to consider 
the Indian situation in Natal, and its findings were published in 1887.37 It was the second of 
three commissions, the first having taken place in 1872, but the Wragg Commission seems 
to have had the most impact on Indian policy. These commissions reflect that the Natal 
Government felt compelled, if not to hinder, then at least to monitor the racial agitation 
towards Indians. Recognition was given to the aggression experienced by Indians but it did 
not seem resolved to ensuring that these conditions were improved. Its main emphasis was 
the discontent with the Indian presence in Natal.38 The Commission recognised that the 
'preponderance of opinion in Natal' was that the Indians should be indentured during the 
whole period of [their] residence in the colony'. 39 
33 Meer, Portrait of Indian South Africans. p. 23. 
34 Welsh, D. The Roots of Segregation, Native Policy in Colonial Natal, 1845 -1910. (Cape Town, 1971), p. 
294. 
35 Ginwala, 'Class, Consciousness and Control'. pp. 47, 48. 
36 Henning, The Indentured Indian in Natal (1860 - 1917), p. 68. 
37 Tinker, A New System of Slavery. p. 273. 
38 Ibid. pp. 273, 274. 
39 Ibid. p. 274. 
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Natal Government's Responses 
The issues of how Indians were dealt with came to have a direct impact on the white 
electorate.4o The Wragg Commission concluded that it was apparent that the prejudices of 
the white electorate would have to be appeased by the government.41 However, the Natal 
Government had to deal with the fact that the Indians formed a unique group who had been 
brought to the colony within the structure of the British Empire which entitled them to abide 
there afterwards. The 'passenger' Indians were particularly unpopular because they had 
come to the colony independently, meaning that there was no documentation apart from 
British citizenship to control their presence. 
In the light of the reluctance of the pro-Responsible Government leaders to embrace 
the anti-Indian cause, the Working Men's Association decided to form a Labour League to 
contest the election solely on a platform of legislation against Indians.42 Yet, Lambert has 
pointed out that the Labour League did not enlist any considerable support among Durban 
workers who seemed to have been largely apathetic to its formation. 43 Ironically, it was the 
Indians themselves who gave momentum to the campaign to legislate against them. The few 
Indians who had the vote, decided to oppose the proposal for Responsible Government. This 
resulted in the pooling of resources of the pro-Responsible Forward Party and the Labour 
League to confront the so-called common enemy.44 
Even though Natal was a young settler colony, white settlers had started to assume 
partial responsibility for the administration of the colony and its economic and political 
activities, rather than these roles being assumed solely by the interests of the metropole, 
Britain.45 Inevitably, settlers came to question their commitment to many of the British 
policies. In particular, they felt as a minority group, the relatively liberal policies towards 
black populations that British authorities professed, were not suited to their circumstances. 
Thus, the Natal colonials demanded greater control over their racial affairs. 
A most significant turning point for the legislation affecting Indians was when Britain 
agreed to give Natal Responsible Government in 1893. When they did gain Responsible 
Government, the whites became the dominant governing minority in a complex ethnic 
40 Ibid. p. 273. 
41 Meer, Portrait of Indian South Africans. (Durban, 1969), p. 26. 
42 Lambert, 'The Labour League and the Franchise Question', p. 77. 
43 Ibid. p. 78. 
44 Ibid. p. 82. 
45 Davies, R.J. City in transition: outlines of residential segregation in a post-settler colonial city - Salisbury/ 
Harare. (Cape Town, 1990), p. 4. 
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community.46 Gandhi later wrote that Natal, having gained Responsible Government, then 
really began to feel its strength.47 Although prior to 1893 a number of trends had been 
established and laws passed which were to shape the future of Indians, Natal achieved 
Responsible Government at the time when the anti-Indian campaign was gathering 
momentum,48 and the Government responded with key discriminatory legislation.49 
Policies Impacting on Indentured Indians 
According to Ginwala, in the last quarter of the nineteenth century there were three parallel 
developments in Natal that affected indentured labourers. These were an increasing 
manifestation of popular white 'hostility' towards Indians; a steady deterioration in the 
conditions of indentured labour, especially in terms of their contracts; and an increase in the 
numbers being brought to Natal. 50 This in turn impacted on the former two trends. 
The Natal employers of indentured labour pushed for increasing rights to exploit their 
labour sources. One of their earlier successes came in 1862 when the Indian Government 
approved of an extension of the indentured contracts from three years to five years. Natal 
fixed this term in Law 17 of 1864.51 In addition to this, at the end of their five year contracts, 
indentureds were no longer entitled to a free journey home and had to reindenture 
themselves for a further five years if they wanted to claim that option. 52 
The Government constantly debated the merits of spending public money on the 
private venture of the sugar industry, especially since the result was a drastic rise in the 
Indian population. In 1891, within the period of thirteen years, the Indian population had 
increased by 200 per cent, from 10, 000 to 30, 000.53 A solution to the problem was believed 
to be to prolong the indentureds' contracts as well as to terminate their contracts back in 
India. 
With the introduction of Responsible Government, more aggressive action was 
taken.54 The Government's statements did not find favour with all colonials and there were 
46 Marks, Reluctant Rebellion. p. 9. 
47 Narayan, S. The Selected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, Vol Ill, Satyagraha in South Africa. (Ahmedabad, 
1969), p. 37. 
48 Davenport, South Africa, A Modern History. p. 105. 
49 Swan, Gandhi: The South African Experience. p. 43. 
50 Ginwala, 'Class, Consciousness and Control'. p. 58. 
51 Malherbe and Mesthrie. Not Slave, Not Free. p. 31. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Henderson,(ed.), Speeches of the Late Right Honourable Harry Escombe. (Pietermaritzburg, no date), p. 191. 
54 Ibid, p. 336. 
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those who continued to favour the option of stopping Indian immigration altogether. 55 The 
new Responsible Government wanted to bring legislation against indentured labour that 
included forcible repatriation, the signing of new forms and an annual tax of £25 to be paid 
by ex-indentured labourers.56 The tax was intended, ironically, to help alleviate the cost of 
importing Indians57 as well as to encourage repatriation. In January 1894, Binns and Mason, 
who was currently the Indians' Protector, were sent to India to negotiate better terms for the 
planters and colonials in general. 58 Their aim was to reduce the number of ex-indentured 
Indians who settled in the colony and they used population statistics to reinforce their case. 
They told the Indian Government that the population of Natal included 470,000 Africans 
45,000 whites and 46,000 Indians. Tinker suggests that the last figure was probably inflated 
to add emphasis to the whites' vulnerable position in the colony. 59 Binns and Mason 
stressed that there was a strong feeling against the 'Arabs' and it was felt that if the 
permanent Indian population in Natal could be cut down, fewer 'Arabs', would come to the 
colony. Stein introduces an interesting merging concept which is that the problems 
experienced by the free and indentured Indians were closely linked in that the one's 
presence impacted on the other, and only in connection with their place of origin, languages 
and means of coming out to Natal, need they be considered apart. 50 
The Government of India turned down suggestions that indenture be terminated in 
India, or that labourers be required to accept two consecutive terms of indenture (10 
years).51 These aggressive political proposals were also strongly opposed by the Natal 
Indian Congress as will later be discussed, and the Natal Government only succeeded in 
persuading the Indian Government to allow a £3 annual tax on ex-indentured labourers. 
Policies Impacting on Free Indians 
In 1875, Lord Salisbury, the Secretary of State, declared 'the colonial laws and their 
administration will be such that Indian settlers who have completed the terms of service to 
which they agreed ... will be in all respects free men, with privileges no whit inferior to those 
55 Meer, Portrait of Indian South Africans. p.26. 
56 Gandhi, An Autobiography or The Story of My Experiences with Truth. (Ahmedabad, 1948), p.194. 
57 Natal Witness, 27 April 1894, 1 May 1894,2 May 1894 cited in Narayan, (ed.), The Selected Works of 
Mahatma Gandhi. p. 37. 
5S Tinker, A New System of Slavery. p. 281. 
59 Tinker, A New System of Slavery. p. 281. 
60 Stein, 'A History ofIndian Settlement in Natal from 1870 - 1893'. p. 45. 
61 Ginwala, 'Class, Consciousness and Contro)'. p. 61. 
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of any other class of Her Majesty's subjects resident in the colonies'. 62 This statement came 
to be regarded as a fount of Indians' rights and status in the Empire. Yet, it was to be 
challenged and ultimately overthrown by the pressure exerted by the colonists. In all this the 
Natal Government's response to free Indians was complex for there are some examples of 
protection being offered, mainly in the earlier years. Yet, as the free Indian population grew, 
and their perceived economic threat and potential to disrupt the exploitative white-African 
relationship became apparent, legislation reflected the colonists' growing hostility. 
There were three developments in the Natal Government's approach to control 
Indians. The first two were social controls through attempted residential segregation and 
political exclusion, trends that were developed in the 1870s and 1880s. In 1888 Indians were 
classified as members of an 'uncivilised race' by the Registration of Servants Laws.63 Yet in 
the 1890s there was an even more determined and concerted pursuit of commercial 
exclusion and suppression.64 
A study of Escombe's speeches reveals that the Natal Government shifted from 
appearing to dilute whites' concerns regarding free Indians, to more seriously taking the 
colonists' side. His earlier speeches often had a fairly light-hearted tone but by June 1890 his 
words showed a change in attitude and acknowledged 'a real honest feeling which [was] in 
the Colony' when he said 'this Colony is meant to be a European Colony and not to be an 
Asiatic Colony.'65 Brain, however, suggests that Escombe was often a lone voice as he 
appealed to his colleagues and his constituents to adopt a more reasonable attitude towards 
Indians.66 
'Passenger' Indians in particular caused ill-ease amongst the whites and the Natal 
Government drew a definite distinction between the ex-indentured and 'passenger' Indians. 
The term 'Indian immigrant' in Natal legislation applied only to ex-indentured Indians and 
their descendants and not to the 'passenger' Indians. These 'Indian immigrants' were offered 
a degree of protection by the Protector's Office.67 There were occasions when whites 
showed a degree of class respect for the 'passenger' Indians who were often more educated 
and wealthier but this was accompanied by racial resentment, creating a racial ambiguity. 
62 Tinker cited in Ginwala, 'Class, Consciousness and Control'. p. 62. 
63 Huttenback, Racism and Empire. p. 195. 
64 Swan, The Asiatic Menace' p. 405. 
65 Henderson, (ed.), Speeches o/the Late Right Honourable Harry Escombe. p. 154. 
66 Brain, 'Natal Indians, 1860 - 1910 from co-operation, through competition, to conflict', p. 262. 
67 Ginwala, 'Class, Consciousness and Control'. p. 50. 
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In order to protect their economic holdings, merchant Indians and other free Indians 
frequently sought to distinguish themselves from the Indian underclasses. Equally, Ginwala 
suggests that the mere presence of persons who were identifiably not of the dominant class, 
but who were outside of the economically subordinate class, was not welcomed. Free 
Indians either overtly or unintentionally challenged the ideology that provided for unequal 
economic relations with blacks: hence, their economic and political advancement needed to 
be vehemently resisted.68 Whites were aware of the class differences that the free Indians 
(predominantly the 'passenger' Indians) were attempting to promote and were not impressed 
by them. This social irony placed the free Indians in a frustrating position when trying to 
promote their own cause. As will be seen, Gandhi and the free Indians generally attempted 
to be tactful and diplomatic in their political approach, including their offer to serve in the 
South Africa War. This resulted in varying degrees of success. 
The laws relating to free Indians over time became less inclined to distinguish them 
as a special group. In the 1870s, when Natal sought to resume worker recruitment, the 
Government of India insisted upon certain reforms and safeguards for Indians as a condition. 
These reforms enacted from 1872-4 specifically differentiated non-indentured labour from 
African labour. 69 For a period on completion of their contracts, Indians were distinguished 
from all other labour both black and white. For this part, the planters petitioned against the 
reforms. 7o In the following years, legislation that differentiated black from white labour was 
also applied against free Indians whenever possible. Where white and Indian labour were 
legally equated, administrative and customary practice frequently operated to differentiate 
the two. In general there was constant pressure by all sections of the white community to 
equate the status of Indians and Africans.71 
One of the first major moves on discriminatory legislation was the attack on the Indian 
franchise. The attitude of the Natal Legislative Council towards the Indian franchise question 
was not consistent nor unanimous but as the Indian population grew, so did the colonists' 
opposition to their exercise of the franchise. Moreover, the colonials and the government 
became increasingly aware of a possible response from the African population to the Indian 
franchise. The number of Africans who wished 'to rise in the scale of society' was indeed 
growing in the later nineteenth century, but at the same time the colonists' determination to 
68 Ibid. p. 54. 
69 Ginwala, 'Class, Consciousness and Control'. p. 50. 
70 Ibid. p. 51. 
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prevent this was hardening.72 The whites were in a precarious political position, yet the 
official stance of the Empire was no discrimination on grounds of race. What this meant was 
that both the British and Natal Governments were agreed that the franchise was a privilege 
to be exercised by 'civilised' people only; this allowed them the opportunity to discriminate on 
grounds of culture and class.73 Whatever the basis, however, after Natal gained responsible 
government, the Indians were less able to turn to the British and Indian Government for 
support. 
Although the number of Indians who were able to vote at the end of the century was 
very small, it gave them some access to the colonial ruling structure. When in 1883 new 
qualifications for the franchise were enumerated, persons who were under the jurisdiction of 
special courts or subject to separate laws were deprived of the vote, unless in addition to the 
property qualification they were able to write an application in English and Dutch?4 The 
difficulty that ex-indentured Indians were then experiencing in qualifying for the franchise 
was only to become worse in subsequent years. However, the Natal Government was faced 
with the challenges of its own legislature and if residents possessed the necessary property 
qualifications, they could still register for the vote.75 In 1879, complaints were registered over 
the lax way in which Resident Magistrates enlisted the names of Indian voters.76 
White traders in particular became increasingly aware that according to the law, free 
Indians were entitled to vote in the elections for the Legislative Assembly of Natal and to 
stand as candidates for the same.77 James Saunders, on a visit to London in 1882, spoke to 
the Colonial Office about the growing Indian population,78 insisting that 'the risk of the 
overwhelming proportion of votes falling into the hands of men alien in every sense to the 
English government must sooner or later be dealt with.'79 It is significant that the free Indian 
population was about equal to the whitesBO which meant that free Indians had the potential to 
offer a real threat to the whites' dominance. 
71 Ibid p. 50. 
n Welsh, The Roots ofSegration. Native Policy in Colonial Natal, 1845 1910. p.65. 
73 Ibid. p. 51. 
74 Ginwala. 'Class, Consciousness and Control'. p. 52. 
75 Stein, 'A History ofIndian Settlement in Natal from 1870 - 1893'. p. 45. 
76 Ibid. p. 47. 
77 Narayan, The Selected Works of Mahatma Gandhi. p. 38. 
78 Stein, 'A History ofIndian Settlement in Natal from 1870 - 1893'. p. 47. 
79 Ibid. p. 48. 
80 Ibid. p. 45. 
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In 1894, the bill amending the Indians' franchise proposed61 that except for those who 
already held the parliamentary franchise, 'no persons belonging to Asiatic races could qualify 
for the vote.'62 But Lord Ripon as the Colonial Secretary would not pass the Bill,83as he would 
not tolerate its racial prejudice. Still no clear-cut decision was given, leaving it open for 
revision when a new ministry assumed office in the Colonial Office in June 1895.64 By May 
1896 a new and more subtly worded franchise bill designed to do the same job as the old 
one was passing through the Natal Assembly and by August the Colonial Office, under 
Chamberlain, had assented to the Bill.65 Whilst the new Bill was not directly racist, Escombe 
as Attorney-General did not attempt to disguise its intentions. He said 'there need be no 
concealment with regard to the intention of the Bill. The Bill is to prevent Indians who might 
flood the Colony ... become members of the constituent bodies by having their names of the 
Voter's Roll, and so be allowed to influence the legislation of the future in a country which is 
largely peopled by Natives as well as by Europeans.66The merchants witnessed that their 
pOlitical prognosis that the arrival of Responsible Government would be the end of the 'calm 
before the storm' was accurate. Swan suggests that what was more Significant for the 
Indians' future than loosing their franchise was that the campaign reflected the hostility of the 
ruling white minority towards Indians. 67 Natal's first Legislative Assembly under Responsible 
Government demonstrated that the merchants' commercial interests would be a future target 
of attack, as they had already been in the Transvaal and the Free State.66 
Early agitation for legislation against the merchant traders was presented in July 1885 when 
the Pietermaritzburg Chamber of Commerce sent in a petition to the government, asking for 
various restrictions to be put on 'Arab' traders. 69 The Dealer's License Act was also passed 
in the 1897. 90 The law was intended to prohibit as many Indians from trading as possible. 91 
81 CO 179/188/8751 Government to Secretary of State. (27 April 1894) cited in Swan, Gandhi: The South 
African Experience. p. 45. 
82 CO 1791189114248, Minutes by Fiddes (17 November 1894) and Peace to Fairfield 4 December 1894) cited in 
Swan, Gandhi: The South African Experience. p. 45. 
83 Rude, Protest and Punishment cited in Swan, Gandhi: the South African Experience. p. 67. 
84 Swan, Gandhi: The South African Experience, p. 67. 
85 Ibid. 
86 Natal Legislative Debates, 4th Session, April 25 - July 11 1896, Vol. IV. p. 45. 
87 Swan, Gandhi: The South African Experience, p. 45. 
88 Ibid. p. 46. 
89 Stein, 'A History of Indian Settlement in Natal from 1870 - 1892'. p. 44. 
90 Debates of the Legislative Assembly, vol. 25, 73, (25 March 1897) cited in Bhana, S. 'Indian Trade and Trader 
in Colonial Natal', p. 245. 
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Wyley emphasises that restrictions on trade licensing were introduced as a direct result of 
pressure exerted upon Natal parliamentarians by the public and borough authorities. For 
instance, Prime Minister Escombe was under pressure to give in to the demands of the 
Patriotic Union, an association of white Durbanites established to oppose Indian 
immigration. 92 
The issue of Indian immigration became a major issue which was discussed almost every 
year in the 1890s by the Natal Legislative Assembly.93 In 1897 the Government passed the 
Immigration Restriction Act which was intended to curb independent Indian immigration. It 
required prospective immigrants to own property valued at £25 or more and to pass a literacy 
test in a European language. This subtle solution to the migration of non-white races within 
the Empire did not have any directly racial qualifications and it became known as the 'Natal 
Formula' becoming adopted in other colonies in subsequent years. 94 
Other restrictions on freedom of movement were placed on ex-indentured immigrants, who 
had to get licences to leave the colony and carry passes in order to prove that they were no 
longer indentured.95 Indians also experienced restrictions on trains and on trams, exclusion 
from public swimming baths and beaches, and were not allowed to reside in hotels. 
Moreover, insults from government officials were a source of annoyance, especially to rate-
payers and educated Indians.96 
91 Bhana,'Indian Trade and Trader in Colonial Natal', pp. 246, 247. 
92 Wyley, 'The Natal Dealer's Licenses Act of 1897', p. 20. 
93 see for Natal Legislative Debates of 1894, 1896, 1895, 1897 
94 Huttenback, Racism and Empire. p. 141. 
95 Stein, 'A History of Indian Settlement in Natal from 1870 - 1893' p. 61. 
96 Ibid. p. 62. 
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3 
Introduction of Gandhi and the Development of Free Indian Politics 
Gandhi's Early Life 
Curiously, whilst spirituality was to become such an integral part of Gandhi's leadership, 
he was not born into the Brahmin caste that was supposed to have provided Hinduism 
with its hereditary philosophical and religious elite, as his father was a member of the 
vaiyas caste of shopkeepers and petty tradesmen. 1 Yet, his grandfather and father 
were both prime ministers to the court of the Prince of Porbandar,2 which would have 
introduced Gandhi to the proceedings of Indian political life. As a result of his father's 
death, Gandhi was sent to England to study law so that he, too, might become prime 
minister of a princely state.3 
Scholars argue that as a young student he seemed unsure of himself, but 
nonetheless, his legal training would have been a valuable introduction to British legal 
and political structures. Collins and Lapiere describe how he made an unsuccessful 
attempt to try to acculturate himself and adopt some European habits,4 but this did not 
prevent him from continuing to contemplate and digest certain English ideas and 
approaches in his early career in Natal and the Transvaal. Pillay also concludes that 
while studying in London, Gandhi had come to admire the British Constitution5 and this 
respect is marked in the early stage of his political career. 
After he was called to the bar, Gandhi rushed back to India with undisguised 
relief. Yet his homecoming was less than triumphant. For months, he wandered around 
Bombay courts looking for a case to plead. This failure led to the first great turning point 
in Gandhi's life. His frustrated family sent him to South Africa to unravel the legal 
problems of a distant kinsman. His trip was to have lasted a few months but he ended 
up staying over twenty years.6 
I Collins, L and D. Lapiere, Freedom at Midnight: the Epic Drama of India's Struggle for Independence. 
(London, 1997) p. 49. 
2 Vane, 'The South African Indians, A Plea for Better Understanding'. p. 6. 
3 Collins, and Lapiere, Freedom at Midnight. p. 49. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Pillay, 8., Transvaal: Trade, Politics and Imperial Relations, 1885 -1906. (London, 1976), p. 113. 
6 Collins, and Lapiere, Freedom at Midnight. p. 50. 
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Gandhi's Introduction to Natal 
Nothing about the young Gandhi walking down a gangplank in Durban harbour in May 
1893 indicated a vocation for asceticism or saintliness. The future 'prophet of poverty' 
arrived in South Africa wearing a high white collar and the fashionable frock coat of a 
London Inner Temple barrister, his brief-case crammed with documents on the rich 
Indian businessman whose interests he had come to defend.7 
When Gandhi left India for South Africa in 1893 he admits that he 'had no idea of 
the previous history of the Indian emigrants' and said 'I went there on a purely 
professional visit.,8 When trying to analyse the philosophies that Gandhi adhered to in 
Natal and the Transvaal prior to the war, one must allow for some contradictions and 
changing stances because it was during his time in these places that he really started to 
formulate his political opinions. 
Gandhi's introduction to racial prejudice in the South African colonies and 
republics came a week after his arrival on an overnight train ride 'from Durban to 
Pretoria. Halfway to Pretoria, he was approached by a white man and ordered into the 
baggage car. Gandhi, who held a first-class ticket, refused. The individual 
subsequently had Gandhi thrown off the train in the middle of the night.9 This 
experience has been popularly remembered as Gandhi's metamorphosis experience 
and he claimed, four decades later, that he could recall the incident as a turning point. 
He passed the night, pondering his first brutal confrontation with racism and praying to 
the Hindu God of the Gita for courage and guidance, the next morning the timid, 
withdrawn man was a so-called 'changed man', ready to denounce oppression and 
prejudice. 10 Such at any rate is the classic Gandhi folklore version. 
Gandhi's Leadership Philosophies and the Response they Received 
Recognition should be given to the fact that some of Gandhi's ideas were better 
received than others. Some of Gandhi's contemporaries did not welcome his early 
insistence on cross-cultural borrowing. For example, he received criticism for his early 
reactions to colonial rule. Despite being concerned about the oppression that the British 
7 Collins, and Lapiere, Freedom at Midnight. p. 51. 
8 Narayan, (ed.) The Selected Works of Mahatma Gandhi. p. 54. 
9 Collins, and Lapiere, Freedom at Midnight. p. 51. 
10 Ibid. p.50. 
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had brought to India, at that stage he was loyal to the British and their policies. 11 This 
loyalty would go on to be a driving force in the Indian decision to serve the British in the 
South African War. According to Parekh, Gandhi concluded that the British had come to 
India because of the inner compulsions of this modern civilisation; they had been able to 
consolidate their rule because of their ability to legitimise it through a developed 
ideological language, thereby making their rule not merely political but also moral and 
cultural. Therefore, Indians had to respond to British rule at both a political but also at a 
moral and cultural level. 12 In Natal, he was faced with an extension of the British Empire 
and a new colony, and both the metropole and the colony had their own economic 
interests and political agenda to serve. This meant that Indians had to take responsibility 
for their own conditions. The Indians came to learn that the colonists' needs would 
always take precedence and thus they would have to find ways of defending their 
position in the colony. 
Gandhi felt the Indians needed to undergo national self-examination. 13 When the 
Natal government passed discriminatory laws against the Indians, the latter either 
accepted or resorted to devious ways of circumventing them. When Gandhi urged the 
Natal Indians to protest, he sometimes found that they lacked readiness and expected 
him to do their fighting for them. Gandhi was not surprised that as a result the 
Government became bolder and passed increasingly oppressive laws. 14 His reflections 
on his Southern African experience led him to several interrelated 'discoveries' and he 
started to develop a theory of how victimisation was not merely the result of the 
oppressor's actions but also the fault of the oppressed for accepting their condition.15 
Despite there being a degree of questioning from others about his leadership 
philosophies, Gandhi became very influential with a strong ability to motivate Indians 
into action. 
Formation of the Natal Indian Congress 
One must be wary of a total Gandhi-centric outlook on Indian political development and 
be alert to the complex, interactive process that created the path of the Indians' political 
II Parekh, B. Gandhi's Political Philosophy, a Critical Examination. (London, 1989), p. 34. 
12 Ibid. p. 15. 
13 Ibid. p. 45. 
14 Ibid. p. 154. 
15 Ibid. 
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experience. Although, there is debate over the level of Indians' political awareness prior 
to Gandhi's arrival, one has to acknowledge that the politically-conscious Indians had 
already taken some action. In 1890, the Durban Indian Committee had been formed, 
representing trading interests of the merchant class in Natal as well as the Transvaal 
and Orange Free 8tate. 16 It was headed by the prominent merchants Dada Abdulla and 
Haji Mohamed Haji Dada, and included in its membership were Abdullah Haji Adam and 
Mohamed Cassim Camroodeen. Its members began petitioning the Colonial Office and 
Officials in India, arguing that Responsible Government in Natal 'would do us 
incalculable harm.'17 Swan suggests that by the time the Natal Indian Congress was 
established in 1894, their political priorities had been firmly established and a tentative 
start made on a political organisation, and that Gandhi helped the organisation to fulfill 
their objectives rather than to determine their priorities. She claims that Gandhi was 
able to fill a need and was drawn into merchant politics when there was an urgency for a 
full-time organiser, preferably fluent in Gujerati and English and with a legal training. 18 
Aside from the discussion about how organised Indian politics were in general, 
there is also a degree of questioning as to how ready Gandhi was to assume a 
leadership position. Brown says that he and his associates needed to become 
'accustomed to speaking in public and to working amongst the Indian community, 
recruiting support' .19 Despite the assertive role Gandhi assumed, Brown argues that 
Gandhi was not eager to be a public man. Rather, the position was thrust on him by the 
growing urgency of the Indians' situation and the seeming incapacity of any other Indian 
to champion the community.20 Nonetheless, within a short period, he displayed a 
remarkable ability to mobilise his fellow Indians, so much so that Robert concludes that 
Gandhi was aided not only by the extraordinary veneration felt for his character but by 
his own acute political intuition and efficient and astute organisational abilities.21 His 
training as a lawyer would have honed his skills in recognising bias in white political 
discourse towards Indians, as well as how to put together effective and legally-viable 
responses to these biases. He had observed the Imperial state in a developed form in 
16 Swan, Gandhi: The South African Experience cited in Padayachee, V. and R. Morrell., 'Indian Merchants 
and Dukawallahs in the Natal Economy', p. 95. 
17 Swan, Gandhi: The South African Experience, cited in Wyley, 'The Natal Dealer's Licenses Act of 
1897', p. 19. 
18 Swan, Gandhi: The South African Experience. p. 38. 
19 Brown, Gandhi: Prisoner of Hope. p. 47. 
20 Gandhi to Dadabhai Naoroji (5 July 1894) cited in Brown, Gandhi: Prisoner of Hope. p. 34. 
21 Robert, P.E. History of British India: Under the Company and the Crown. (London, 1958), p. 591. 
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Britain, and in distorted colonial forms in Natal and India and he gradually came to 
understand how the government was interlocked with the dominant political and 
economic interests of the state and upheld the prevailing social order?2 
A week after his arrival, Gandhi delivered his first public speech to the Indians in 
Pretoria. The advocate who had been so painfully shy in the courtrooms of Bombay, 
began to find his political strength. The meeting was attended principally by Memon 
merchants and Gandhi believed that he had made 'a considerable impression on the 
meeting.'23 He suggested the formation of an association to make representations to 
the authorities concerning the hardships of Indian settlers. 24 A committee was formed 
which in May 1894 was converted into the Natal Indian Congress.25 It is important to try 
to understand the composition of the Natal Indian Congress because, whereas it does 
not necessarily imply that the members' concerns were given exclusive attention, it does 
reflect who had the opportunity to decide which issues would be focused on. The early 
debates and campaigns of the Natal Indian Congress are also relevant to later Indian 
involvement in the South African War, as they help to offer a broader understanding of 
their motivation to participate. 
Prior to the actual formation of the Natal Indian Congress, Sheth Haji 
Muhammad Haji Dada was regarded as the foremost leader of the Indian community in 
Natal, although he was not the most affluent of the merchants. When the free Indians 
took the decision to oppose the Franchise Bill, the meeting was held under his 
presidentship.26 Abdulla Hajee Adam was the first president of the Natal Indian 
Congress and all the early presidents of the Natal Indian Congress's were prominent 
merchants.27 Abdulla Hajee Adam was assisted by 23 vice-presidents. an honorary 
secretary and 37 other members of the Congress Committee. A body of 52 was too 
large to carry out the day-to-day operations of the Natal Indian Congress and the work 
was evidently entrusted to a small core, with Gandhi as secretary, taking responsibility 
for the administration of the organisation. Rajmohan Gandhi suggests that Gandhi 
---.. --.. -----
22 Parekh, Gandhi's Political Philosophy, p. 110. 
23 Gandhi, M.K. An Autobiography or the Story of my Experiences with Truth. p. 156. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Gandhi, R. 'The Origins and Growth ofSatyagraha: Gandhi's Reaction to the Conditions ofIndians in 
South Africa', Shanti Sadiq Ali (ed.), Gandhi and South Africa. (no place, 1994). p. 127. 
26Ibid.p.171. 
27 Vahed, 'Natal's Indians, the Empire and the South African War, 1899 1902', p. 1. 
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wanted to assume a quiet authority.28 This may have been the case, or else possibly he 
wanted other Indians to assume the main leadership positions in order to encourage 
them to appropriate the organisation as their own. Whatever the motive, Bhana 
describes his work as 'energetic' and 'thorough and meticulous.'29 
The people who volunteered to enroll in the Natal Indian Congress were mostly 
Natal-born Indians, many of these local merchants. These included some of Durban's 
largest property-holders such as Abubakar Amod, Dada Abdullah, Mohammed Isak and 
R Naidoo, Moosa Hadji Cassim and Davad Mahomed who later served as Vice-
Presidents, and Adamj Miankhan who was Gandhi's replacement as secretary.30 
Among others who joined were men from the clerical class and unskilled wage-
earners.31 Many Christian Indian youths also joined as volunteers.32 Gandhi claimed 
that 'in the face of the calamity that had overtaken the community, all distinction such as 
high and low, small and great, master and servant, Hindus, Musalmans, Parsis, 
Christians, Gujaratis, Madrasis, Sindhis etc. were forgotten. All were alike the children 
and servants of the motherland.'33 The Natal Mercury of October 6, 1895, then asked 
'How is it that Sepoys and Mussalmans (presumably meaning Hindus and Muslims) who 
are at deadly enmity in their own country, Bombay and Mauritius, etc. are now [in Natal] 
working together with such zealous fervour?,34 Equally, it must be stated that those 
distinctions that were being overlooked were predominantly the cultural or religious 
distinctions of the free Indians, rather than the class differences of the whole 
community. 
Predictably it was the leading merchants who made up the financial backbone of 
the Natal Indian Congress, and the net was cast widely to incorporate those in Verulam, 
Pietermaritzburg, Newcastle and Charlestown. The organisers of the Congress were 
expected to have regional branches but the official Natal Indian Congress reports are 
silent about these. Bhana notes that in practice, the Natal Indian Congress was Durban-
centred. 3s 
28 Gandhi,R. 'The Origins and Growth ofSatyagraha' p. 126. 
29 Bhana, Gandhi's Legacy, the Natal Indian Congress, 1894 1994 (New Haven, 1989), p. 12. 
30 Swanson, 'The Asiatic Menace', p. 419. 
31 Gandhi, M.K. An Autobiography or The Story oj My Experiences with Truth. p. 176. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid. 
34 The Natal Mercury quoted in Gandhi, R. 'The Origins and Growth ofSatyagraha'. p. 127. 
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The organisation's official aim was to reach all Indians, but the high subscription rate 
undermined that ambition and the indentured labourers were still outside the pale of the 
Natal Indian Congress.36 Swan argues that Gandhi shared the merchants' ideologies. 37 
In the course of his first two or three days in Natal, Gandhi observed the class 
breakdown of the free Indian community. Gandhi commented that the free Indian and 
'passenger' Indian classes had some social relations with one another but that they had 
nothing but business relations with the indentured labourer class. 38 Pahad confirms this, 
saying that until the experience of uniform legislation after 1900, the two streams of 
Indian immigrants had very little in common, except for the epithet Indian, as a result of 
the economic, religious, cultural and linguistic differences which characterized the Indian 
population.39 The divisions in the society concerned Gandhi, as he saw them as only 
hindering the Indians' fight against discrimination.40 Similarly, Gandhi recongnised the 
divisions created by religion and language. Yet understanding Gandhi's ideologies is not 
a simple issue because of the contradictions and ambiguities that arise, especially in 
these early years. He either adhered to the apparent 'classist' attitudes of the 
merchants, or he attempted to convert them. Gandhi defended the state of free Indian 
politics up until 1893, saying that since the free traders saw themselves as the chief 
target of attack, their measures for defence were limited to that class.41 Tinker confirms 
this42 as does Bhana, saying that while the leaders of the Indian communities in Natal 
were only slowly becoming alert to the threat facing their future, in the early period the 
Natal Indian Congress was dominated by wealthy Indian merchants who hoped to 
resolve the issues relating to their own interests. They did this by appealing to the 
Imperial doctrine of equalitY,43which needed to be combined with the concept of 
'respectable' free Indians having reached a level of desirability. 
With the substantial representation of the commercial elite on the Natal Indian 
Congress executive, it is not surprising that the organisation was concerned with the 
35 First Report ofthe Natal Indian Congress, August 1895 cited in Bhana, Gandhi's Legacy, the Natal 
Indian Congress. p. 10. 
36 Bhana, Gandhi's Legacy, the Natal Indian Congress, 1894 - 1994. p. 10. 
37 Swan, Gandhi: The South African Experience. p. 38. 
38 Gandhi, M.K. An Autobiography or The Story of My Experiences with Truth. p. 136. 
39 Pahad cited in Davenport, South Africa, A Modern History. p. 9. 
40 Meer, Portrait of Indian South Africans. p. 28. 
41 Narayan, (ed.) The Selected Works of Mahatma Gandhi. pp. 53, 54. 
42 Tinker, A New System of Slavery. p. 283. 
43 Bhana, Gandhi's Legacy: the Natal Indian Congress, 1894 -1994. p. 1. 
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issues that most affected their interests, namely trade and immigration.44 Yet, Gandhi 
and the Natal Indian Congress did not limit themselves to exclusive elitist-orientated 
activities while the indentured Indians were not given a direct opportunity to voice their 
grievances, Gandhi was nevertheless becoming aware of their state and argued that 
though 'the Congress was not yet theirs .... [the Congress] could win their attachment' 
through representing their needs.45 Still, Naidoo contends that Gandhi drew a distinction 
between the Indians who were in South Africa to 'toil' and the Indians who were there to 
'trade'. He was convinced that the position of the indentured Indian was one of contract 
whereas the position of the trade Indians was one of imperial relations.46 The fate of the 
indentured labourers, as Gandhi saw it, had already been decided as the laws defining 
their status could not be redefined.47 This attitude would still be applicable to the Natal 
Indian Congress' defense of the poll tax, to be discussed shortly, as the tax was only to 
be applied when indentured labourers ended their contracts. However, Gandhi 
recognised that as long as one sector of the Indian population was discriminated 
against, racial prejudice would develop and soon the whole population would feel the 
antagonism. One could possibly view Gandhi as according priority to the plight of both 
the indentured and free Indians but discretely segregating them. The complications in 
understanding the relationship between the free Indians, especially the wealthier 
merchants, and indentured Indians and whether or not they shared a sense of 
community, would be clearly reflected during the war period. 
Gandhi was particularly concerned about the Indians' lack of self-respect and 
how to a large extent they seemed to have accepted a subservient position in Natal 
society.48 For Gandhi, courage was also one of the highest human virtues, and he saw 
the Hindus as having become woefully deficient in it. He insisted that 'no revolution is 
possible till we build our character,.49 Thus, he promoted self-respect amongst the 
Indians, and this is one of the areas where he seemed to differentiate between 
indentured and free Indians, feeling that free Indians should distinguish themselves as 
having advanced in society in terms of education and wealth. Gandhi encouraged free 
Indians to show that they had acculturated themselves and had become 'civil' enough to 
44 Bhana, Gandhi's Legacy: the Natal indian Congress, 1894 - 1994. p. 1. 
45 Gandhi, M.K. An Autobiography or The Story of My Experiences with Truth. p. 190. 
46 Indian Opinion, 1906. Cited in Naidoo, 'Clio and the Mahatma', Journal of Southern African Studies, 15, 
4, 1990, p. 745. 
47 Naidoo, 'Clio and the Mahatma" p. 745. 
48 Gandhi, M.K. An Autobiography or The Story of My Experiences with Truth. p. 134. 
49 Parekh, Gandhi's Political Philosophy. p. 46. 
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be regarded as equal members of European society. 50 He thus supported a campaign 
organised by the free Indians and especially the Musalman traders to resist being 
wrongly described as 'coolies'. Gandhi always claimed as a matter of course that the 
reasons for drawing a distinction between indentured and free Indians were not 
exclusive to South Africa but were linked to conditions peculiar to India. 51 
One of his first 'successes' was when he wrung from the railway authorities the 
right for well-dressed Indians to travel first- or second-class on South African railways.52 
This was a victory against racialism to an extent but still excluded the poorer sectors of 
the free population and the indentured Indians. Certainly, this type of sectional 
campaign was a far cry from the Gandhi who in future years would wear only his self-
spun cotton cloth as part of his allegiance with the poor. 
Linked to self-respect was the Indians' self-presentation. Gandhi sought 'internal 
improvement' in the Indians and later, he and his Congress associates initiated lectures 
and discussions on sanitation, hygiene and 'the necessity of having separate buildings 
for houses and shops and for well-to-do traders (to live) in a style befitting their 
position,.53 At the same time, however, attempts were made to refute through 
newspaper correspondence, the derogatory labels that had been placed on Indians. 
Newspapers were supplied with information about the Indian movement and whenever 
Indians were unfairly attacked in the press, they sent replies to the newspapers 
concerned. 54 Gandhi insisted that in nationalist terms, 'their responsibility to be truthful 
was all the greater in a foreign land because the conduct of a few Indians was the 
measure of that of the millions of [their] fellow countrymen.,55 He was always aware of 
how the Indians' actions would impact not only on their lives in Natal and the Transvaal 
but could also have repercussions overseas in India and in other colonies. 
However, Gandhi's work extended beyond supporting the merchant Indians' 
cause and he also aimed to assist less affluent and educated Indians. He started to look 
for practical solutions to overcome the obstacles he saw as hindering Indians from 
bettering their position and treatment in the colony. Parekh stresses that Gandhi has 
been one of the few prominent people in history to fight simultaneously on moral, 
50 Gandhi, M.K. An Autobiography or The Story of My Experiences with Truth. p. 164. 
51 Narayan, (ed.), The Selected Works afMahatma Gandhi. p. 53. 
52 Collins, and Lapiere, heedom at Midnight. p. 52. 
53 Gandhi, R. 'The Origins and Growth ofSatyagraha', p. 127. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid. 
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religious, political, social, economic and cultural fronts.56 Gandhi recognised the 
attempts the free Indians had made to fight against their difficulties. Yet they had been 
'seriously handicapped', being 'ignorant of English', and with 'no experience of public 
work in India'. They had sought the help of European barristers and had petitions 
prepared for them,57 but Gandhi came to realise that Indians would struggle to represent 
themselves if they were unable to speak English. Accordingly, he urged the Indians to 
unite in order to defend their interests and, as a first step, to learn how to communicate 
in their oppressors' English tongue. 58 Gandhi believed education would contribute to 
unifying the Indian community through improved communication, as well as advancing 
their position in political campaigns. Up until 1893 there were hardly any free and well-
educated Indians in South Africa capable of espousing the Indian cause. Thus, the need 
to educate a larger sector of the population to speak English assumed great importance. 
Naidoo argues that Gandhi was not out to safeguard commercial interests, at least not 
primarily or exclusively, but instead to foster education: this was a principle he 
considered higher than mere trading rights.59 Yet even though education did assume a 
level of importance, the merchant Indian community still prioritised their economic 
interests in their political actions. 
When the Natal Indian Congress was formed, one of its main purposes was to ensure a 
better understanding of the position of the Indians by Natal's white colonists.6o At the 
time the Natal Indian Congress was founded, some whites tended to perceive it as a 
secret organisation with sinister motives. The organisers sought to reassure them that 
their purpose was indeed to promote 'concord and harmony' with whites, and towards 
this end invited a white to serve as a vice-president. 51 They were anxious to present 
themselves as prepared to co-operate within colonial structures and not as wanting to 
disrupt it or bring it into disrepute. This attitude was to be carried through to their 
approach to the war. They knew if they were too aggressive in their approach, there 
was the risk of being subjected to further discrimination. 
56 Parekh, Gandhi's Political Philosophy. p. 4. 
57 Ibid. pp. 53, 54. 
58 Collins and Lapiere, Freedom at Midnight. p. 51. 
59 Naidoo, 'Clio and the Mahatma' p. 743. 
60 Bhana, Gandhi's Legacy. p. 9. 
61 Ibid. p. 10. 
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The Indians, in the short period between Gandhi's arrival and the war, achieved 
a fair degree of publicity even though their political campaigns were relatively 
unsuccessful. For all that, Brown's perception indicates the greater problems that 
awaited them in the future. She shows that in these early years of the Congress, the 
local government and London were still approachable. Pressure could be put on white 
settlers in South Africa and appeals made to liberal opinion in England and educated 
opinion in India.62 Furthermore, she points out that the Indian Government was 
interested in the colonial Indians' complaints, largely because of concern about a 
reaction from India's educated public. 63 
Publicising the Indians' Concerns 
A major activity of the Congress was propaganda and correspondence through which it 
aimed to create local and international awareness of the Indians' position in Natal and 
the Transvaal.64 Gandhi maintained a list of friendly newspapers and individuals, and 
utilized these contacts for the distribution of open letters on Indian problems.65 In the 
first year alone, after the formation of the Natal Indian Congress, more than 1,000 
letters were written to persons and organisations inside South Africa and abroad in 
connection with the franchise and immigration legislation and the petitions of the 
Transvaal merchants.66 In India, Anglo-Indian papers such as The Statesman and The 
Englishman showed concern for these Indians abroad. This turned out to be most 
useful, as these papers enjoyed the support of sympathetic English residents.67 Sir 
William Wilson Hunter, the editor of the Indian section of the Times in London also 
highlighted the Indians' cause. In Gandhi's view, 'he discussed our question in its true 
perspective,.68 Within Natal, Gandhi used public correspondence to refute anti-Indian 
arguments and to correct any misinformation that was published regarding Indians. 
The determined approach that the Indians adopted with their correspondence 
succeeded in creating an international awareness and aided the prospect of Imperial 
intervention on their behalf. The work had begun prior to Gandhi's arrival. In 1891, the 
merchant firm of Hajee Mahamed Dada established contact with the Indian Political 
62 Bhana, Gandhi's Legacy. p. 10. 
63 Brown, Gandhi: Prisoner of Hope. p 33. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid. p. 51. 
66 Ginwala, 'Class, Consciousness and Control'. pp. 165, 166. 
67 Pillay, British Indians in the Transvaal. P. 116. 
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Agency in London through Dadabhai Naoroji. He ensured that questions regarding 
Indian trade and travel were raised in the House of Commons.69 Naoroji acted as a 
pivotal contact both for Indian Nationalists and the British Government. As a founding 
member and former president of the Indian National Congress and a later member of 
the British Parliament, he was in an ideal position to channel representation to the 
correct quarters and to mobilize support. 70 
Gandhi wrote two critical pamphlets in 1896, supported by his knowledge of the 
general conditions of Natal Indians. The first was 'An Appeal to Every Briton in South 
Africa.' It contained a statement supported by evidence of the general conditions of 
Natal Indians. The other was entitled 'The Indian Franchise - An Appeal'. It contained a 
brief history on the Indian franchise in Natal with facts and figures. 71 On a visit to India 
prior to the war, Gandhi wrote a pamphlet on the condition of Indians in South Africa. It 
was noticed by most Indian newspapers and five thousand copies were distributed in 
India. During this visit, he also secured the privilege of seeing elite Indian leaders, 
including Gokhale and his circle in Poona.72 
The publicity created about Indians' conditions had mixed implications for Indians 
in Natal and those who had settled in other colonies. They awoke to the importance of 
their own position, and the local Europeans awoke to the danger which they believed 
Indians may pose to their predominance.73 
The agitation that Gandhi created in India regarding Natal and Transvaal Indians' 
conditions attained enough importance for the principal Indian newspapers to notice it in 
their columns and for it to be cabled to the British press. 74 On returning to Natal, Gandhi 
discovered that a Reuters' representative in England had sent a brief cablegram to 
South Africa, containing what Gandhi felt was 'an exaggerated summary of [his] 
speeches in India.'75 This added to the anger that many whites were feeling regarding 
Indian immigration. As has been previously mentioned, he and the 'passenger' Indians 
on his returning ship were met by the angry white mob at the Point Demonstration76 
68 Narayan,(ed.), The Selected Works of Mahatma Gandhi. p. 89. 
69 Masani, Dadabhai Naoroji: Grand Old Man of India cited in Ginwala, 'Class, Consciousmess and 
Control'. p. 160. 
70 Ginwala, 'Class, Consciousness and Control'. p. 160. 
71 Gandhi, M.K. An Autobiography or the The Story of}.ty Experiences with Truth. p. 185. 
72 Narayan, (ed.), The Selected Works of Mahatma Gandhi. p. 67. 
73 Ibid. pp. 90, 91. 
74 Ibid. p. 70. 
75 Ibid. p. 71. 
76 Narayan, (ed.), The Selected Works of Mahatma Gandhi. p. 72. 
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Gandhi believed that they were concerned that they had been 'blackened before India. ,77 
Gandhi was assisted by M.H. Nazar and attorney F.A Laughton, who acted as a counsel 
for the Indian community.78 It is presumably through these events that a bond developed 
between Nazar and Gandhi. Nazar was described as having a deep concern for the 
poor and he was later to become first editor of Indian Opinion and joint secretary of the 
Natal Indian Congress 1901 _1904. 79 
In the period prior to the war, Nazar was deputed to England on behalf of the 
Indian community. He was instructed to work with members of all parties, and during 
his stay in England kept in touch with Sir William Wilson Hunter, Sir Muhcherjee 
Bhownuggree and the British Committee of the Indian National Congress. He also 
made contact with several influential retired officers of the Indian Civil Service, with the 
Indian Office and with the Colonial Office. Thus, he also played .a role in making the 
condition of Indians overseas a question of some public importance in the eyes of the 
Imperial Government. 
Response to Pending Legislation against Free Indians • 
Gandhi had intended to return to India at the end of 1893. At a farewell party in Durban, 
he read a few lines in small print in the Natal Mercury to the effect that the Responsible 
Government was about to introduce a bill to disenfranchise those few Indians who had 
the right to vote. In Durban at the time, only 251 Indians were registered as voters and 
in the capital, Pietermaritzburg, only 31 in contrast to 7000 and 300 white voters in the 
respective two cities. But, as small as their present numbers were, the Indian voters 
were seen as a future danger. so Gandhi asked his friends to fight the proposed law and 
they asked him to stay and guide them, to which he agreed.81 Thus, prior to the 
establishment of the Natal Indian Congress, the Indians embarked on their first protest 
campaign.82 
The Indians put together a subtle and intricate set of arguments to fight the 
franchise campaign. They were aware that in so doing they stood the risk of worsening 
77 Narayan, (ed.), The Selected Works of Mahatma Gandhi. p. 72. 
78 Bhana, S and J.D. Hunt, Gandhi's Editor: The Letters ofM.H. Nazar, 1902 1903. (New Delhi, 1989), 
p.4. 
79 Ibid. p. 5. 
80 Ibid. pp. 14, 15. 
SI Gandhi, R. 'The Origins and Growth of Satyagraha'. p. 126. 
82 Ibid. 
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their position, and had to ensure that they presented their case so as to accommodate 
the whites' anxieties. The Indians were well aware that the whites feared the growing 
Indian population and believed that with the franchise, Indians could threaten white 
supremacy. They also had to take into consideration that in many whites' opinion if the 
Indians received the franchise, it could arouse tensions within the black population that 
would be difficult to subdue. Referring to his philosophy of oppressors and their victims, 
Gandhi commented on whites' relationship with Africans. He suggested that the whites 
in Southern Africa could not deprive the blacks of their livelihood and basis of human 
dignity without suppressing their doubts .... and becoming victims of moral conceit, 
morbid fears and irrational obsessions. 83 
Indian-African Relations 
Since the Indians' presence and demand for the franchise was presented as a threat to 
the white-African relationship, one needs to examine how Indians, or in this case free 
Indians, viewed themselves in relation to Africans. Here, the position of free Indians and 
Gandhi in particular was often inconsistent. 
Meer claims that Gandhi had advised Indians to keep their issues distinct from 
those of other non-white groups and that this was purely a political tactic, and had 
nothing to with a belief in Indian cultural exclusiveness. 84 Adding to this, Naidoo 
contends that Gandhi regarded South African affairs as an appendage of Indians' 
relations with Britain and continued to see the Indians of South Africa 'as sons and 
daughters of mother India,.85 Even though Gandhi is renowned as a spokesman for 
humanitarian conduct, in Natal he did not seem to want to interact or align Indians' 
politics with that of Africans. Naidoo emphasises Gandhi was generally ignorant of 
Africans' history, sensitivities, plight and aspirations, even their leaders.a6 Tinker, 
however, opposes Meer's proposition and writes that in public and private 
communications the Indians constantly emphasized the difference between their own 
civilization and the primitive barbarity of Africans. 87 Huttenback also claims that to the 
average Indian, blackness connoted inferiority. Lightness of skin was associated with a 
83 Parekh, Gandhi's Political Philosoph: A Critical Examination. p. 91. 
84 Meer, Portrait of Indian South Africans. p. 28. 
85 Naidoo, 'Clio and the Mahatma' p. 749 
86 Ibid. 
87 Tinker, A New System of Slavery. p. 283. 
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high caste status attained through virtue in previous journeys along life's path.ss 
Whether this religious viewpoint had any significant bearing on the political attitudes of 
the Indians towards Africans is debatable but it does add to the complications of their 
relationship. Spooner also observes that Africans 'at times [were] none too happy about 
[the Indians'] presence,S9 and that the Indians '[did] not [fuse] with Africans, and 
continue[d] to live a life rather alien to conditions in [Southern Africa] largely because of 
their religion:90 
Gandhi's statements about Africans are as interesting as are those about class 
differences in Indian society. It is difficult to find a consistent trend and, in both cases, 
he seems to be liable to promote equality as well as differentiation. One cannot claim to 
know Gandhi's nor other Indians' personal attitudes towards Africans, but in their 
political presentations the Indians' statements reflected their tricky position. The free 
Indians wished to distinguish themselves from Africans, as they did at times from 
indentured Indians, yet they also had to be cautious of being seen to promote 
discrimination. 
A comparison can be drawn between the aspiring elitist African class, the kholwa 
and the merchant Indians who were both trying to create a unique place for themselves 
in the colonial social hierarchy. The kholwa (believers) were mission-educated 
Christians who formed the greater part of the new African land-owning class. Their 
education and Christianity distinguished them in African society,91 and they chose to 
emphasise this identity. Instead of politically identifying themselves in terms of their 
relationship to chiefs, as did most African homesteads, the kholwa consciously 
developed an identity that was located in the colonial discourse of progress. They put 
themselves forward primarily as subjects of the British monarchy,92 and as Lambert 
explains their break with traditional society was exemplified by their attempts to obtain 
exemption from the operation of customary law.93 Even though the kholwas' numbers 
were not large (10 000 out of 350 000 at the end of 1880),94 in order to maintain their 
evolving segregational policies, the Natal white supremacist ideology could not allow for 
88 Huttenback, Gandhi in South Africa, p. 44 
89 Spooner, South African Predicament. p. 107. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Morrell, Wright and Meintjes, 'Colonialism and the Establishment of White Domination 1840 1890', p. 
43. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Lambert, Betrayed Trust: Africans and the State in Colonial Natal. (**, 1995)p. 50. 
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a kholwa class which aspired to white cultural and socio-economic norms.95 Thus, the 
kholwa experienced similar frustrations to those of the elitist Indians, as the very social 
group from which they sought acceptance, was finding their presence hostile. 96 
However, there were no attempts from either of these groups to support each others' 
cause and to fight a unified campaign. 
The Franchise Campaign 
Here, the Indians organised an impressive campaign, for within a month of hearing of 
the proposed Franchise Bill, ten thousand Indians across Natal had signed a petition to 
Lord Ripon. Gandhi's main helpers were Muslim traders who collected the signatures 
within two weeks, with no payment despite the problems of poor communication links 
and vast illiteracy in the free Indian community.97 The signatures were submitted to 
Ripon98 and accompanying this list Gandhi submitted a written petition. 99 
In a petition to the Legislative Council and Assembly of the Colony of Natal of 28 
June 1894, the Indians responded to the reports in newspapers about the Second 
Reading of the Franchise Law Amendment Bill. The reasons that were presented for 
Indians not being allowed to vote included that Indians had never exercised the 
franchise in the land they come from and that they were not fit to exercise the 
franchise. 10o The free Indians refuted both of these statements. They claimed that the 
Indian nation had partaken in election processes 'from times far prior to the time when 
the Anglo-Saxon races first became acquainted with the principles of representation', 101 
and they emphasised their right to vote in India's municipal local self-government. 
Gandhi also reminded Governor Hely-Hutchinson on 3 July 1894, that 'even in England 
any British subject having the proper property qualifications is entitled to vote 
irrespective of caste, colour or creed.'102 The Indians also quoted a variety of leading 
figures who spoke of the positive characteristics of Indians. They furthermore requested 
94 Morrell, Wright and Meintjes, 'Colonialism and the Establishment of White Domination 1840 1890', p. 
43. 
95 Lambert, Betrayed Trust: Africans and the State in Colonial Natal. p. 167. 
96 Ibid. p. 125. 
97 Brown, Gandhi: Prisoner of Hope. p. 50. 
98 Narayan, (ed.), The Selected Works of Mahatma Gandhi. p. 40. 
99 Gandhi, M.K. An Autobiography or The Story of My Experiences with Truth. p. 178. 
100 Bhana Collection, 1402,957/3054, Petition to the Legislative Coucil and the Assembly of the Colony of 
Natal from Indians resident in the Colony of Nata!, (28 June 1894) 
101 Ibid. 
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a Commission to investigate whether or not the Indians resident in the Colony were fit to 
exercise the privilege of franchise, before proceeding further with the BiII.103 
Gandhi sought to give a firm constitutional basis to the Congress's demand for 
the franchise by claiming that equality followed Crown rule in India. 104 However, Gandhi 
recognised that the Natal Government was clearly not prepared to accept all Indians as 
fellow subjects and Swan asserts that neither did the Congress's ideology lend itself to 
the notion of equality for all Indians. Thus, the campaign tried to find an acceptable 
compromise, saying that Indians should be entitled to the vote as members of the 
Empire when they had reached a level of being 'desirable citizens', a status for which 
the merchants felt they obviously qualified. 105 According to Swan, whatever the root 
cause of the anti-Indian hostility in Natal, the form in which it manifested itself was racial 
discrimination. It was this in particular that the commercial elite fought because they 
wanted to be seen as a class and not as a race group. On this basis, in order to protect 
their economic interests they sought to distinguish themselves from the Indian 
underclasses.106 Furthermore, Swan argues that there were direct links between the 
Franchise Bill and the continuing security of Indian commercial interests. 107 Thus, the 
free Indians sought to present themselves as a valuable and unique group in order to 
protect their economic freedom. Swan suggests there could be no attempt to construct a 
sense of an Indian community so long as the distinction between the merchants and the 
underclasses was a logical requirement of the merchants' ideology. lOS But, according to 
Tinker, Gandhi was also quick to see that the position of the Indians in Natal was 
indivisible: if the indentured Indians were treated as inferiors, excluded from ordinary 
civic rights, then this inferiority would be quickly fastened upon the Indian traders and 
professional people. 109 Gandhi outlined how the Indians could be defined as 'desirable 
citizens' in his petition to Ripon as Secretary of State for the Colonies in London. In his 
view, 'the indentured Indians while under indenture may not have the right to vote, 
[however], .... these men should not for ever be deprived from voting if they acquire the 
102 Bhana Collection, 1402,957/3036, Letter to Sir Hely Hutchinson signed by Gandhi and other 'leading 
Indians' in Durban (3 July 1894) 
103 Bhana Collection, 1402,957/3036, Letter to Sir Hely Hutchinson signed by Gandhi and other 'leading 
Indians' in Durban (3 July 1894). 
104 Meer, Portrait of Indian South Africans. p. 23. 
105 Swan, Gandhi: The South African Experience. p. 63. 
106 Ibid. p. 43. 
107 Ibid. p. 63. 
108 Ibid. p. 50. 
109 Tinker, A New System of Slavery. p. 283. 
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sufficient qualifications in later life. Such men ... come under European influences, and ... 
rapidly begin to assimilate themselves to the European civilization, and develop into full 
Colonists. ,110 
One should remember the irony that the merchants were campaigning for their 
right to vote as desirable citizens, and yet it was the free Indians who had really 
intensified anti-Indian antagonism because of the economic threat they posed, as well 
as of the prospect of a growing permanent Indian population. The free Indians' 
campaign had to be handled carefully so as to minimise the image of them being 
economic competition and a politically aggressive group who could impose upon 
existing political structures, especially with their growing population. They were anxious 
to counter any idea that the Indian vote would threaten the whites' dominance in the 
colony. Gandhi made it clear that the merchants had no ambition to share political 
power with whites, far less to pave the way for 'coolies' to vote. 111 
Inevitably, the franchise issue received international attention. For example, the Times 
of India, in a leading article on the petition strongly supported the Indian demands, 112 
with Gandhi reporting that 'the London Times supported our claims and we began to 
entertain hopes of the Bill being vetoed.'113 The combined efforts of the Indian franchise 
campaign as well as a loyalty to British legislation meant that Ripon disallowed the bill 
and declared that the British Empire could not agree to the establishment of a colour bar 
in legislation. This was regarded as a great victory for the Indians.114 
Nonetheless, the planters and the Natal Government were not prepared to stop 
there. To curb the political power of Indians was for them the indispensable first step; 
but the real point of their attack was Indian trade and free Indian immigration. 115 For the 
time being, though, the result of the publicity created by the opposition to the 
disenfranchising bill was that colonial officials had to avoid express racial distinctions in 
their legislation, thereby attaining their aims in a more discreet manner.116 
When the Bill was eventually passed in 1896, Gandhi's comment was that 'We 
all knew that this was a foregone conclusion but the agitation had infused new life into 
110 Tinker, A New System of Slavery. p. 284. 
111 Swan, Gandhi: The South African Experience. p. 63. 
112 Ibid. p. 179. 
113 Ibid. 
114 Narayan, (ed.), The Selected Works of Mahatma Gandhi. p. 40. 
115 Ibid. 
116 Ibid. p. 41. 
57 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of
Ca
pe
 To
wn
the community and had brought home to them the conviction that the community was 
one and indivisible and that it was as much their duty to fight for its political rights as its 
trading rights.'117 
The Dealer' License Act and the Immigration Restriction Act 
The Natal Government then passed the Dealer's License Act of 1897 and the 
Immigration Restriction Act of 1897 ; while neither of these laws mentioned Indians nor 
other racial groups, they were still intended to have a direct impact on Indians. 
According to Wyley, merchants had emigrated to Natal at a time when laissez-
faire was the prevailing economic policy in the British Empire,118 yet they were to face 
increasing restrictions on their trading freedom. He explains that the initial phase in the 
process whereby whites attempted to secure control over land in the central business 
district occurred in the years 1897 - 1909, a period which marked the crucial beginning 
of the policies that eventually produced two distinct business districts in Durban. 119 The 
substance of the first Act was that no one could trade without a discretionary license 
issued by an official appointed in accordance with its provisions. 12o Considerations of 
appeals before the Town Council in 1897 indicate that all appeals by Indian 
shopkeepers were turned down, whereas in some cases dealing with white 
storekeepers, the Licensing Officer's decision was reversed and previously refused 
licenses were granted. 121 The merchants expressed particular concern that they were 
unable to appeal to the Supreme Court. They petitioned to the Government of Natal to 
amend the Act and threatened that the indentured labour scheme would otherwise be 
halted. Chamberlain proceeded to caution the Government of Natal as to the likelihood 
of this occurring. 122 Huttenback claims that this law was by far the most insidious piece 
of legislation passed against Natal Indians. 123 
The chief provision of the Immigration Restriction Act was that only such immigrants as 
were able to pass the education test in a European language could enter the Colony.124 
117 Gandhi, M.K. An Autobiography or The Story of My Experiences with Truth. pp. 177, 178. 
liS Rajah 'The Durban Indian Central business district: case study in the geography of apartheid' cited in 
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119 Wyley, 'The Natal Dealer's Licenses Act of 1897', p. 1. 
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121 Town Council Minutes, Durban cited in Wyley, 'The Natal Dealer's Licenses Act of 1897', p.26. 
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Again, the Indians offered strenuous resistance, but in spite of this, the laws were 
enacted. 
Swan concludes that the 'elite' Indian political activities between 1894 and 1906 fell into 
two distinct phases. The first, between 1894 and 1897, was an attempt to forestall the 
passage of damaging discriminatory legislation. The second, between 1897 and 1906, 
reflected the failure of phase one and was characterized by an attempt to mitigate the 
effect of discriminatory laws passed in 1897.125 
Related Experiences in the Transvaal 
While this study assumes a regional approach in focusing on the political development 
of Indians within Natal, the free Indians did not always limit their business or social 
contact to its boundaries. When free Indians chose to settle in the Transvaal, they often 
maintained their contacts with Natal Indians, especially through a sense of class 
superiority to other Indians. At a similar time to the foundation of the Natal Indian 
Congress, the Transvaal British Indian Association was formed and the two 
organisations probably became a support structure for one another. Gandhi was not 
uninterested in developments in the Cape and the Orange Free State, but as Indians 
were most heavily clustered in Natal and the Transvaal, it was there that they bore the 
brunt of the white settlers' sharpening fear and hostility.126 
Even though entrance for Indians into the Transvaal was protected by Article 14 
of the London Convention of 1884,127 constitutionally the Transvaal Indians were much 
more powerless against Boer republicanism. The Boers passed the first anti-Indians 
law in 1885, restricting Indians' rights to occupation and trade in the Transvaal, and in 
1891 all Indian business in the Orange Free State was restricted and the owners were 
given no compensation. 128 The Transvaal Indian merchants regarded themselves as 
superior citizens and, like the tactic adopted by the Natal free Indians, they presented 
petitions to the Volksraad which drew attention to the difference between themselves 
and 'Coolies' and Chinese. 129 
125 Swan, Gandhi: The South African Experience. p. 61. 
126 Brown, Gandhi: Prisoner of Hope. p. 44. 
127 Vane, 'The South African Indians, A Plea for Better Understanding'. p. 13. 
128 Meer, Portrait of Indian South Africans. p. 24. 
129 Vane, 'The South African Indians, A Plea for Better Understanding'. p. 13. 
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The Transvaal Republican Government, after a lengthy correspondence with the British 
Government, succeeded in persuading the latter to waive its right to insist upon the strict 
interpretation of the London Convention, Thereupon, the Volksraad proceeded to pass 
Law 3 of 1885, which was based on the general principle that no equality between white 
and coloured races should be tolerated, It was referred to by P.S, Joshi, the Indian 
writer, as the great-grandfather of anti-Asiatic laws. 13o The law enacted that persons 
belonging to the aboriginal races of Asia could not become citizens of the South African 
Republic, or own property while those who already were traders had to be registered. 131 
The Secretary of State from Natal said that he had understood that the proposed 
legislation would not apply to 'Arab traders or merchants' but to 'Indian or Chinese 
Coolie immigrants.'132 However, Law 3 was never wholly effective because it was 
continually opposed by the British government,133 The Boer opinion of the British actions 
was reflected in the Standard and Diggers' News during 1898. It questioned how the 
British government could support Natalians' attempts to restrict Indian competition and 
then intervene in the Transvaal's efforts to do likewise, 134 
Defending the Poll Tax 
The Congress took up the indentured labourers' cause in 1894, when the Responsible 
Government wanted to bring legislation against indentured labour that included forcible 
repatriation, the signing of new indenture forms and annual tax of £25. 135 It was evident 
that no Indian labourer could pay such an exorbitant tax and still live in Natal as a free 
man.136 Since the Government of India would not agree to compulsory repatriation, it 
amounted to a direct attempt to force Indians to remove themselves from the Colony or 
else to reindenture. 137 Gandhi declared said this was perceived by the Indian community 
as an expression of anti-Indian antagonism in the same way as the disenfranchising 
bill. 138 The free Indians' response to this issue does seem to offer significant insight into 
the Natal Indian Congress, Now, the merchant Indians were prepared to defend the 
rights of indentured and ex-indentured Indians. Yet, equally, the issue of how 
130. Vane, 'The South African Indians, A Plea for Better Understanding'. p, 13, 
131 Ibid, 
132 Ibid, p. 14, 
133 Ibid. 
134 Pillay, British Indians in the Transvaal. p, 68, 
135 Gandhi, An Autobiography or the The Story of My Experiences with Truth. p, 194, 
136 Ibid. p. 37. 
m Bhana, Gandhi's Legacy: the Nata/Indian Congress, 1894 -1994, p, 14, 
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concerned the merchant Indians were about the indentured Indians is complicated by 
the fact that the Indian traders knew their presence had in part provoked the agitation 
for the poll tax and they were anxious to curb the growth of general anti-Indian laws. It 
remains uncertain, however, how influential Gandhi was in motivating the Congress, as 
opposed to the members of the Congress calling for action to be taken. In this and other 
declarations of Gandhi's relationship to indentured labourers, there is a sense of a 
recognised social gap between educated leadership and the indentured labourers. 
Expressing his concern for their plight, involved adopting almost a paternalistic attitude 
towards them. 
In Gandhi's view, 'the [tax] proposal astonished me. I put the matter before the 
Congress for discussion and it was immediately resolved to organize the necessary 
opposition.' The free Indians then wrote to Chamberlain as Colonial Secretary, 
mentioning the delegates' concern that the 'great Native problem, yet to be solved' could 
not be avoided. 139 All the same, the Indians sending the petition stated that the reasons 
given for the restriction of the settlement of free Indians was contradictory. They 
pointed out that the tensions that had risen related mainly to the merchant or 
'passenger' Indians, although the people who would be effected by the bill would be 
indentured or ex-indentured Indians. These indentured and ex-indentured Indians were 
also 'equally British subjects and .... [were] so to speak, invited to go to the Colony' and 
who [had] therefore a special claim on the goodwill and attention of the Colonists. ,140 
They also emphasised the positive qualities of the indentureds noting that 'the peace-
loving disposition and the mildness of the Indian nation are proverbial.'141 
Bhana observes that it was the Government of India that objected to the original 
amount of the tax.142 In this, the Natal Indian Congress and Gandhi's role nevertheless 
should not be ignored, especially the work which they did in exposing the proposed tax, 
to which the responsiveness of the Government of India must be given due credit. 143 
Gandhi explained that 'if the Natal Indian Congress had remained silent on the subject, 
the Viceroy might have approved of even the £25 tax but instead it was reduced to £3,144 
138 Gandhi, An Autobiography or the The Story of My Experience with Truth. p. 194. 
139 Ibid. 
140 Bhana Collection, 957/3039, Memorial to Chamberlain. 
141 Ibid. 
142 Bhana, Gandhi's Legacy, the Natal Indian Congress. p. 14. 
143 Gandhi, An Autobiography or the The Story of My Experiences with Truth. p. 193. 
144 Ibid. p. 195. 
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The Natal Government then passed Act 17 of 1895 or the Indian Immigration 
Amendment Bill, which required indenture-expired Indians to pay a tax of £3. 145 
Yet, Gandhi and the Congress were not satisfied with the £3 tax, and Gandhi 
claimed 'the Congress could not regard it as any great achievement to have succeeded 
in getting the tax reduced from £25 to £3.,146 The indentured labourers received such a 
minimal income during their contract period that it would in any event have been difficult 
for them to pay the annual fee. 147 Again, local Indians attempted to protest against the 
tax, and in August 1895, Gandhi, on their behalf addressed another petition to the 
Colonial Secretary. In conclusion, the petition ended: 'If the Colony cannot put up with 
the Indians, the only course .... is to stop a future immigration to Natal'. For the first 
time, Indian leaders dared to suggest that the solution to problems raised by indenture 
was to abolish 'coolie' emigration, even if other emigration was affected. 148 Yet, as seen 
with the franchise campaign, the issue of immigration was not limited to the indentured 
labourers' conditions and it was in part retaliation for the failure to grant equality to 
British Indian subjects anywhere in South Africa. 149 Against this background, the free 
Indians continued to campaign against the poll tax and also addressed a separate 
petition to the Indian Viceroy, Lord Elgin, but both petitions were a wasted effort. 150 
In the meantime, Gandhi sought also to serve the indentured community through 
other means such as representing them in court. 151 During the course of their campaign 
against racist colonial policies, the Indian elite was repeatedly told by white critics that 
men in glass houses should not throw stones at others. The fact that for centuries 
Hindus had been treating large masses of their own people as 'untouchables' showed 
that equality was not a value for them. Since they apparently did not believe in equality, 
it was inconsistent for them to ask for it and hypocritical of them to blame whites for 
denying them it to them. Gandhi rejoined that the Hindus believed not only in equality 
and brotherhood but also in the higher principle of the unity of all men. In his view, the 
deeply regrettable practice of untouchability was not an integral part of their religion but 
a corruption that had entered into it. 152 
145 Bhana, Gandhi's Legacy, the Natal Indian Congress, 1894 -1994. p. 14. 
146 Gandhi, M.K. An Autobiography or the The Story of My Experiences with Truth. p. 196. 
147 Brain, 'Natal's Indians, 1860 - 1910, from co-operation, through competition to conflict'. p. 261. 
148 Tinker, A New System of Slavery. p. 284. 
149 Ginwala, 'Class, Consciousness and Control'. p. 165. 
150 Tinker, A New System of Slavery. pp. 284, 285. 
151 Gandhi, An Autobiography or the The Story of My Experiences with Truth. p. 190. 
152 Parekh, Colonialism. Tradition and Reform: An Analysis afGandhi's Political Discourse. p. 215. 
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4 
International Reaction to Natal Indians' Conditions 
The ability of the Natal colonists to impose their will upon the Natal Government with regards 
to exploiting and controlling the Indian population, was partly dependent on the international 
response that the Natal Government received, especially in the period prior to Natal gaining 
Responsible Government. The three main international sources that monitored Natal Indians' 
experiences were the British Government, the British Indian Government and the Indian 
Nationalist movement. It is hard to find a consistent pattern when trying to understand the 
extent of concern that Imperial authorities felt for their non-white subjects. Individual 
characters within the two Governments were influential in shifting the concern towards or 
away from the Indians' treatment. The Indian Nationalist movement also only started to gain 
strength towards the end of the century and to a large extent their discussions focused 
around the free Indian propertied class. 
Responses from the Indian Government 
It is difficult to assess the extent of real concern or support that the Indian Government felt 
for its subjects in South Africa. It certainly appears that it was prepared to intervene more 
on the part of the indentured Indians than the free Indians, but even there it had limited 
success. The Indian Government compromised on its support for the Indians who wished to 
settle in the Natal when it complied, although to a greatly reduced extent, with the demands 
for extended indenture contracts and the poll tax to encourage repatriation. However, one 
must also take into account that once Indians had chosen to settle in the colony, India could 
offer less protection. 
The Indian Government's response to the treatment of Indians abroad was in part impacted 
upon by its relationship with its subjects in India. Tinker records that sympathy and support 
for the overseas Indians receded in the aftermath of the Mutiny of 1857, which served to 
widen the already opening gulf between the British and those they ruled. However, the harsh 
reality of oppression in the sugar colonies was brought to the Indian Government's attention 
through reports from ex-indentured labourers and free Indian sources. This scandal 
necessitated some form of response. 1 
I Tinker, A New System o/Slavery. p. 240. 
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With regard to indentured Indians, Emmer argues that it is hard to understand why the Indian 
Government allowed the system to continue, knowing of the distress that it caused. There 
were naturally always pressures from the British Government, which wished to represent the 
economic interests of the colonies. However, Emmer believes that the most important 
reason for the 'benevolent neutrality' of the Indian Government was the absence of an Indian 
lobby of landowners and industrialists protesting against the loss of so many valuable 
workers.2 Moreover, according to Emmer, the British Indian authorities were not really 
interested in the system of indentured emigration, since it only affected 0.01 per cent of the 
population.3 Tinker offers another view and says that there was no firm intention, either from 
Whitehall in Britain or the Government of India to probe deeply into the wrongs of the 
system. While there was uneasiness that so many wrongs were being uncovered, the will to 
move was lacking.4 Many high officials in Indian also felt sympathy for white settlers in 
Natal. 5 
However, the Indian Government did take some action. As it became aware of 
hardships experienced by the indentured labourers, it did start to demand that more 
information be supplied from the Natal authorities.6 As already mentioned, the Indian 
Government in 1872 stopped sending out labourers to Natal until better protective structures 
were introduced. India's response to Natal was at times part of a broader reaction of all the 
British colonies that imported indentured labour. Following exposure of some of the worst 
aspects of the Indian emigration system in Grenada, Demerara, British Guinea, and 
Mauritius, the Indian Government monitored Natal at least for a period and the free labour 
began to enjoy some degree of protection. 7 
When looking at how the Indian Government handled Natal's demand for greater restrictions 
and the imposition of a poll tax on ex-indentured Indians, the Government responded in 
stages. Initially, it would not agree to the £25 suggested by the Binns-Mason commission. 
Yet, India was not beyond stiff negotiation. The Indian authorities started to discuss the idea 
2 Emmer, 'The Meek Hindu; the recruitment of Jndian indentured laboure~s for service overseas, 1870 - 1916,' 
Emmer, P.C. (ed.), Colonialism and Migration; Indentured Labour Before and After Slavery. (Dordrecht, 1986), 
p200. 
3 Ibid. p. 204. 
4 Tinker, A New System olSlavery. p. 247. 
5 Huttenback, Racism and Empire. p. 143 .. 
6 Tinker, A New System olSlavery. p. 244. 
7 Ginwala, 'Class, Consciousness and Control'. pp. 56, 57. 
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that 'if the settlement of Indians is not restricted, the emigration to that colony will be 
closed'.! Faced with what allegedly was almost an ultimatum, the Government of India 
accepted a policy that was contrary to principles that had been reiterated for fifty years. It 
was made simpler, according to Tinker, by the fact that the Viceroy, Lord Elgin, was not 
concerned about the rights of common people, although, he did write to the Governor of 
Natal in September 1894 in a reasonably firm tone. He asserted that the Government of 
India had 'little sympathy with the views that would prevent any subject of the Crown settling 
in any Colony under the British flag'. Nevertheless, it was agreed that there should be a 
system which encouraged indentured Indians either to return to India after their indenture or 
to renew their contracts.9 The new Natal laws were accepted by Britain in January 1896. 
Elgin made it clear that he did not intend to reconsider the issue. In his view, 'the question 
whether it is right to compel any class of Her Majesty's subjects to pay for permission to 
reside in any part of Her Majesty's dominions is rather for the consideration of Her Majesty's 
Government than for ours. ,10 The only reservation was that 'such coolies as refuse to return 
should in no case be made subject to penalties under the criminallaw.'11 
Elgin could not escape a reaction from citizens in India, and in March of the following 
year, he received a memorandum from the British Indian Association of Calcutta. It 
commented on the 'impositions' on the Natal Indians and demanded more information. 12 
The poll tax exposes a number of interesting issues regarding the Indian 
Government's support for free Indians in Natal. The proposal for the poll tax was strongly 
opposed by the free Indians and their petitions made some impact on the negotiation 
process. Yet, the Indian Government acceded to the white colonials' demands and the tax 
was in essence the Indian Government's tacit approval of Natal's attempts to discourage 
Indian settlement. Furthermore, Elgin openly relinquished responsibility for protecting Indian 
settlement, claiming that it was exclusively Britain's duty. 
However, there were other British Indian authorities who regarded the responsibility 
of imperial trusteeship as more firmly involving the upholding of rights of 'the lesser breeds'. 
Lord Curzon, who became Viceroy in 1898, took a more concerned paternal stance than his 
predecessor, Elgin. He was to reassert the doctrine that the Government of India was in 
8 Tinker, A New System a/Slavery. pp. 281, 282. 
9 Thompson, Indian Immigration. quoted in Pachai, The South African Indian Question 1860 - 1971. p. 9. 
10 Ginwala, "Class, Consciousness and Control. p. 285. 
II Ibid. pp. 282,283. 
12 Ibid. p. 285. 
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India but his position changed little.13 Nevertheless, in 1899, both the British and the Indian 
Governments warned the Natal Government that if unjust measures towards Indians 
continued, it would bring to an end the Colony's participation in the indentured labour 
scheme. 14 The threat of terminating the indentured labour system, it seems, was used freely 
by both the Natal and the British Governments, however, it did little to aid those Indians who 
were already resident in Natal. 
Responses from the British Government 
The British Government showed great inconsistency in its reaction towards Indians' 
treatment in Natal, and, invariably, its current broader colonial concerns impacted upon its 
racial attitudes and policies. Colonial Office policy towards Natal during its formative years 
was marked by the difference between Ripon's and Chamberlain's priorities, but it gradually 
assumed the direction which it was to take in the period following the war. Swan stresses 
that Ripon, who was the Colonial Secretary from 1892 to 1895, was unusually sympathetic 
towards the Natallndians.15 
It has been suggested that the presence of an Indian population delayed the grant of 
full responsibility to Natal. 16 However, as Stein points out, that the Indian question influenced 
the British Government to any appreciable degree seems unlikely. The Governors and 
Secretaries of State, when deciding whether to grant Natal Responsible Government, were 
focused on what were perceived as the major problems: the administration of the black 
population, and the question of defence, both internal and external. 17 
Still, the Colonial Office under Ripon did take a firmer stand on Natal's attempts to impose 
discriminatory legislation. Ripon saw the proposed Franchise Bill of 1894 as an affront to 
Indians which would cause dangerous repercussions in India if it were passed. The India 
Office was behind the condemnation of the bil1. 18 By contrast, Swan reports that when 
Chamberlain took charge of the Colonial Office in 1895, within three months the guidelines of 
more racist future policies had been laid down.19 
13 Tinker, A New System o/Slavery. p. 286. 
14 Pachai International Aspects. cited in Brain, 'Natal's Indians, 1860 - 1910, from co-operation, through 
competition, to conflict'. p. 262. 
15 Swan, Gandhi: the South African Experience, p. 66. 
16 Stein, 'A History of Indian Settlement in Natal from 1870 - 1893'. pp. 69. 70. 
17 Ibid. p. 70. 
18 Rude, Protest and Punishment, cited in Swan, Gandhi: the South African Experience, p. 66. 
19 Swan, Gandhi: the South African Experience, p. 67. 
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Nevertheless, having allowed Natal Responsible Government, Britain objected to its 
first discriminatory actions towards free Indians. Pachai summarises Natal's response to this 
reproach, saying that this reprimand might have proved to be a deterrent in ordinary 
circumstances. But Natal, in the early days of having Responsible Government, 'was in no 
mood to be dictated to as a recalcitrant schoolboy. ,20 In taking this disapproving stance, the 
British authorities chose to overlook the fact that the Colonial Office allowed the Franchise 
Amendment Bill of 1896, the Immigration Restriction Bill and the Dealer's Licenses Bill to be 
passed.21 Guest concludes that Whitehall officials believed that the colony's voterless 
majority would be adequately protected by the Legislative Council and by the Governor's 
authority as 'Supreme Chief' of the African population,22 yet Natal proved to be wanting in the 
protection it offered. When the Natal Government proposed to disallow Indians the vote, 
Chamberlain as Colonial Secretary firmly opposed this. However, Pachai argues that it is 
doubtful whether the British Government took this stand purely as a matter of principle, and 
not more due to political expediency. The move to disenfranchise the Indians coincided with 
an uncertain period for Britain during which it was attempting to establish overall supremacy 
in South Africa. Since the British were taking a stand against the treatment of the Uitlanders 
in the Transvaal and the barriers that were being imposed on them gaining franchise rights, it 
recognised that would be inconsistent if it acceded to Natal's Indian disenfranchisement 
campaign.23 
Britain also protested against the Transvaal's discrimination against Indians and used 
it as a minor justification for interfering in the Transvaal.24 In the build-up to the war, the 
British made political use of the question of maltreatment of Indians by the Government of 
the Transvaal, although there were fundamental flaws in the British approach. Apart from the 
restrictions placed on Indians in Natal, the Uiitlander merchants were in full agreement with 
the Transvaal legislative restrictions placed on Indian traders, as they, too, were opposed to 
the 'cut-throat' competition'. In April 1899, Milner decided to win the tacit silence of the 
Uitlanders on the Indian question in order to exploit the issue.25 The Uitlander response was 
that 'any stick is good enough to beat Kruger with, and though we don't love the Indian we 
20 Pachai, The South African Indian Question 1860 - 1971. p. 11. 
21 Swan, Gandhi: the South African Experience, p. 68. 
22 Guest, 'Indians in Natal and Southern Africa in the 1890s', p. 8. 
23 Pachai, The South African Indian Question 1860 - 1971. p. 10. 
24 Thompson, E. and G.T. Garratt, Rise and Fulfilment o/British Rule in India. (London, 1935), pp. 585, 586. 
25 Chandramoham, "Hamlet with the Prince of Denmark left out'?', p. 153. 
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wouldn't say a word.,26 The value of the Indian issue as a propaganda tool was not lost on 
the Transvaal government, which tried to embarrass the British Government by proposing a 
general South African conference on alien immigration. As Milner wrote in a letter to the 
Governor of Natal, Hely-Hutchinson, 'The Boers know the hole we are in over this 
business'.27 
In 1897, a detailed approach to British non-white subjects was outlined by Chamberlain. The 
British authorities displayed an ability to change their viewpoint on their non-European 
subjects, depending on the circumstances, and here Chamberlain took a much less 
supportive stance towards British Asian immigrants. The Prime Ministers of the self-
governing, settler colonies gathered in London to attend the Diamond Jubilee celebrations 
and an Imperial Conference, chaired by Chamberlain. Tinker's view is that Chamberlain 
thought only in terms of the development of white communities overseas, and describes the 
conference as 'the high-water mark of his mission in Imperialism'. In dealing with the issue of 
'Alien Immigration', he spoke for example, of the right of the self-governing colonies to 
control the entry of Indians and Chinese.28 In Chamberlain's view: 
'we quite sympathise with the determination of the white inhabitants of these 
Colonies which are in comparatively close proximity to millions and hundreds of 
millions of Asiatics that there should not be an influx of people alien in civilisation, 
alien in religion, alien in customs, whose influx moreover would most seriously 
interfere with the legitimate rights of the existing population .... but we ask you also 
to bear in mind the traditions of the Empire, which make no distinction in favour of, 
or against race or colour; and to exclude by reason of their colour or by reason of 
their race all Her Majesty's Indian subjects, or even Asiatics, would be an act so 
offensive to those peoples that it would be most painful, I am quite certain, to Her 
Majesty to have to sanction it. 29 
Here, there was some sense of ambiguity, or of finding a balance. But the nub of 
Chamberlain's pronouncement came in his concluding words, 'if there were a clash between 
the ideal of an Empire in which race and colour were not inseparable barriers, and the reality 
of an exclusive white colony, then - however reluctantly - it would be necessary to bow to 
26 Cammack, The Rand at War, 1899-1902: The Witwatersrand and the Anglo-Boer War cited in Chandramohan, 
'Hamlet with the Prince of Denmark left out'?', p. 154 
27 Chandramohan, 'Hamlet with the Prince of Denmark left out'?', p. 154 
28 Tinker, A New System olSlavery. p. 285. 
29 Proceedings of a Conference between the Secretary of State for the Colonies and the Premiers of the Self 
Governing Colonies (1897) cited in Tinker, A New System olSlavery. pp. 285,286. 
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white colonial opinions.'30 In Huttenback's typical view, the nineteenth century was not the 
most tolerant of ages and many Englishmen must have found it difficult to have felt in their 
hearts that Africans and Indians were really the equals of white men. 31 
The Natal Indian Congress sent Nazar as their delegate to report on the 
conference.32 This highlights that the Natal Indian Congress was attempting to monitor the 
Imperial response to their treatment and in this instance could be under no illusions of 
meaningful sympathies. 
The Growth of Nationalism in India and its Concern for Indians in the Colonies 
Towards the end of the nineteenth century, the Nationalist movement in India grew more 
vociferous.33 Within India, the significance of the Nationalist movement was, of course, the 
start of the struggle for greater self-government or independence. But for Indians in other 
colonies, the impact that they would have felt was the increasing vocalised concern for their 
treatment.34 Initially, the Moderates amongst the Nationalist movement accepted but wished 
to transform the British rule.35 
On this basis, the Indian National Congress was founded in 1885. Its members were Indian, 
but it had owed its initial organisational inspiration largely to a British example. 36 Thompson 
and Garratt claim there is little accurate evidence about the strength of the Congress party in 
its early years, but it was soon popular enough to attract over a thousand delegates to its 
yearly meetings.37 The Indian National Congress had at first enjoyed a certain amount of 
official approval from the British Indian Government. But before long it became the most 
influential opponent of the Government: the foremost representative of Indian nationalism.3s 
In this, it was essentially an institution of nationalist moderates. 39 
In the 18905, there was in general little coherent concern for the masses in the 
thinking of politically-advanced Indians. They were primarily interested in matters which 
30 Tinker, A New System of Slavery. p. 286. 
31 Huttenback, Racism and Empire. p. 142. 
32 Bhana and Hunt. Gandhi's Editor: The Letters of MH Nazar, i902 i903. p. 4. 
33 Thompson, and Garratt, Rise and Fulfilment of British Rule in india. p. 527. 
34 Ibid. 527. 
3S Ibid. p. 542. 
36 Lumby, E.W.R. 'The Transfer of Power', Lewis, M.D. (ed.), The British in india, Imperialism or Trusteeship? 
(Boston, 1962), p.90. 
37 Thompson, and Garratt, Rise and Fulfilment of British Rule in India. p. 544. 
38 Lumby, 'The Transfer of Power'. p. 90. 
39 Thompson and Garratt. Rise and Fulfilment of British Rule in India. p.543. 
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affected their own class interests, such as higher education, employment in the public 
services and political enfranchisement.4o The position of the indentured Indians had at first 
no place in their concern, whereas the difficulties of a fraternal propertied interest overseas 
provoked a prompt response.41 
The 10th session of the Indian National Congress in 1894 first publicly considered the 
question of restrictions on Indians in Natal and the Transvaal. During Gandhi's visit to India 
in 1896, he established personal contacts with Indian leaders in the commercial, civic and 
political sectors.42 
A growing indigenous Indian bourgeoisie resented the prescriptive domination and privileged 
economic position of a colonial British bourgeoisie. It was for this reason that restrictions on 
the 'passenger' Indians in South Africa began to find such a ready response from the Indian 
National Congress.43 By 1897, the question of Indians' status in Southern Africa was being 
considered in relation to the status of Indians within the Empire, and demands were being 
made for the full equality of British Indian subjects with European British subjects.44 Thus, 
the Indian National Congress' views on the need for class distinctions coincided with those 
which, in certain respects, the South African Indian elite were also underlining.45 Gandhi, on 
his return to India, pressed the idea that enlightened Indians needed to partake in setting the 
standard for Indian treatment abroad. Yet he also took a 'non-classist' view when he 
repeatedly reminded his countrymen that as long as they treated some of their own people 
as 'untouchables', they could not legitimately blame the Canadian, South African and other 
foreign governments for treating them as the 'pariahs of the empire'. Though Gandhi's 
argument was not new, the international dimension that he brought to it was.46 
International defence for the treatment of indentured Indians only started to grow in 
the first decade of the twentieth century. This was led by resolute individuals and anti-
indenture organsisations.47 
40 Tinker, A New System of Slavery. p. 280. 
41 Ginwala, 'Class, Consciousness and Control'. pp. 163, 164. 
42 Gandhi, Satyagraha. cited in Ginwala, 'Class, Consciousness and Control'. p. 164. 
43 Ginwala, 'Class, Consciousness and Control'. pp. 162, 163. 
44 Speech of Sir C. Sankaran Nair, President ofIndian National Congress cited in Ginwala, 'Class, 
Consciousness and Control', p. 164. 
45 Ginwala, 'Class Consciousness and Control', p. 165. 
46 Parekh, Colonialism, Tradition and Reform, An Analysis of Gandhi's Political Discourse. (New Delhi, 1989), 
p.215. 
47 Henning,. The Indentured Indian in Natal (1860 -1917). p.120. 
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5 
Political Motivation/or Indian Involvement in the War 
Free Indians' Motivation for Involving Themselves in the War 
Gandhi appealed to the free Indian population to offer their services to the British in the 
war and was met with a predominantly positive response. The free Indians recognised 
how the war effort could link into the Indian National Congress's objectives and it was 
agreed that this was a political opportunity to prove their devotion to the Empire and 
Natal in order to receive better treatment within the colony. 
A major force driving Gandhi's campaign was that Indians were believed to be 
unconcerned about the British and the Empire. One of the charges laid against the 
Indians was that they had come to Natal and other colonies only for money-grabbing 
reasons and had become a deadweight to the British. They were described as 'worms 
which settle inside and eat it up hollow' and that 'the Indians were in South Africa only to 
fatten themselves upon them.... and would not render them the slightest aid if the 
country was invaded or if their homes were raided'. According to Gandhi, the British 
expected that instead of offering aid in protecting the Empire, the Indians would expect 
the British to protect them.1 This meant that for Gandhi the urgent need to prove Indian 
loyalty did not start from a neutral standpoint but rather the issue was first having to 
overcome the attitude that they were uncommitted. 
As has been seen with the assertive yet non-aggressive manner with which 
Gandhi and the Natal Indian Congress addressed the pending anti-Indian legislation, the 
Indians' offer to serve in the war reflected a similar diplomatic approach. Doke 
emphasises that the Indians were well aware that they were a minority, foreign group in 
the colony? Thus they were in a vulnerable position and always had to be careful not to 
worsen their conditions. 
In addition, Gandhi was quite aware that even if their services were accepted, 
anti-Indian hostility could continue, espeCially when having to work in close contact with 
whites in the war context. As he noted 'again, [they] would treat us all as coolies, insult 
us and look down upon us.3 The phrase 'all as coolies' again raises questions about his 
attitudes towards Indians in the colony and whether he felt that certain Indians, namely 
I Narayan, (ed.), The Selected Works of Mahatma Gandhi. p. 96. 
2 Doke, MK. Gandhi, An Indian Patriot in South Africa. p. 59. 
3 Narayan, (ed.), The Selected Works of Mahatma Gandhi. p. 101. 
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the Indian elite or merchant Indians, did not deserve to be treated as such, or if he was 
concerned about the potential degradation of all Indians. 
Gandhi was not alone in taking the initiative to promote Indian war involvement. For 
instance, an Indian called on the Indian community in the Natal Mercury to forget its 
grievances against the British. He argued that 'every Indian should bury the hatchet and 
reserve his resentment for the future, and come forward for the defence of the Colony.'4 
In typical view, a self-styled gentleman calling himself 'Colonial Indian', wrote that 
'if the Government were to call for Indian volunteers ... scores of young men would 
enlist themselves in it and it would be one of the best means to reconcile the Indian 
subjects and to enlist their sympathy.'s 
General Black Optimism for Improved Treatment 
The Indians' hopes for improved treatment through loyal war service can be placed 
within the broader context of general black hopes emanating from the war. Warwick 
outlines that the coming of the war aroused considerable interest among the most 
westernized and politically-conscious African, coloured and Asian groups in South 
Africa. It was widely believed that the defeat of the Boers would be accomplished 
without undue difficulty, and that once the republics had been overthrown, the limited 
political, educational and commercial opportunities afforded to black people in the Cape 
would be extended to those resident in the Transvaal and Orange Free State as well as 
Natal. In particular, the hope was generated that once these territories were 
administered directly by Britain, the Cape's mildly liberal franchise would be extended 
throughout South Africa.6 Such optimism on the part of members of the black elite was 
encouraged by statements made by prominent British spokesmen during the early 
months of the war. As Chamberlain told the House of Commons in October 1899, 'The 
treatment of the natives [in the Transvaal] has been disgraceful; it has been brutal; it 
has been unworthy of a civilized Power.,,7 The Colonial Secretary went on to imply that 
affairs there would be run very differently under British administration. Even the British 
4 Natal Mercury, 3l October 1899 cited in Tichmann, 'We are sons of the Empire after all', p. 10. 
5 Natal Mercury, 3 October, 1899 cited in Pyarelal, Mahatma Gandhi, Vol II, p. 266 
6 Warwick, 'Black People and the War', p. 189. 
7 Parliamentary Debates, 4th series, Commons, vol.77, c.271 (October 1899) cited in Warwick, 'Black 
People and the War' I p. 189. 
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Prime Minister, Lord Salisbury, informed Parliament that following a victory in the South 
African campaign, 'There must be no doubt .... that due precaution will be taken for the 
kindly and improving treatment of those countless indigenous races of whose destiny, I 
fear we have been too forgetful'. 8 
Indian Reaction to the British Attack on the Boers 
Significantly, Gandhi took his firm stand to support the British despite his knowledge of 
the degradation that Indians had suffered both in Natal and in India. 
In his view, Britain had done grave economic and cultural damage to India. He 
believed they had fought unnecessary wars at its expense, maintained a ruinously costly 
civil and military administration, destroyed indigenous industries and de-industrialised 
India, ignored its agricultural development, caused massive unemployment and famine, 
and in general had mercilessly exploited it. They had also sapped the foundations of 
Indian civilisation, de-nationalised the Indians, ridiculed their society and religion, and 
foisted alien values on to them. In the face of this severe criticism, it is curious that he 
claimed to think that on balance the principles and ideals of British rule were not too 
oppressive. As has been seen with his political approach prior to the war, Gandhi at this 
stage of his career remained loyal to the British Empire. He emphasised that he took 
this stance because he admired and shared many of Britain's political ideals, and had 
himself enjoyed the rights of an imperial citizen, including the freedom to live in South 
Africa. 9 
He then presented carefully constructed arguments to the Indian community as 
to why they should serve the British in the war. Gandhi was a good motivator and in all 
likelihood his legal experience and his understanding of the British political and legal 
systems contributed to his effectiveness as a leader. However, he did record some of 
the oppOSing ideas towards serving the British as well as his own doubts, which shows 
that there were diverse attitudes within the free Indian community regarding the war. 
Gandhi acknowledged how certain Indians questioned the appropriateness of 
supporting the British when the British would oppress the Boers in a similar way to that 
in which they treated the Indians. Furthermore, they urged that since '[they were] more 
or less a community of slaves', how could they then fight a small nation like the Boers 
which was fighting for 'its very existence [and] why should [they] be instrumental in their 
8 Warwick, P. The South African War, The Anglo-Boer War, 1899-1902. p. 190. 
9 Parekh, Gandhi's Political Philosophy. pp. 127, 128. 
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destruction?' The final argument that they presented was that the Boers would 'wreak 
vengeance' upon the Indians if they won. 10 Amongst some nationalist circles in India 
there was also great admiration for the Boers.11 Most strikingly, despite the pro-British 
stance which Gandhi took, he even admitted that when the war was declared 'his 
personal sympathies were with the Boers' but he believed that he had no right 'to 
enforce [his] individual convictions.12 
Even though Gandhi recognised that there was 'a powerful party among [the free 
Indians] which strongly advanced the above argument', he subsequently refuted their 
ideas as follows: 
'Our existence in South Africa is only in our capacity as British Subjects. In 
every memorial we have presented, we have asserted our rights as such. We 
have been proud of our British citizenship, or have given our rulers and the world 
to believe that we are so proud. Our rulers profess to safeguard our rights 
because we are British subjects, and what little rights we still retain, we retain 
because we are British subjects. It would be unbecoming to our dignity as a 
nation to look on with folded hands at a time when ruin stared the British in the 
face as well as ourselves, simply because they ill-treat us here. And such 
criminal inaction could only aggravate our difficulties. If we missed this 
opportunity, which had come to us unsought of proving the falsity of a charge 
which we believe to be false, we should stand self- condemned and it would be 
no matter for surprise if then the English treated us worse than before and 
sneered at us more than ever. The faults in such a case would lie entirely at our 
door.,13 
The notion that, 'We have been proud of our British citizenship, or have given our rulers 
and the world to believe that we are proud.' opens up the possibility that Gandhi did not 
necessarily respect British authority to the extent that he proclaimed, but saw a tactical 
display of loyalty more as the best means of improving Indians' conditions through 
incremental advance. 
He also took his argument to an even more extreme level saying, 'if any class 
among the subjects considers that the action of a government is immoral from a 
religious standpOint before they help or hinder it, they must endeavor fully and even at 
the risk of their lives to dissuade the government from pursuing such a course'. For 
10 Narayan, (ed.), The Selected Works of Mahatma Gandhi. p. 97. 
11 Chandramohan, B. "Hamlet with the Prince of Denmark left out'?, p. 161. 
12 Gandhi, M.K. An Autobiography or the The Story of My Experiences with Truth. p. 264. 
13 Narayan, (ed.) The Selected Works of Mahatma Gandhi. pp. 97, 98. 
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Gandhi, however, 'we have done nothing of the kind. Such a moral crisis is not present 
before us, and no one says that we wish to hold aloof from this war.' Therefore he 
believed that '[their] ordinary duty as subjects ... [was] not to enter into the merits of the 
war,' but rather to, 'render such assistance as [they] possibly [could]'. In response to the 
concern about the Boers winning the war and taking revenge on the Indians, he replied 
that this 'would be doing injustice to the chivalrous Boers as well as ourselves. To 
waste the slightest thought upon such a contingency would only be a sign of our 
effeminacy and a reflection on our loyalty.'14 For Davenport, this shrewd position 
reflected Gandhi's 'rare capacity for promoting a partisan cause without giving offense 
to the other side. ,15 
In all, he saw their cause as going beyond the boundaries of Natal and the rest of 
Southern Africa arguing 'It is true that we are helots in the Empire' but believing 
Simultaneously that Indian rejuvenation would happen in the context of the Empire. 
'This,' he said, 'has been the policy of all our leaders in India and ours too'. He went on 
to insist that, 'the authorities may not always be right, but so long as the subjects owe 
allegiance to a state, their clear duty is generally to accommodate themselves, and to 
accord their support to acts of the state. ,16 It is important to note, however, that Vahed 
argues that this war was a significant turning point in Gandhi's career with regards to his 
viewpoint on the Empire. Whilst prior to the war, Gandhi had placed great emphasis on 
India being part of the Empire, the British reception of the Indians' service 'forced him to 
reassess this strategy,.l1 Vahed acknowledges that the transition in Gandhi's attitude 
was not sudden but the war marked the beginning of the transformation process18. 
Gandhi placed a great deal of emphasis on Natal Indians' position within the British 
Empire and how their actions within the colony would have far a reaching impact. 
However, when looking at why the free Indians partiCipated in the war, one should also 
consider the possibility that many of them had come to see Natal as their new home and 
their primary concern was improving their possibilities in the Colony. 
14 Narayan, (ed.) The Selected Works of Mahatma Gandhi. pp. 9S, 99. 
15 Davenport, South Africa, A Modern History. p. lOS. 
16 Narayan, (ed.), The Selected Works of Mahatma Gandhi. p. 9S. 
17 Vahed, G. 'African Gandhi': The South African War and the limits of imperial identity', Historia, 45(1), 
2000, p. 201. 
18 Ibid. 
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Gandhi was well aware of the opposition to the war from a large minority of politically 
conscious progressives in Britain, ranging from the pro-Boer Liberals and supporters of 
Labour, to smaller Marxist or neo-Marxist groups. But he believed that his starting pOint 
was different to theirs. They lived within the democracy of Britain and hence could 
involve themselves in the policies of their Government. Gandhi, on the other hand, felt 
that as he was a nationalist of a dependency of Great Britain, he was not in a position to 
question the British approach.19 
Recording the War Experience 
As a well-educated man, Gandhi had the foresight to recognise the relevance of 
recording his experiences. Consequently, much of the knowledge of the Indians' 
attitudes towards the British and the war has been told from Gandhi's perspective. In 
reporting on the Indians' decision to involve themselves in the war and the work they 
performed, Gandhi writes in the plural. It is difficult to ascertain whether the rest of the 
Indian community, both free and indentured, felt the same conviction for improving the 
Indians' image in Natal, or if it is more the case that Gandhi asserts that they were 
communally committed. Adding to this issue, it appears that no other known Indians 
recorded the service experience to the same degree as Gandhi, which perhaps raises 
some questions about the importance they attached to their service, although one must 
also allow for the fact that many Indians were illiterate, especially amongst the 
indentured community. Certainly, Gandhi was not alone in his commitment to serving 
the British, but it is difficult to ascertain how deeply the commitment ran throughout the 
Indian community. Gandhi claims that his arguments for Indians to serve in the war 
'commended themselves to many' and that one should not suppose 'that [he] was the 
only one to advance them'. He added that 'even before these views were set forth, there 
were many Indians who held that [they] should do [their] bit in the war'.20 Both in his 
contemporary and retrospective writing Gandhi's vocabulary was obviously motivated by 
his long term political cause and this should be taken into account when analysing his 
recordings of the Indian involvement in the war. 
19 Pyarelal, Mahatma Gandhi, Vol II: The Discovery oJSatyagraha On the Threshold. p. 227. 
20 Tichmann, 'We are sons of the Empire after all'. p. 10. 
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Gandhi's Theories on Non-violence 
Gandhi is renowned for his philosophies on non~violence as a means of overcoming 
one's enemy. Thus, one needs to look at how he reconciled this belief system with 
participating in a war. It was only in the early 1900s that Gandhi specified the political 
strategy of satyagraha21 but he began to develop the techniques of passive protest 
known as satyagraha (soul force), based on the teachings of the pacifist Jain sect of 
Hinduism in South Africa.22 Chandramond claims that the war played a role in 
developing Gandhi's religio-political philosophy and, in terms of Gandhi's personal 
growth, sees this as the war's 'most significant legacy,.23 
In his retrospective writings, Gandhi attempted to make sense of the Indians' 
contribution to the war effort. His teachings of ahimsa pertained particularly to the 
issues of war and non-violence and were uncompromising in their application. Yet, he 
believed that non-violence did not signify the unwillingness to fight against an enemy. 
For he argued, the enemy is always ignorance and the evil is that which men do: it is not 
in human beings themselves. Even though he loathed war and violence in all its forms, 
Gandhi could not be classified at this stage as an orthodox pacifist. He held that the 
courage and heroism often displayed by war-struck individuals reflected well upon their 
moral character, even if war itself was 'a dark, moral blot on those who encouraged or 
allowed it to happen.' He rejected avoidance or even indirect participation in war, and 
refused to let others fight his battles for him. As he proposed, 'if I have only a choice 
between paying for the army of soldiers to kill my neighbours or to be a soldier myself, I 
would, as I must, consistent with my creed, enlist as a soldier in the hope of contrOlling 
the forces of violence and even of converting my comrades'. 24 
He later wrote, 'I believe that where there is only a choice between cowardice 
and violence I would advise violence. Hence it was that I took part in the Boer War, the 
so-called Zulu rebellion and the late War. Hence also do I advocate training in arms for 
those who believe in the method of violence. I would rather have India resort to arms in 
21 Brain, 'Natal Indians, 1860 - 1910 from co-operation, through competition, to conflict, p. 263. 
22 Warwick,. The South African War, The Anglo-Boer War, 1899-1902. p.191. 
23 Chandramohan, B. "Hamlet with the Prince of Denmark left out'?', p. 162. 
24 'Difficulty of Practice' , Young India, 30 January 1930, cited in Iyer, R.( ed.), The Moral and Political 
Writings of Mahatma Gandhi, Vol II, Truth and Non-Violence. (Oxford, 1986), p. 13. 
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order to defend her honour than that she should in a cowardly manner become or 
remain a helpless witness to her own dishonour. ,25 He later also philosophised: 
even the seeming endorsement of violent action by my participation on the side 
of Britain in the Boer War and the Zulu revolt was a recognition in the interest of 
non-violence of an inevitable situation. That the participation may nevertheless 
have been due to my weakness or ignorance of the workings of the universal law 
of non- violence is quite possible. Only I have no conviction then, nor have any 
now, of such weaknesses or ignorance.26 
Indians Offer their Services 
On 16 October 1899, about 100 Indians assembled at a meeting held in Durban under 
the auspices of the Natal Indian Congress to decide what their response to the war 
should be.27 Pyarelal says although the arguments that Gandhi was presenting were not 
new, the burning conviction with which he spoke produced such enthusiasm that almost 
all present put their names down.28 
Swan points out that the Natal Indian Congress's political activity, which had 
already started to decline before the war, was more or less suspended for the duration 
in the interests of maintaining a working relationship with the whites. She claims that 
Gandhi could see nothing in the party's future except monitoring the administration of 
discriminatory laws and appealing to the imperial government in the event of new 
threats.29 In light of this, it is interesting how much energy Gandhi brought to the 
politically-motivated work in the war. 
Vahed pOints out the irony that at the very time the Indians were striving to prove 
their loyalty, the 'Indian Question' was central to the contest for a seat for the Natal 
Legislative Assembly. When Gandhi was telling volunteers to be in 'a state of 
readiness', 'A Working Man' complained that whites did not object to Indians as long as 
they 'keep to their place' for Natal was 'a white man's country.'30 
Aside from the whites' determination not to include the various black groups in 
2S Iyer, R. (ed.), The Moral and Political Writings of Mahatma Gandhi. p. 298. 
26 Ibid. p. 394. 
27 Gandhi, M.K. Satyagraha in South Africa. cited in Tichmann, P. 'We are sons of the Empire after all', 
pp. to, 11. 
28 Pyarelal, Mahatma Gandhi, Vol II, p. 266. 
29 Swan, Gandhi: The South African Experience. p. 60. 
30 Natal Mercury, 4 December, 1899 cited in Vahed, 'Natal's Indians, the Empire and the South African 
War, 1899-1902', p. 4. 
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the war, the Indians faced the additional obstacle of lacking appropriate war skills. 
Gandhi raised the practical concern of what the Indians could do since 'none of [them] 
had ever wielded a weapon of war' and he well recognised that 'even the work 
performed by non-combatants in war required training. ,31 
He knew the Indians' offer would not be readily accepted, and pondered 'if we 
volunteered for service, how could we induce the Government to accept our offer?' Yet, 
Gandhi was very committed to the decision, and in his writings stressed that 'finally, we 
came to the conclusion that we should make earnest endeavors to get our offer 
accepted, that the experience of our work would teach us to do more work, that if we 
had the will, God would grant us the ability to serve, that we need not worry how we 
could do the work entrusted but should train ourselves for it as best we might, and that 
having once decided to serve, we should cease to think of discriminating between 
dignified work and other and serve, putting up even with insults if it came to that. ,32 
After the Boers had pOSitioned themselves to seize Ladysmith, Colonel Gallwey, 
the principal Medical Officer, stressed to General Buller the need to make arrangements 
for an European Ambulance Corps. The Corps was formed accordingly, hospitals were 
improvised and doctors, nurses and bearers began to be hurried to the front. That gave 
Gandhi his opportunity. On behalf of the Indians he telegraphed the Government how 
they would do even 'sweepers' and 'scavanengers' work' in the hospitals.33 
As Gandhi had predicted, the local colonials as well as many of the English 
initially met his offer with hostility, confirming his view that the average Englishman 
believed that the Indian was 'a coward, incapable of taking risks or looking beyond his 
immediate self-interest.,34 
In his correspondence with colonial authorities Gandhi made no attempt to mask 
Indian intentions for offering their services. He wanted it to be understood that this was 
a voluntary act to prove their loyalty which they hoped would be reCiprocated with 
greater respect and protection. In his speeches, he emphasised that the Indians had an 
'unflinching devotion to duty and extreme eagerness to serve our Sovereign' and stated 
openly that the 'motive underlying their humble offer is to endeavor to prove that, in 
common with other subjects of the Queen-Empress in South Africa, the Indians, too, are 
31 Narayan, (ed.), The Selected Works of Mahatma Gandhi. p. 100. 
32 Ibid .. p. 101. 
33 Pyarelal, Mahatma Gandhi, VallI. p. 274. 
34 Gan<llii,M.K. An Autobiography or the The Story of My Experiences with Truth. p. 264. 
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ready to do duty for their Sovereign on the battlefield,.35 In a letter to the Colonial 
Secretary in Pietermaritzburg on 19 October 1899, he explained that their 'services are 
offered by the applicants without pay' and it was 'open to the authorities to accept the 
services of all or so many as they may consider fit or necessary.' He admitted that 'we 
do not know how to handle arms. It is not our fault; it is perhaps our misfortune that we 
cannot, but it may be there are other duties no less important to be performed on the 
battlefield and, no matter of what description they may be.'36 
Throughout, Gandhi remained positive, and believed that the willingness and 
preparedness conveyed through letters created a 'very good impression', 37 even though 
the offer was dismissed on several occasions. Local and Imperial authorities gave him 
a variety of responses ranging from insulting rejections to hesitation. In part, this 
probably reflected the lack of willingness from the British authorities, to have to 
reciprocate the Indians' services, rather than simply their lack of faith in the Indians' 
capabilities. Yet, as Gandhi wrote, he would not 'rest satisfied' with such refusal. 38 
He spoke to Jameson. a current Member of the Legislative Council, to whom he 
was well-known and offered the Indians' services. Doke recreates the dialogue between 
the two men which may not have been the exact words that were spoken, but indicates 
something of the struggles which Gandhi endured. Jameson. laughing at the idea. said 
'you Indians know nothing of war. You would only be a drag on the army, you would 
have to be taken care of, instead of being of help to us.' 'But,' replied Gandhi, 'is there 
nothing we can do? Can we do ordinary servants work in connection with the Hospital? 
Surely that will not demand very great intelligence? 'No,' he said, 'it all needs training.' 
Yet, he had the support of F.A. Laughton, who he had initially met at the Point 
Demonstration. Laughton said to Gandhi, 'that's the very thing, do it well, raise your 
people in the estimation of us all, and it will do them good. Never mind Mr. Jameson.' 
Thus encouraged, another letter was written to the Government, but this failed toO.39 
The Principal Under Secretary of Natal wrote to Gandhi on 23 October 1899 in a 
more respectful tone, informing him that 'the Government [was] deeply impressed with 
the offer of Her Majesty's loyal Indian subjects in Durban who have offered their 
35 Meer, F.(ed.), The South African Gandhi, An Abstract of the Speeches and Writing ofMK. Gandhi, 1893 
~ 1914. (Durban, 1995), pp. 744, 745. 
36 Narayan, (ed.), The Selected Works of Mahatma Gandhi. p. 101. 
37 Ibid. pp. 101, 102. 
38 Gandhi, M.K. An Autobiography or the The Story of My Experiences with Truth. p. 264. 
39 Doke, UK. Gandhi, An Indian Patriot in South Africa. pp. 53, 54. 
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services ... and should the occasion arise, the Government [would]1 be glad to avail itself 
of those services.' and asking him to 'convey to the Indians in question an expression of 
the Government's appreciation of their loyal offer:40 
Thus, it can be seen that the process of simply gaining acceptance of their offer 
to serve was not easily achieved and it was largely thanks to the determination of 
Gandhi and the few European voices who were prepared to support and re-enforce the 
Indians' capabilities and willingness.41 
General Resistance to Black Involvement 
Apart from the specific agitation felt towards Indians who could claim special privileges 
as subjects of the Empire, the whites' reluctance to accept the Indians' offer should be 
placed in a wider context. They tended to classify the Indians as a non-white group 
rather than as British subjects. Warwick makes the obvious point that the South African 
War was fought in a region where white people made up only a fifth of the total 
population and in Natal the ratio was almost ten blacks to every white.42 Thus, the white 
authorities would have been cautious of any form of Indian involvement if they saw any 
potential in it to evoke a troublesome response from other sectors of the black 
population. The Natal government was determined that firearms or ammunition should 
not be supplied to black civilians, whose protection the ministers felt, should be 
organised under the umbrella of the pOlice force and not carried out on an irregular 
basis by chiefs themselves.43 The whites feared the response of African people to the 
war, and neither the colonial British nor the Boers at the outset committed all their 
resources to do battle with one another. Both sides took precautions to ensure that 
troops were held in reserve to be prepared to counter possible African disturbances.44 
Indians Prepare to Serve in the War 
Gandhi asked Dr. Prince to examine the Indians who had volunteered their services to 
know how many were fit to serve on the battlefield. On 18 and 19 October Prince 
40 Meer, (ed.), The South African Gandhi, An Abstract of the Speeches and Writing ofMK. Gandhi, 1893-
1914. p. 745. 
41 Doke, MK. Gandhi, An Indian Patriot in South Africa. p. 54. 
42 Warwick, The South African War, The Anglo-Boer War, 1899 -1902. p. 186. 
43 Warwick, 'Black People and the War.' p. 76. 
44 Warwick, The South African War, The Anglo-Boer War, 1899-1902. p. 192. 
81 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
examined 25 of the volunteers and passed 23, whose names were sent to the 
Government. 45 
Many of the leaders who served would continue to playa prominent role in South 
African Indian politics in subsequent years. For instance, James Walter Godfrey, a 
lawyer, served 2 terms on the South African Indian Congress and became Vice 
President of the Indo-European Joint Council. Vincent Lawrence was Gandhi's 
confidential clerk for 6 years and became Chairman of the Durban and District Indian 
Educational Advisory Committee, Honorary Treasurer of the Indian War Memorial 
Committee and President of Catholic Indian Young Men's Society.46 Interestingly, Nazar, 
along with J Horne, did not qualify in the initial examination but he subsequently was 
passed and went on to serve as a volunteer. 47 Prince recorded the men's professions 
as well as their ages, heights, weights and chest sizes, all of which were probably 
intended to be an indication of their strength.48 
Shortly afterwards, Dr. Booth started to give ambulance classes almost every 
evening. He trained the Ambulance Corps leaders in ambulance and nursing work and 
also secured medical certificates of fitness for service for them.49 Booth, who was an 
Anglican missionary medical doctor, was a friend of Gandhi's.50 He introduced Gandhi to 
Bishop Baynes of Natal. There were a number of Christian Indians in the Corps, and 
the Bishop was delighted with the proposal and promised to help them in getting their 
services accepted. Laughton and Escombe also enthusiastically supported the plan.51 
In the opening stage of hostilities, the British had underestimated the outer 
effectiveness of the Boer defenses against the relief of Ladysmith and soon found 
themselves in a pOSition where additional aid was badly needed. Brookes and Webb 
45 The following names were listed: M.K. Gandhi (Advocate, 29), H.L. Paul, (Interpreter, 37), A.H. Peters 
(Interpreter, 30), R.K .. Khan (Advocate, 26), Parsee Dhanyisha (Merchant, 27), C. Cooper (Bookkeeper, 22) 
J. Godfrey (Attorney's Clerk, 18), J.D. Home (Clerk, 18), M.H. Nazar (Gentleman, Fellow of the Imperial 
Institute and Member of the East Indian Associate, no age given), R. Bughwan (Photographer, 24), P. Peter 
(Printer, 19), N Dhunde (Bookkeeper, 18), V. Lawrence (Attorney's Clerk, 26), L Gabriel (Photographer, 
27), G.D. Harry (Attorney's Cleark, 21), R Govinda (no profession listed, 21), S. Shadrack (Clerk, 37), 
Ramtahan (Compositor, 20), P.K. Naidoo (Merchant, 23), A Singh (Clerk, 21), S.N. Christopher, 
Attorney's Clerk, 30), C Stearns (no profession listed, 40), Natal Archives, P.W.D. 8047, List of Indian 
Volunteers examined by Dr. Prince, 18 October 1899. 
46 Bramdaw, D. (ed.), South African Indian Who's Who of 1939. (Pietermaritzburg, 1939), pp. 106 - 142. 
47 Natal Archives, CSO, Vol. 1632,804711899, Principle Under-Secretary to Gandhi, 23 October 1899 
cited in Vahed, 'Natal's Indians, the Empire and the South African War, 1899', p. 2. 
48 Natal Archives, P.W.D.8047, List of Indian Volunteer examined by Dr. Prince, 18 October 1899. 
49 Gandhi,M.K. An Autobiography or the The Story of My Experiences with Truth. p. 264. 
50 Tichmann, 'We are sons of the Empire after all'. p. 10. 
S1 Gandhi, M.K. An Autobiography or the The Story of My Experiences with Truth. pp. 264, 265. 
82 
Un
iv
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
have accurately described the Siege of Ladysmith as a 'triangular tragi-comedy' 
between the Boers, White in Ladysmith and Buller who was in charge of the relief. The 
siege lasted almost four months until 28 February 1900. There are many critics who 
feel that White oUght never to have let himself be besieged, but likewise there is a 
general agreement that Buller ought to have achieved the relief weeks before he did.52 
Thus the Indians' inclusion should be seen in the light of pressures, with the urgency of 
the situation forcing the British to call on Africans as well as to accept the Indians' offer. 
Lambert has suggested that, 'had the war not begun with such dramatic reverses in 
northern Natal, the Ministry's determination to keep the war 'white' and restrict African 
participation to the supply of labour might have succeeded.53 Thus, external factors 
combined with the continued renewal of the Indians' offer meant they finally achieved 
their aim. It was at this point of extreme necessity that the Indians obtained acceptance. 
At the stage when the British realised that they urgently needed additional auxiliary 
assistance, the concept of using indentured labourers was introduced. It was Gandhi's 
idea to permit indentured labourers to join the Corps, but he explained that it was the 
Government which approached the employers. 54 When it was finally formed, the Corps 
consisted mostly of indentured Indians supplied by the estates in Natal, through the 
Protector's Department. 55 
Introduction of Indentured Labourers into the Corps 
Swan maintains that Gandhi's call for partiCipation was notably to add substance to the 
merchants' claim to be 'desirable' citizens, and that this move fitted well into the elite's 
strategy which the Congress had pursued since its inception.56 The picture of whether 
the motivation behind Gandhi and the Congress's work incorporated the concerns of the 
indentured labourers remains fairly vague, but certainly the indentured labourers were 
not in a position to partiCipate in the free Indians' decision-making processes regarding 
the war. 
52 Brookes and Webb, A History of Natal. p. 206. 
53 Lambert, J. 'Loyalty its own reward': the South African War experience of Natal's loyal Africans'. paper 
presented at the UNISA Library Conference, 'Rethinking the South African War, 1899 - 1902',3- 5 August 
1998, p. 4. 
54 Narayan, (ed.), The Selected Works of Mahatma Gandhi. pp. 101, 102. 
55 Meer, (ed.) The South African Gandhi, An Abstract of the Speeches and Writing ofMK. Gandhi, 1893-
1914. pp. 755, 756. 
56 Swan, Gandhi: The South African Experience. p. 89. 
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In terms of considering whether the Indian contribution to the war was collective, 
it is relevant that the suggestion to use indentured labour came from Gandhi, although, 
their inclusion was only possible with the consent of the labourers' employers. The fact 
that it was the Natal Government which then approached these employers, rather than 
the request coming independently from Gandhi or the Congress, must have influenced 
the employers' decision to allow their workers to go. Furthermore, as will be shown, a 
situation almost arose where only the indentured labourers were used which would have 
altered the political significance of Indian involvement. 
Buller wrote to the Natal Government at the end of November to recruit Indian 
bearers. In response to this, Barnes, Chief Engineer, Public Works Department was 
appointed to recruit men. 57 Buller made it clear to the Natal Government that the 
Indians would not be required to work within the range of tire. 58 
A letter from Clarence, Superintendent of the Indian Ambulance Corps, to 
Barnes on 12 December 1899, indicated that the response from the sugar estates had 
been good with the names of 543 men having been gathered. 59 For Barnes, the 
cooperation of sugar owners 'is to be the more appreciated seeing that this is the busy 
season of the year, cane crushing being in full swing. ,60 
Clarence listed the sugar estates that had sent labourers.61 Pyralel added to 
these names Messrs Marshall and Wilson and the Colleries Companl2 and a later list 
of 11 December 1899 mentions further factories. 63 Clarence's list indicates that these 
men were accompanied by their sirdars.64 These men were labeled as 'Sub-overseers' 
and were paid 10 shillings a day.65 
Following the Indians' service, Gandhi received letters requesting the return of 
indentureds to their employers. Gilbert Wilkinson of the Ottawa Estate complained that a 
57 Vahed, 'Natal's Indians, the Empire and the South African War, 1899 - 1902', p.3. 
58 Natal Archives, P.W.D. 4964199, Chief Engineer to Protector ofImmigrants, 811211899 cited in 
Tichmann, 'We are sons of the Empire after all'. p. 10. 
59 Vahed, 'Natal's Indians, the Empire and the South African War, 1899 -1902', p. 3. 
60 Natal Archives, PWD, 4694/99, Barnes to Col. Johnston, 13 December 1899, cited in Vahed, 'Natal's 
Indians, the Empire and the South African War', p. 3. 
61 Reynolds Brothers, Umzinto (105), Shires & Co. (67), Elands Laagte Colliery (68), Saville Bros (45), 
Cornubia (80), Milkwood Kraal (25), Sutton (18), Sacharine Hill Estate (31), Mount Edgecombe (41), 
Blackburn Factory (26), Natal Archives, PWD, 4694/99, Donnolly to Barnes, 21 December 1899 cited in 
Vahed, 'Natal's Indians, the Empire and the South African War, 1899 - 1902', p. 3. 
62 Pyarelal, Mahatma Gandhi, Vol II. p. 275. 
63 Natal Archives, P.W.D. 496411899, Chief Engineer, PWD - Relative to Indians for Bearer Corps 
64 Natal Archives,. P.W.D. 4964, Clarence to Chief Engineer, 12 December 1899 cited in Tichmann, 'We 
are sons of the Empire after all'. p. 12. 
65 Natal Archives, PWD 4964/1899, letter from Clarence to Barnes, Chief Engineer, 12 December 1899. 
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number of his 'coolies' had left the estate and joined the Indian Ambulance stretcher 
bearers' corps and requested him 'kindly to arrange to send them all back to me ... On 
my behalf you can assure them that I shall take no action against them for desertion and 
shall give them free pardon.' Similarly the Natal Government Railway authorities 
intimated to Gandhi that one Sidney Josiah, a timekeeper in the Railway who had 
offered himself as a volunteer to work under him, could not be spared, and should be 
sent back to his job.66 These letters seem to indicate that, in some instances at least, 
the sending of indentureds to the front had not been particularly well organised and the 
labourers had left without discussing their return with their employers. Although it is a 
tentative suggestion, it does open up the possibility that some indentured labourers were 
acting on their own convictions when they left for the front. 
The first call for Indian service came when Colonel Gallwey requested 60 Indians to 
work at Fort Napier Hospital in Pietermaritzburg.67 The Protector of Indian Immigrants 
sent 28 men on 7 December 1899, and promised that a further 32 would follow the next 
day.68 However, it seemed only indentured labourers were wanted. Gandhi wired back 
that it would be a great disappointment, if after all their preparation, the Government 
would not accept the ambulance volunteers.69 If the volunteers had not been able to 
participate in the war, the interest in the various services offered by the whole Indian 
community may have been considerably less in contemporary and historical writing. 
However, Barnes indicated to Clarence that he wanted to 'take advantage of the Indians 
from Canon Booth's Ambulance classes', based on the recommendation of Colonel 
Johnston,70 and Gandhi, the leaders and the other volunteers were later called upon. 
Thus indentured Indians served in the war prior to the volunteer Corps, and 
Gandhi acknowledges that the free Indians who helped him to form the Corps should 
not take credit for the inclusion of the indentured labourers. This he said 'should rightly 
have to go to the planters,71 and he concedes how the indentured labourers who joined 
66 Natal Mercury, 15 December 1899 cited in Pyarelal, Mahatma Gandhi, Vol II. p. 294. 
67 Natal Archives, CSO, 9294/1899, G.D. Plowman to General Officer Commanding, Lines of 
Communication,S December, 1899 cited in Vahed, 'Natal's Indians, the Empire and the South African 
War',p.3. 
68 Vahed, 'Natal's Indians, the Empire and the South African War, p. 3. 
69 Pyarelal, Mahatma Gandhi, Vol II. p. 275. 
70 Natal Archives, PWD, Vol. 2/72, 496411899, Barnes to Gallwey, PMO, 13 December, 1899 cited in 
Vahed, 'Natal's Indians, the Empire and the South African War, 1899 1902', p. 3. 
71 Narayan, (ed.), The Selected Works of Mahatma Gandhi. p. 103. 
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the Corps were under the charge of the English overseers from their respective factories 
and plantations. Yet, he goes on to describe how the management of the entire Corps 
naturally passed into the Indian leaders hands,72 and the whole Corps was described as 
the Indian Ambulance Corps (also referred to as the Indian Stretcher Bearers Corps).73 
General Buller acknowledged the work done by 'the Indian community' and did 
not draw particular distinctions in his dispatches.74 Nevertheless, when dealing with the 
issue of certificates of acknowledgment which Gandhi requested after the Indians had 
served in the war, the British authorities emphasised that the indentured labourers had 
been organised by the planters and did not hold the same status as volunteers. 
Composition of the Indian Ambulance Corps 
The Indian Ambulance Corps under Gandhi's leadership consisted of between three and 
four hundred free Indians with the remaining two thirds, being indentured labourers/5 
The number of Indians who served increased at each consecutive battle, as more 
indentured labourers were sent to the front. There are some discrepancies in writings 
about the total number of Indians who served but, according to Gandhi, the Corps 
became 1,100 strong, with nearly 40 leaders, a complement reached when they served 
at Spion KOp.76 Most of the men were employed between 10 and 20 December1899.77 
The ex-indentured Indians in the Corps were recruited through the efforts of 
other free Indians. Of these free men, thirty-seven were looked upon as leaders, and 
the offer made to Government had been sent under their signatures.78 Among the 
leaders, there were barristers and accountants, while others were either artisans such 
as masons or carpenters, or ordinary labourers. According to Gandhi, there were 
Hindus and Musalmans, Madrasis and 'upcountry' men and all classes and creeds were 
well represented. There were hardly any traders in the Corps but they subscribed 
considerable amounts of money.79 Apart from the names sent forward by Prince, when 
Nazar was sending names to the War Office of those men who should receive 
72 Narayan, (ed.), The Selected Works of Mahatma Gandhi. p. 103. 
73 Tichmann, 'We are sons of the Empire after all'. p. 10. 
74 Narayan, (ed.), The Selected Works of Mahatma Gandhi. p. 103. 
75 Gandhi, M.K. An Autobiography or The Story of My Experiences with Truth. p. 265. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Vahed, Natal's Indians, the Empire and the South African, 1899 -1902', p. 3. 
78 Narayan, (ed.), The Selected Works of Mahatma Gandhi. p. 102. 
79 Ibid. p. 103. 
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acknowledgement for their work, he included prominent Natal merchants, Mohamed C 
Anglia and Dada Osman. Among the other individuals he mentioned were associates 
Mr. Goodricke and Mr. Laughton, Durban law partners, and Rahim Khan, the other 
Secretary of the Natal Indian Congress, although it is not explicit in what capacity they 
served.80 The other volunteers were mostly young free Indians, many of who became 
important political, sporting and community leaders over the next three to four decades. 
Booth had agreed to accompany the Corps at Gandhi's request. Gandhi and the 
organisers of the Ambulance Corps faced numerous obstacles and were almost faced 
with a situation where Booth could not join them. In the few days preceding the Indians' 
departure, Bishop Baynes felt that Booth could not be spared from his mission work. Yet 
Gandhi persuaded Baynes of the strong need for Booth's guidance. Afterwards, Colonel 
Gallwey installed Booth as Medical Officer for the Corps.81 An incident like this was 
minor but it does serve to illustrate the determination with which Gandhi worked. Whilst 
he worked predominantly with the Indian Christians, Gandhi says that he freely mixed 
with Indians of all denominations.82 Another white, Herbert Kitchin, also joined the 
Corps.83 After the Indians' work in the war, Kitchin sent Gandhi graphic descriptions of 
the war, allowing Gandhi to follow the developments from afar.84 
The leaders served without any payment, but most of the free Indians who served 
accepted remuneration.85 Vahed suggests that the free Indians joined because the 
bearer corps represented a valuable source of employment, whilst the situation was 
different for the elite merchant and trader classes who were continuing their fight against 
anti-Indian legislation on the ground that they were British subjects.86 There may be 
validity in that statement, although Pyarelal reports that these men received £1 per week 
and rations, even though many of them were earning much more than £4 a week from 
their respective pursuits.87 The £1 financial remuneration received by many of the free 
80 Bhana, and Hunt., Gandhi's Editor, p 56. 
81 Pyarelal, Mahatma Gandhi, Vol II. p. 276. 
82 Narayan. (ed.), The Selected Works of Mahatma Gandhi. 102. 
83 Vahad, 'Natal's Indians, the Empire and the South African War, 1899 - 1902', p. 2. 
84 Pyarelal, Mahatma Gandhi, Vol II. p. 301. 
85 Pillay, B. British Indians in the Transvaal. p. 88. 
86 Vahed, 'Natal's Indians, the Empire and the South African War, 1899 - 1902', p. 13. 
87 Pyarelal, Mahatma Gandhi, Vol II. p. 276. 
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Indians does not imply they were not motivated to serve the British, but it does blur the 
reading of their loyalty. The indentured Indians were also paid about 20 shillings per 
week as against the 35 shillings per week paid to whites. 88 As will be discussed, 
understanding the indentureds' attitude towards the war is further complicated by their 
not having control over the decision regarding their participation. It is likely that they did 
not foresee the potential for social advancements accrued from loyal service which the 
free Indians were trying to gain. 
88 Natal Archives, PWD, Vol. 2172, 4964/1900, F. W. Barnes, Chief Engineer to A. L. Griffm, Accounting 
Department, 30 January 1900. cited in Vahed, 'Natal's Indians, the Empire and the South African War, 
1899 - 1902', p. 3. 
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6 
Indian Involvement in the War 
The contribution that the Indians made to the British in the South African War, 1899 -
1902, was one of their more striking attempts to protect and improve their rights and to 
expand a level of political awareness and organisation which was to grow in future 
years. Indian activities, of course, were fairly minor in comparison to that of other black 
groups. However, their contribution deserves a place in the body of knowledge that 
recognises that many black groups throughout the Southern African republics and 
colonies were active in the war and were aware that the outcome would impact on their 
future. Furthermore, as part of a historical discussion of their own political development, 
their war involvement was phYSical proof of loyalty of the politically conscious free 
Indians to the British and the Empire. 
Colonial Responses to Indians Leaving for the Front 
The leaders of the stretcher-bearer corps were honoured by various leading individuals 
in the white and Indian communities of Natal. Significantly, they attended a reception at 
Escombe's residence before leaving for the front. Pyarelal reported that much water had 
flowed under the bridge since Escombe had met Gandhi in his office on 20 January 
1897 after the Point Demonstration and that he was deeply moved by the Indians' 
actions.1 Following on this, Escombe is reported to have spoken to Gandhi after the 
Battle of Colenso, saying, 'I have never realised there was so much Christian charity 
locked up in the Indian breast. ,2 He then went on to express his regret about 'Anti-Asian' 
measures and 'hoped that time would remove any inconvenience. ,3 
The Natal Mercury of 14 December 1899 provided a brief press report of the 
speech that Gandhi had been asked to make at the function. This prestigious invitation, 
and the fact that it was reported would have been regarded as a political advance by 
Gandhi and other leaders.4 Naturally, this public acknowledgment was a marked 
contrast to the anonymous manner in which the indentured labourers' work was treated. 
On this occasion, Gandhi spoke of the enthusiasm that the men had shown 'as 
subjects of the Queen, to do something to prove their loyalty.' He made it clear that they 
I Pyarelal, Mahatma Gandhi, Vol II. p. 279. 
2 Gandhi in conversation with the author, Pyarelal, Mahatma Gandhi, Vol II. p. 283. 
3 Indian Opinion, 3 September 1903 cited in Pyarelal, Mahatma Gandhi, Vol II. p. 283. 
4 Meer, (ed.), The South African Gandhi. p. 743. 
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had '[come] to the conclusion that they would offer their services to the Colonial or 
Imperial Government, unconditionally and absolutely without payment, in any capacity in 
which they could be useful, in order to show the Colonists that they were worthy 
subjects of the Queen.' He acknowledged those whites who had supported their cause 
such as Prince, Booth, Bishop Baynes and also Colonel Johnston. Gandhi ended by 
saying that 'their dream had been realized, and although, unfortunately they were not to 
be engaged in the fighting line, he hoped they would be able to discharge their duties 
well. ,5 
Earlier in the day Gandhi, Nazar, Khun, Booth and other leaders had been given 
a hearty send off at the Congress Hall and that night Parsi Rustamji treated them to a 
sumptious dinner.6 
Pyarelal claimed that the Indians' offer of service was all a revelation to many whites of 
Natal. More than one colonist felt compelled to revise his earlier attitude towards the 
Indians, as illustrated by the following which appeared in the Natal Mercury on 11 
November, 1899: 
My apologies to you, Ramasamy Naidu - I have often called you names not 
altogether complimentary ... but well, let bygones be bygones from now, for you 
are sons of the Empire after all, and 
Tho' he speak from a swarthy cheek 
The friend of a friend is mine. 
The offer made by the Indians of Durban to raise a coloured contingent ... will be 
always remembered to their credit in days to come? 
However, there were also examples of anti-Indianism or scepticism. The editor of the 
Natal Mercury, commenting on the departure of Indian volunteers for the Front, advised 
his readers not to forget the 'loyalty and patriotism' of Indians but hoped equally that 
after the war the means would be found to relieve Natal of the Indians who 'are not all 
that is desirable as inhabitants of Natal. ,8 This statement in many ways pre-empted the 
tone of the response that British officials would adopt towards Indians after the war. 
5 Meer, (ed.), The South African Gandhi. p. 747. 
6 Pyarelal, Mahatma Gandhi, Vol II. p. 280. 
7 Natal Mercury, 11 November 1899 cited in Pyarelal, Mahatma Gandhi, Vol II. p. 278. 
8 Natal Mercury, 13 December 1899 cited in Vahed, 'Natal's Indians, the Empire and the South African 
War, 1899 - 1902', p. 13. 
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Indians from the Transvaal 
With the coming of the war, Vane notes that most of the Indians resident in the 
Transvaal left for Natal or the Cape Colony, while some went back to India.9 However, 
the option of fleeing to Natal presented obstacles, since, the Immigration Restriction Act 
was in force. The Government would only allow Indians who could prove that they were 
previously domiciled in the Colony to enter Natal. They had to produce two affidavits to 
the effect that they were doing some 'permanent business' for a term of at least two 
years in Natal. To receive a 'domicile certificate' they were charged a fee of half a 
Crown and they then had also to pay lawyers to draw up the affidavits. 10 Otherwise, 
Indians were forced to pay a deposit of £10 for a temporary visit to the Colony. In July 
1899, Gandhi asked the Government to suspend this deposit during the 'period of 
tension' to facilitate the entry of Indians. The Government replied that it did not have the 
power to do SO.11 The Standard and Digger's News, reflecting Boer opinion, ridiculed 
Natal's hypocrisy. In a scathing article it pointed out the inconsistency of the Imperial 
Government in coercing the Transvaal to do justice to the Uitlanders, while allowing 
Natal to treat the British Indians as they pleased. Faced with the embarrassing exposure 
of their inconsistent policies, the British Vice-Consul in Johannesburg vigorously took up 
the Indians' cause and further pressure was exerted from the High Commissioner, Sir 
Alfred Milner. The Natal Government thereupon conceded that In the event of the war 
breaking out, they would be 'guided by considerations of humanity,12 and allow Indians 
to enter Natal. 
Yet, there was an additional problem because the railway line between Durban 
and Johannesburg had been closed. Indian refugees had to go to Durban via Delagoa 
Bay, but the Natal Government had instructed shipping lines in Delagoa Bay not to take 
Indian passengers. Again, Imperial pressure was exerted and the Government 
suspended this instruction.13 Vahed explains that although the Natal Indian Congress 
tendered its 'best thanks' to the Natal Government for this 'gracious act', 14 Gandhi 
questioned why it was that special arrangements were made to receive alleged white 
9 Vane, 'The South African Indians, A Plea for Better Understanding'. p. 15. 
IQ Pyarelal, Mahatma Gandhi, Vol II. p. 229. 
II Vahed, 'Natal's Indians, the Empire and the South African War, 1899 -1902', p. 11. 
12 Pyarelal, Mahatma Gandhi, Vol II. p. 230. 
13 Vahed, 'Natal's Indians, the Empire and the South African War, 1899 - 1902', p. 11. 
14 Gandhi, M.K.Collected Works cited in Vahed, "Natal's Indians, the Empire and the South African War, 
1899 - 1902, p. 11. 
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prostitutes and criminals from the Transvaal, while Indians were subject to such 
difficulties. is Gandhi's reaction does show that at times his frustration with British policy 
was overtly stated, whilst in other situations he believed discretion to be more 
advantageous. It also highlights his always acute awareness of social distinctions. 
Bhana and Hunt also raise the point that Indians who lived in Natal and wanted 
to leave the colony for the duration of the war, could obtain permits to return but only 
with great difficulty. is Thus, for those free Indians who did not align themselves with the 
British cause but wished to live in the colony, there was little option but to see the war 
through. 
Responses to the War from India 
Chandramohan has written an important, new essay on the significance of India's role in 
the war which is helpful to this discussion as the responses to the war from India are 
relevant from various perspectives. Firstly, there was the obvious link between Natal and 
India, with Natal having received many Indians and both places being part of the 
Empire. Despite their status as emigrants, the free Indians in Natal and the Boer 
Republics maintained their social affiliations with India and often economic and political 
links as well. The connection was also perpetuated in India. Many Indians within India 
as well as the British Indian Government, monitored and commented on Indians' 
experience around the Empire. When looking at how different sectors of Indian society 
responded to the war, one should question if they viewed this war in terms of the British 
and the Empire or if they were wanting to take a stand for Indians in South Africa as well 
as in India. Secondly, the racial discrimination displayed by the British authorities in not 
allowing their black subjects to assume combatant roles extended to the rest of the 
Empire and well·trained Indians were deprived of the chance of taking up their weapons 
to fight. Thirdly, there are comparisons to be drawn between the reaction of different 
sectors of Indian society and Natal Indians to the war. Yet, it should also be noted that 
there seems to have been minimal contact made between the Natal Indians and those 
auxiliaries who participated in the war from India. 
The Indian Government naturally became involved in the war because it was part of the 
Empire and its Imperial voices rallied support for the war. Chandramoham relates a 
15 Vahed, 'Natal's Indians, the Empire and the South African War, 1899 -1902', p.ll. 
16 Bhana, and Hunt, Gandhi's Editor. p. 11. 
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typical example where, at the special church service parade organised in February 1900 
for the Lumsden Horse about to embark for South Africa, the Bishop of Calcutta 
declared, 'It is a matter which vitally and personally touches your interest that to your 
fellow-subjects in South Africa should have been denied elementary rights of citizenship, 
the common privileges of humanity.' He claimed that 'the injury that has been done to 
them is done to you. ,17 Nevertheless, as Chandramohan points out, there is no 
indication here that the Bishop included Indian South Africans in the 'fellow subjects'. 
India sent 7794 white combat troops and 6,761 horses. 1B Equally, there was a strong 
tradition of Indian loyalty and martial valour displayed in previous imperial wars 19 and it 
seems that the Imperial authorities assumed 'the Indian 'native' contribution' to be 'just a 
matter of loyalty to be expected in times of crisis. ,20 
All the same, there was predictably not a uniform reaction to the war and the 
ambivalence about what the war represented to the Indian population is reflected in their 
different responses to the conflict. Indian loyalists offered their services, but wider Indian 
support was not always so forthcoming.21 Certainly, the princely assistance to the British 
was not unexpected, given the fact that many of them owed their position and survival to 
the Raj. The Indians' support was officially acknowledged by Queen Victoria and Lord 
Curzon who expressed his appreCiation of the Indians' 'most exemplary and gratifying 
10yalty,.22 Yet those Indians who chose to serve in the war were also subjected to racial 
limitation in that they were only allowed non-combatant roles. In the first year of the war 
alone nearly 7,000 Indians were sene3 mostly highly disciplined and proficient Indian 
cavalrymen who resented being shunted into menial support jobs such as being 
washermen and farriers. 24 Some Indians also served as doctors, and others were 
engaged in work in the hospital camps.25 The bravery of the work of Indian dhoolie-
bearers at the Talana Hill Battle was described in the Natal Mercury which described the 
17 Morrison, D.M.India and Imperial Federation. cited in Chandramohan, "Hamlet with the Prince of 
Denmark left out'?', p. 155. 
18 Pyarelal, Mahatma Gandhi, Vol II. p. 219. 
19 Chandramohan, "Hamlet with the Prince of Denmark left out'?', p. 150. 
20 Ibid, p. 151. 
21 Ibid. p. 156. 
22 Ibid. p. 155 
23 Pyarelal, Mahatma Gandhi, Vol II: The Discovery of Satyagraha On the Threshold. p. 219. 
24 Chandramohan, "Hamlet with the Prince of Denmark left out'?', p. 159. 
25 Vahed, 'Natal's Indians, the Empire and the South African War, 1899 1902', p. 3. 
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Indians as 'stoical and stolid' and claimed that 'it [was] due to them very largely that so 
many wounded were not afterwards numbered among the killed. ,26 
Two reasons were advanced within India as to why Indians should not participate, firstly 
that 'a civilised Power should not employ Black and savage allies against white and 
civilised foes', and, secondly that England would lose her prestige amongst the natives 
of India if the impression was created that she was incapable of fighting her own 
battles.27 At the same time, the South African War was presented by the imperial 
government and elements of the pro-war press, as a crusade to uphold the ideals, unity 
and interests of the Empire.28 It was these ideals that motivated both many Indians in 
Natal and those who came from India, and despite the indignity they suffered, each of 
these groups trusted that the ideals of equality for all subjects of the Empire would 
ultimately prevail. 
The loyalists, in general, supported the war effort as a means of aligning themselves 
with the British. They wanted to be recognised as equal to the British through what they 
perceived to be their superior education and culture.29 Here there is an overlap with the 
elitist elements of the Natal merchants whose loyalty was connected to their belief that 
they were superior citizens and deserved recognition as British subjects. The loyalists' 
position in India was probably more secure, making their loyalty more politically obvious. 
Yet, they, too, were looking to advance their political position and their assistance was 
also marshalled in support of a say in the government of the Empire.3o In a similar 
fashion to the Natal merchant traders' contribution to the war, the Princely states of India 
responded generously to British appeals for financial support.31 For example, Indian 
princes subscribed £40, 000 to the Transvaal War Fund and Lumsden Horse.32 In 
26 Natal Mercury, 30 October 1899 cited in Vahed, 'Natal's Indians, the Empire and the South African War, 
1899 -1902', p. 3. 
27 The Times, 28 January 1900 cited in Vahed, 'Natal's Indians, the Empire and the South African War, 
1899 -1902', p. 2. 
28 Chandramohan, "Hamlet with the Prince of Denmark left out'?', p. 150. 
29 Ibid. p. 156. 
30 Ibid. p. 155. 
31 Ibid. 154. 
32 Pyarelal, Mahatma Gandhi, Vol II. p. 266. 
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addition, different branches of trade in Calcutta provided everything required for 
equipment of the Indian corps.33 
The Indian National Congress, which was the Natal Indian Congress' closest ally in 
India, was preoccupied at this time with famine-related issues and the South African 
War seemed only to be one of its peripheral concerns. Generally, however, it 
supported, or at least did not oppose, the British war effort. It seems that the Indian 
National Congress was mainly interested in the general principal of improving conditions 
for Indians in South Africa, rather than in specifically supporting the Natal Indians' war 
effort. The Indian National Congress hoped that the British, when victorious, would 
reward the Indians by undoing the restrictions and discrimination that Tranvaal and 
Orange Free State Indians were suffering under Boer rule. It also believed that a greater 
assertion of the role India played in the Empire would lead to improved recognition and 
justice within the whole Empire.34 Yet, an indication of some misgivings over support for 
the war effort was that the Congress resented Indian resources being used in foreign 
adventures that did not benefit India.35 After his work in the war, Gandhi returned to 
India and during the year which he spent there, tried unsuccessfully to persuade the 
Congress leaders to make a major issue of South Africa,36 despite its 'foreign' status. 
Indians' Contribution to the War 
Contributions from the Free Indian Population 
Many of the free Indians who did not go to the front still made contributions to the war, 
and despite there being less evidence as to what their experience entailed, it should 
also be recognised as part of the Indian war effort. Furthermore, their efforts were to an 
extent organised independently of Gandhi, supporting the possibility that numerous 
Indians felt a conviction for the war effort and were prepared to take action. Many 
traders, for instance, gave financially to the war cause. The significance of this 
contribution is heightened by the fact that the Indian trading community was passing 
33 Ameny, L. (ed.) The Times History a/the War in South Africa, Vol VI cited in Pyarelal, Mahatma 
Gandhi, Vol II: The Discovery o/Satyagraha On the Threshold. p. 226. 
34 Chandramohan, "Hamlet with the Prince of Denmark left out'?: the South African War, Empire and 
India', p. 156. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Swan, Gandhi: the South African Experience. p. 91. 
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through a period of great stress due to the virtual suspension of business just prior to 
the war. 37 Gandhi, for example, started a Patriotic League Fund to collect funds from 
Indian merchants. The list of contributors included major merchants such as G.H. 
Miankhan, Musa Haji Cassim, Amod Jeewa, M.H. Joosab and Abbobakr Amod. These 
funds were used to support the families of 'such leaders as needed it' and to equip the 
volunteers. 38 The Corps was given minimum rations by the military, and the traders 
supplied such comforts as sweets, cigarettes and gifts for both the Indians and their 
patients.39 Indian traders had paid for the uniforms of the leaders,40 and they assumed 
the job of paying the salaries of the leaders of the units, although it is not clear if this 
entailed just the organising of the salaries or financially contributing towards them. They 
also cared for the stretcher bearers' families and undertook the task of supporting the 
large exodus of Indians fleeing the Transvaal and Northern Natal. 41 At a meeting in 
March 1900, John Nicol, the Mayor of Durban, thanked those Indians who had cared for 
the refugees.42 Vahed points out that the Durban Town Council went out of its way to 
see to the needs of the white refugees, but did nothing for the Indian refugees, who 
numbered approximately 4000.43 Yet, there were also examples of Indians either 
neglecting or being unable financially to help other Indians. A hospital was started by the 
voluntary effort of two white doctors intended to provide free treatment for Natal's 
impoverished ex-indentured workers. However, it folded due to lack of funds, despite 
Gandhi's attempts to secure financial support from the Congress.44 Many Indians were 
left in charge of up-country farms by the British owners, and had to endure being turned 
adrift by Boer commandos, whilst others working in the coal mines were captured by the 
Boers,45an occurrence that will be discussed later. But whenever possible, assitance 
was provided. Gandhi records how 'whenever [the stretcher bearers] camped near 
towns, the local traders did their best to look after [themJ.46 
37 Pyarelal, Mahatma Gandhi, Vol II. p. 277. 
38 Gandhi, M.K. Collected Works, Vahed, 'Natal's Indians, the Empire and the South African War, 1899-
1902', p. 4. 
39 Nayaran, (ed.) The Selected Works of Mahatma Gandhi. p. 103. 
40 Pyaralal, Mahatma Gandhi, Vol II cited in Tichmann, 'We are sons of the Empire after all'. p. 12. 
41 Meer, (ed.), The South African Gandhi. p. 743. 
42 Vahed, 'Natal's Indians, the Empire and the South African War, 1899 - 1902', p. 11. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Swan, Gandhi: The South African Experience. p. 90. 
45 Tinker, A New System of Slavery. p. 288. 
46 Narayan, (ed.), The Selected Works of Mahatma Gandhi. p. 103. 
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The white colonials set up a Durban Women's Patriotic League to provide medical 
assistance to wounded soldiers and volunteers and started a street collection. The 
treasurer, Mr. Palmer, complained in a letter to Gandhi that while 'Coolies' had 
contributed 35 pieces, the 'Arabs' had declined to render any help.47 'This had become 
the talk among the lady collectors' and would 'appear very strange when published.' 
Gandhi did not shy away from assuming responsibility for this section of the India 
community and yet again proved to be a diplomatic tactician. He requested Palmer to 
assure the 'self-sacrificing ladies that no Indian would have declined to assist for want of 
sympathy.' 'The existence, if it so,' he said 'of a few selfish persons need not ... cause 
us to think uncharitably of the whole class to which they belong.' He asked Mr. Palmer 
to send him the names of the collectors and of the 'Arabs' who had declined to help, 
indicating that he intended to intervene. As for the distinction that Mr. Palmer had drawn 
between 'Coolies' and 'Arabs', Gandhi gently reminded him that after all 'Coolies' were 
as much Indians as 'Arabs'.48 
In addition to their own collection, the Durban Indian merchants and traders 
contributed to this Fund. They also donated materials which Indian women used to 
make pillowcases and handkerchiefs for the Women's Patriotic League Fund.49 
Despite, their absence from any of the decision-making processes, it is significant that 
women could claim to have made a contribution to the imperial war effor, however 
domestic its basis. 
Commenting on the Indians' apology for their sum subscribed to the Women's 
Patriotic League Fund not being larger, an article in the Natal Advertiser intimated that 
there was no need to be apologetic, saying 'Such gestures as these will... not be 
forgotten by the Colonists in after years.'50 What would have been in mind was an 
episode such as that in which Gandhi recorded an endearing account of an Indian 
woman who lived by selling fruit. She was reported to have emptied the whole content 
of her basket into the Tommies' truck at the Durban wharf saying that was all she could 
give that day. 51 
47 Palmer to Gandhi, 3 November 1899 cited in Pyarelal, Mahatma Gandhi, Vol II. p. 277. 
48 Gandhi to Palmer, 13 November 1899 cited in Pyarelal, Mahatma Gandhi, Vol II. p. 277. 
49 The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi. vol 3, quoted in Tichmann, 'We are sons of the Empire after 
all'. p. 10. 
50 Natal Advertiser. 4 December 1899 cited in Pyarelal, Mahatma Gandhi, Vol II. p. 278. 
51 Times of India, 16 June 1900 cited in Pyarelal, Mahatma Gandhi, Vol II. p. 277. 
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The Work of the Indian Ambulance Corps 
When looking at the Indians' work at the front, the stretcher bearers were involved in 
what is described as the second phase of the Natal campaign, in Buller's attempts to 
relieve Ladysmith.52 They first served at Colenso in December 1899. Here, they arrived 
at Chieveley on 15 December, where they were handed red cross badges and then 
proceeded to march to the field hospital 6 miles away.53 The Indian Corps arrived at the 
hospital at dusk, hungry, thirsty and fatigued. The Battle of Colenso had just ended and 
the wounded were beginning to arrive. They were brought by the European bearers to 
the Field Hospital where their wounds were dressed.54 From there the Indian Ambulance 
Corps volunteered to take them to the stationary hospital, even before the leaders' tents 
could be pitched or the men have anything to eat. About 45 wounded officers were 
carried to the hospital between 7 and 11 p.m. that night.55 An eye witness recalls that 
the Indians worked 'steadily and ungrumbling the whole night'. 56 The following morning 
they were crammed into the train carriages and they had to wait for five hours before 
departing for Estcourt. They remained in Estcourt for two days in the open, exposed to 
the 'storm, sun and wind'. The corps was disbanded on 19 December.57 They were sent 
back to Durban but told to expect another call soon.58 On 25 December, Colonel 
Gallwey instructed Clarence to organise another corps. Clarence communicated with the 
indentureds' employers to establish the number of men that each could supply and 
whether the employer could supply rations for the railway trip to Durban.59 On 29 
December, Gandhi also received a letter from Colonel Gallwey informing him that 
another corps was being formed. Gandhi replied in early January that 500 free Indians, 
who had registered their names at his office since October were ready 'to start at instant 
notice' while Dr Booth would again act as medical officer.60 The Corps 
52 Wessels, A. 'The Phases of the Anglo-Boer, 1899 - 1902', brochure at the War Museum of the Boer 
Republics, (Bloemfontein, 1998), p. 45. 
53 Vahed, 'Natal's Indians, the Empire and the South African War, 1899 -1902', p. 4. 
54 Pyarelal, Mahatma Gandhi. Vol II. p. 280. 
55 Ibid. p. 281. 
56 Natal Mercury, 4 October 1899 cited Pyarelal, Mahatma Gandhi, Vol II. p. 280. 
57 Vahed, 'Natal's Indians, the Empire and the South African War, 1899 -1902', p. 5. 
S8 Doke, UK. Gandhi, An Indian Patriot in Natal. p. 55. 
59 Natal Archives, PWD. Vol. 2171, 5117/1899, Clarence to Employers, 25 December 1899 cited in Vahed, 
'Natal's Indians, the Empire and the South African War, 1899 1902', p. 5. 
6D Gandhi, M.K. Collected Works cited in Vahed 'Natal's Indians, the Empire and the South African War, 
1899-1902',p.5. 
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was reformed and proceeded to Estcourt from 7 January 1900; there were over 1000 
men at the Front by the second week of January. 61 These men were there to assist 
Buller in a second attempt to force a way to Ladysmith. It was a fortnight before battle 
commenced. An indication of the leaders' commitment to their work is that during this 
interval, 36 of their number placed themselves in training under the instruction of doctors 
so that they might prove of greater IJse in hospital work.62 Booth used the two-week 
period to drill the bearers and their leaders. He taught them how to lift the wounded, 
place them on the stretchers and carry them and also made the Indian volunteers' 
perform long marches on extremely rough ground.63 Their efforts paid off as Treves' 
testimony reflects. Treves was the surgeon in charge of the No. 4 Stationary Field 
Hospital which operated during the relief of Ladysmith and he spoke of the telling 
conditions under which the soldiers were brought to the hospital: 
Some of the wounded came up by train and some by ambulance or by waggon, 
but a very large portion, which included nearly all the serious cases were carried 
up on stretchers by hand. No mode of transport is more comfortable than this, 
or is less fatiguing to the patient, and the splendid organisation of volunteer 
bearers and of coolie carriers enabled this means of saving lives and of sparing 
those they carried an infinite amount of pain.64 
On 24 January, the Corps received orders to leave for Frere, and from Frere they 
walked 25 miles to the military headquarters at Spearman's Camp, near Spion Kop65 
They remained for three weeks for in the field and during this period they were more 
than once under fire. 66 During the Battle of Spion Kop, it was the duty of the bearers to 
receive the wounded outside the line of fire and to tramp with them to Frere, some 20 or 
30 miles away.67 After Spion Kop, Boer General Botha took some prominent English 
officers prisoner, and then allowed the remainder of the wounded men to be taken 
away. Gandhi and his men worked along side other white stretcher bearers to complete 
this demanding task.66 Some of the stretcher bearers helped again for another three 
61 Natal Archives, PWD, 147/1900, Chief Engineer to Minister, Land & Works, 13 January 1900 cited in 
Vahed, 'Natal's Indians, the Empire and the South African War, 1899 -1902', p. 5. 
62 Doke, MK. Gandi, An Indian Patriot in Natal, p. 56 .. 
63 Gandhi, Collected Works cited in Tichmann, 'We are sons ofthe Empire after all'. p. 14. 
64 Treves, F. The Tale of a Field Hospital. (London, 1900), p. 34. 
65 Vahed, 'Natal's Indians, the Empire and the South African War, 1899 -1902', p. 6. 
66 Doke, M K. Gandhi, An Indian Patriot in Natal. pp. 55, 56. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Ransford, O. The Battle ofSpion Kop. (Great Britain,1969), p. 116. 
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weeks at the Battle of Vaal Kranz, July 1900, and Gandhi was then awarded the position 
of Sergeant Major.69 
The corps was disbanded after six weeks' service. After the reverses at Spion 
Kop and Vaal Kranz, the British Commander-in-Chief abandoned the attempt to relieve 
Ladysmith and waited for further reinforcements from England and India.70 When 
Buller's operations in connection with the relief of Ladysmith were over, the Indian 
Ambulance Corps was dismissed, as was the European. Soon after the relief of 
Ladysmith, the Red Cross units arrived from Britain.71 But the Indians stated that they 
were always prepared to rejoin. In the order disbanding the Corps it was stipulated that 
the Government it would certainly utilise their services if operations on a large scale 
again proved necessary, especially in Natal.72 
In addition to his ambulance duties, Gandhi was in charge of the provisioning 
department. He distributed the wages to the bearers, kept account of all expense 
incurred and looked after the men under his charge, although he was also reported to 
be a great disciplinarian.73 
After their service, Gandhi wrote to each of the volunteers to thank them for 
'serving '[their] motherland at a critical juncture,.74 He also kept meticulous records of all 
expenditures incurred and donations received, and personally thanked the stretcher 
bearers at the end of the war, offering each recruit free legal services to the value of 
£5.75 Gandhi also valued the work of the volunteers as something done personally 'out 
of a regard for him'. Chandramohan describes well the mixture of self-sacrifice, 
idealism, patriotism, public loyalty to the Empire, private obligation and reciprOCity which 
combined to give Gandhi the broader political base that no other public figure before or 
during his stay in South Africa could command.76 
When describing what the stretcher bearers did, Gandhi observed that '[they] soon got 
to work and that too harder than [they] had expected.' The stretcher bearers' ordinary 
69 Henning, The Indentured Indian in Natal. p. 82. 
70 Gandhi, An Autobiography or the The Story of My Experiences with Truth. p. 265. 
71 Warwick, 'Black People and the War', p. 133. 
72 Andrews, C.F. Mahatma Gandhi: His Own Story. (London, 1930), p. 147. 
73 Pyarelal, Mahatma Gandhi, Vol II. p. 288. 
74 Vahed, 'Natal's Indians, the Empire and the South African War, 1899 -1902', p. 12. 
75 Meer, (ed.), The South African Gandhi. p. 743. 
76 Chandramohan, "Hamlet with the Prince of Denmark left out'?', p. 160. 
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routine was to carry the wounded at least seven or eight miles from the battle scenes to 
medical tents.77 The march would commence at eight in the morning, medicines had to 
be administered on the way, and they were required to reach the base hospital at five. 
They had to endure hardships such as carrying the badly wounded over distances that 
were greater than 25 miles through rugged, hilly roads in mud and torrential rains, 
although Gandhi records that it was rare that they had to carry the wounded 25 miles in 
a single day.78 The Indians assisted in the unpleasant task of disposing of those who 
had died. They carried the corpses to the mortuary tent, where each body was sewn up 
in an army blanket or in a sheet. 79 Since it was the Indians' intention to prove their 
devotion and sense of sacrifice for the Empire, Gandhi did not resent but took pride in 
the hardships and danger that they faced. The Government, on the terms in which it 
accepted the Indians' services, had said that the auxiliaries would not be expected to 
work within the range of fire, even though the Indians had not requested such 
exemption. Initially, the permanent European Ambulance Corps would fetch the 
wounded from the line of fire and leave them outside the danger zone for the Indians 
and the temporary European Ambulance Corps to collect. Yet, as the British army met 
initially with reverse after reverse and after the repulse at Spion Kop, Buller sent the 
message that the army would be thankful if the Indians would join the permanent 
Ambulance Corps and be prepared to fetch the wounded from the field. When such an 
emergency arose, they were reminded that they were not compelled to do this and it 
was understood that Buller had no intention of forcing them to work under fire if they 
were not prepared to accept such risk. But Gandhi claimed that 'we were only too 
willing to enter the danger zone and had never liked to remain outside' and concluded 
that they 'welcomed this opportunity:80 The action at Spion Kop found them working 
within the firing line and it was at this time that they had to move from 20 to 25 miles a 
day.81 They were exposed to risk as at Spion Kop, where Wilson reported that the Boers 
fired on them 'with the utmost impartiality' as they either could not or would not see the 
Red-Cross badges .• 82 This frustrated remark probably reflects British anti-Boer opinion 
as much as it shows a real concern for the Indians. The Indian contingent was also 
77 Narayan, (ed.), The Selected Works of Mahatma Gandhi. p. 105. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Treves, The Tale of a Field Hospital. p. 84. 
80 Narayan, (ed.), The Selected Works of Mahatma Gandhi. p. 105. 
81 Gandhi, M.K. An Autobiography or the The Story of My Experiences with Truth. p. 265. 
82 Wilson, With the Flag to Pretoria cited in Pyarelal, Mahatma Gandhi, Vol II. p. 286. 
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under fire at Vaal Kranz. In all of this, there is uncertainty about whether any Indians 
were killed. Narayan states that surprisingly, despite being in a danger zone on several 
occasions, none of the stretcher bearers received a bullet wound or any other injury.83 In 
the same text, Gandhi is quoted as arguing that the Indians 'suffered hardly any loss of 
life.84 
Gandhi was very aware of any prestige and acknowledgment that could be 
attached to Indian actions and reports that 'amongst the wounded we had the honour of 
carrying soldiers like General Woodgate,.85 He describes how the agony of the General 
was excruciating as they 'hurried through the heat and dust, fearful lest he should die 
before they could reach camp. ,86 The bearers of the Indian Ambulance Corps also 
carried lieutenant Roberts, Lord Roberts's fatally injured son from the Field Hospital to 
Chieveley. The leaders of the Corps were considered privileged to attend his military 
funeral. 87 
Provisions made for the bearers were very basic. Men carried food rations and firewood 
for a week or even two at a time, and were often unaccompanied by any wagons or 
water carts.88 Men were given rice, dhall, ghee, oil and fish to last a week and supplied 
with one pot per twenty men. At dawn, they prepared a 'pot full and each man had his 
breakfast and filled a small tin with food for the day,. 89The hardiness of these Indians 
was presented by Clarence as one of their advantages and he concluded that 'therefore 
the coolie becomes the most useful carrier to be obtained.'90 In Escourt they camped in 
the open for two days, exposed to the sun and rain. 91 In addition to that, 600 bearers 
had to share 137 blankets.92 Treves emphasised the general shortage of water and 
reported that 'water [was] precious, more precious than any other necessity for every 
drop has to be brought by train from Frere.'93 The shortage of water was a major 
83 Narayan, (ed.), The Selected Works of Mahatma Gandhi. p. 105. 
84 Ibid. p. 106. 
85 Gandhi,M.K. An Autobiography or the The Story of My Experiences with Truth. p. 265. 
86 Doke, MK. Gandhi, An Indian Patriot in Natal. pp. 55, 56. 
87 Pyarelal, Mahatma Gandhi, Vol II. p. 282. 
88 Andrews, Mahatma Gandhi: His Own Story. p. 147. 
89 Vahed, 'Natal's Indians, the Empire and the South African War, 1899 -1902', p. 5. 
90 Natal Archives, PWD, VoL 2171, 5117/1899, Clarence to Chief Engineer, PWD, 23 December 1899 cited 
in Vahed, 'Natal's Indians, the Empire and the South African War, 1899 - 1902', p. 5. 
91 Tichmann, 'We are sons of the Empire after all'. p. 13. 
92 Vahed, 'Natal's Indians, the Empire and the South African War, 1899 - 1902', p. 5. 
93 Treves, The Tale of a Field Hospital. p. 21. 
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problem at Chievely and the Field Camp Hospital, particularly as the Corps did not have 
a water cart. 94 
When the Indians had completed their service, correspondence passed between 
the British authorities as to what could be done in the future to improve their conditions 
and performance if they were needed again. This response indicates to some extent 
what difficulties the Indians had faced whilst serving. The required items listed included 
a wagon, a water cart, tents and more stretchers as Clarence reported that there was 
fewer than one stretcher to every eight men, meaning that the stretcher bearers could 
not all be used very effectively. Another requirement was more food for the railway 
journey to the front, which would entail the supply of a loaf of bread per bearer,95 
bringing into question how much the Indians had been fed on their journey. 
Observations of the Significance of the Indians' Work 
Predictably, Gandhi attempted to contextualise the Indian role in the war effort as being 
part of the process of achieving various long term social and political goals. One of the 
goals was to create greater understanding and support for one another within the Indian 
community. 
The war was asserted to have been a significant unifying episode which also 
affirmed the 'manliness' of Hindus. Still, there were certain symbolic divisions between 
the leaders and the stretcher bearers. It is hard to ascertain exactly what impact this 
had on their interaction. A most marked difference was clearly that many of the free 
Indians as well as the indentureds were paid whilst the leaders and other free Indians 
had volunteered. Other examples of differentiation were the way in which the various 
sectors of the Corps travelled to the Front, their accommodation and their manner of 
dress. 
After the leaders' send-off dinner at Parsi Rustamji on 4 December 1899, they 
left in the early hours on the morning. Gandhi was supplied with 5 first class, 20 second 
class and 20 third class train tickets for the leaders.96 The departure of the bearers was 
less elaborate. The men arrived at the railway station in Durban from the various 
94 Natal Archives, PWD, Vol. 2171, 5117/1899, Clarence to Barnes, 23 December] 899, cited in Vahed, 
'Natal's Indians, the Empire and the South African War, 1899 - 1902', p. 5. 
95 Natal Archives, PWD 5117/99, letter from Clarence (Superintedent Indian Ambulance Corps) to Chief 
Engineer PWD. 
96 Vahed, 'Natal's Indians, the Empire and the South African War, 1899 -1902', p. 4. 
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plantations, where they were met by Clarence who was accompanied by two white 
overseers. The labourers were all provided with third class rail tickets.97 Furthermore, as 
has been mentioned, the leaders were provided with tents but the other free and 
indentured Indians had to sleep in the open. The decision not to provide the other 
Indians with tents was in all likelihood the doing of British officers rather than Indian 
leaders, making it an example of how the British contributed to buttressing the hierarchy 
in the Indian Ambulance Corps. 
The leaders adopted British uniforms, whilst the indentured labourers wore their 
traditional clothes, including their turbans. Brooke and Webb describe how Gandhi [and 
the leaders] wore a slouch hat, khaki uniform and puttees of the period, a clear 
identification with the British cause.98 Treves has described the contrasting appearance 
of the indentured labourers, noting, 'with us were a hundred coolies, who were attached 
to the hospital for camp work. They were a dismal crowd as they stalked along with 
their bare legs and their picturesque tatters of clothing, with all their earthly possessions 
in bundles on their heads, and with apparently a vow of funeral silence in their heads.,99 
There is an obvious sense of the social gap between whites and the indentured 
labourers, who retained an image of being servants. Whether their leaders felt a similar 
gap remains unclear. In this, one needs to remember that between three and four 
hundred free Indians served100and they may have been more integrated with the 
indentured Indians than were the leaders in this war environment. However, the fact 
that the sirdars from the sugar estates accompanied the indentureds suggests that the 
labourers would have remained under their tight control, and would not have been 
wholly free to interact with the other Indians. 
Prior to the war in Natal, in Indian political discourse there had been many 
situations where free Indians emphasised class differences within the Indian community, 
while there were also times when there was an acknowledgement of shared burdens 
within their population. One can argue that this was similarly reflected in the war. Vahed 
asserts that the Indian response to the war must be viewed in terms of the entrenched 
class differences amongst them,101and there is much evidence to support this, not least 
that the indentured labourers were organised independently of the free Indians. 
97 Vahed, 'Natal's Indians, the Empire and the South African War, 1899 - 1902', p. 4 .. 
98 Fischer, The Life of Mahatma Gandhi. cited in Brookes and Webb, A History of Natal. p. 205. 
99 Treves, The Tale of a Field Hospital. p. 50. 
100 Gandhi, M.K. An Autobiography or the The Story of My Experiences with Truth. p. 265. 
101 Vahed, 'Natal's Indians, the Empire and the South African War, 1899 - 1902', p. 13. 
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However, there appears also to have been at least some sense of a communal cause. 
Gandhi declares that 'the work for them was the same as for ourselves.'102 He also 
described how 'the Indian community became better organized,' and declared that he 
was pleased that the war allowed him the opportunity to get into 'closer touch' with the 
indentured Indians. 103 Pyarelal writes that for the indentureds to live among and like free 
Indians was a new experience and claims that they were highly pleased. 104 Gandhi 
concluded that 'there came a greater awakening amongst them and the feeling that 
Hindus, Musalmans, Christians, Tamilians, Gujaratis and Sindhis were all Indians and 
children of the same motherland took deep root amongst them. Everyone believed that 
the Indian grievances were sure to be redressed.' 105 
A further objective of the Indians was to gain greater acceptance and respect from 
whites, both locally and from England. Here, the positive long-term impact of the war on 
whites' perception of Indians in Natal should be not be overstated for various clear 
reasons. The whites with whom they worked were not only Natalians, the interaction 
happened over a fairly short period of six weeks, and it was in a particularly, intense 
situation where service admiration may have been earned but not necessarily cultural 
understanding or sympathy on a social and political level. Fredrik Barth, who in recent 
years has organised a seminar on the difficulties of scale as an object of analysis, 
argues that there is a problem in trying 'to describe different combinations of scale in 
different empirical social organizations to measure the part they play in the different 
sections of the lives they shape.'106 Yet, contact in the field was made and since the 
Indians' reception in Natal from white society was affected by factors such as class, 
occupation and geographical location, the status of the whites with whom they worked is 
significant. This status would have effected the nature of the attitudes that were brought 
to war- time social interaction. At the same time, one should take into account the factor 
that in this environment of greater interdependency, these attitudes may have been 
altered. In addition. as the Indians regarded the war as a chance to make a positive 
102 Narayan, (ed.), The Selected Works of Mahatma Gandhi. p. 103. 
103 Gandhi, M.K. An Autobiography or the The Story of My Experiences with Truth. p. 266. 
104 Pyarelal, Mahatma Gandhi, Vol II. p. 277. 
105 Gandhi, M.K. An Autobiography or the The Story of My Experiences with Truth. p. 266. 
106 'F. Barth (ed.), Scale and Social Organization quoted in Levi, Giovanni, 'On Microhistory', Burke, 
Peter (ed), New Perspectives on Historical Writing. (Great Britain, 1991) p. 95. 
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impression and to show their concern for the colony and the Empire, one should also 
consider how successful they felt that contact to be. 
Gandhi was acutely aware of Indians' contact with whites in the war. An obvious 
concern was that some members of the temporary Corps had taken part in the anti-
Indian agitation before the war.107 Gandhi also feared that the indentured labourers who 
were 'supposed to be rather uncouth,108 may not have been well received. 
Indians would have had interaction with white soldiers as well as stretcher 
bearers, their contact with the latter obviously being more extensive as they worked 
directly with them. Pakenham, for example, describes the 'strange procession' of the 
two thousand volunteer stretcher-bearers, including Indians, heading out for Colenso.109 
The whites who worked within the medical corps came from various places. Pakenham 
suggests that since the War Office ambulances were notoriously unsuited to the stony 
veld, Buller had recruited 'body-snatchers' from 'any source at hand'. Early in the 
campaign, Colonel Gallwey was asked to organise a volunteer ambulance corps to work 
with the existing European Ambulance Corps. Two thousand bearers were needed and 
in a few days thousands were enrolled. Treves described the corps as containing 
'examples of all sorts and conditions of men - labourers, mechanics, 'gentlemen' dock 
loafers, seamen, dentists, a chemist or two, a lawyer or two, tram drivers, clerks, miners 
and shop assistants'. Many of the men were refugees from the Transvaal.11o Thus, the 
white stretcher bearers that the Indians had contact with were from varying social 
classes and often did not come from Natal society, as Gandhi and the other leaders 
predictably would have hoped. 
Treves concluded that the white ambulance corps that Gallway had organised 
'formed a strange company', as 'some were disposed to assume a serious military 
bearing, while others appeared to regard the venture as a silly joke of which they were 
beginning to be a little ashamed.'111 They were nevertheless popular with soldiers. In 
Treves'view, 'they had the gift of tongues of a kind and could compete in the matter of 
lurid language. Their incessant hunger and indiscriminate thirst were a matter for 
107 Narayan, (ed.), The Selected Works of Mahatma Gandhi. p. 106. 
108 Ibid. 
109 Pakenham, T. The Boer War. (London, 1992), p. 224. 
110 Treves, The Tale of a Field Hospital. p. 74. 
III Ibid. 
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admiration. ll2 It is hard to know how the Indians responded to their apparently rowdy 
behavior and if they made any impression on those men who came from Natal. 
Nonetheless, the more restrained and disciplined nature of the Indian leaders 
was appreciated by the white organisers of the ambulance corps. Clarence stated that 
Gandhi and the leaders 'are just the men required to take charge of the bearers as they 
speak English and are tee-totalers.'113 
When looking at the possible nature of interaction between white soldiers and the 
Indians, Dominy's material suggests that previous racial tensions may even have been 
heightened in the war context. He analyses the overall social segregation within the 
Natal garrison and concludes that racism was a central part of the division process. 
Drawing on Judith Fingard, this perspective proposes the concept of there being 'rough 
and respectable' elements in the classic imperial military garrison. Within the Victorian 
army, this 'rough and respectable' division often paralleled the patterns of class and 
rank distinction, with officers drawn largely from the aristocracy and the gentry whilst the 
other ranks were recruited from the rural and urban poor.114 Dominy points out that 
Natal was a favoured station for British officers, particularly bachelors who pursued 
hunting opportunities.115 However, he stresses that the development of class 
distinctions within the settler community should not be unduly exaggerated for the 
simple reason that Natal had a very small settler community and the officers of the 
garrison and the 'small circle' of colonial officials were scarcely sufficient to constitute a 
significant class. With the exception of this minority elite, the colony was composed 
almost entirely of working men, tradesmen, farmers and labourers. 116 Combined with 
this, the garrison and settler society were situated in a much larger African context and 
needed to assert a racially defined superiority over the majority African population. As a 
result, social integrating mechanisms were necessary to make the 'rough' of the white, 
military non-commissioned ranks into the 'respectable,.117 Thus, racial divisions would 
have been underlined by any army leadership, where black groups, including Indians, 
112 Treves, The Tale of a Field Hospital. p. 76. 
113 Vahed, 'Natal's Indians, the Empire and the South African War, 1899 -1902', p. 5. 
114 Dominy, G. 'The Making of the Rough and the Respectable: The Imperial Garrison and the Wider 
Society in Colonial Natal', South African Historical Journal, 37, November 1997, p. 48. 
115 Ibid. p. 5l. 
116 Barter, The Dorp and the Veld or Six Months in Natal, cited in Dominy, 'The Making of the Rough and 
Respectable'. p. 52. 
117 Dominy, 'The Making of the Rough and the Respectable'. p. 49. 
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would have been catogorised as an inferior group. Dominy also reveals that there was a 
general attitude within the garrison that, as servants, Africans showed 'greater honesty', 
'over the more intelligent "coolies" who were seen as 'slippery and untrustworthy,.118 
Added to this, the knowledge that the British had intended to keep this a 'white man's 
war' may have also brought a degree of ill-ease to any social interaction between whites 
and other races. 
Aside from the likelihood that racist prejudices were an obstacle in the Indians' 
attempt to improve their image amongst the colonists, Stirling stresses the reality that 
numerically the contact with Natal soldiers was very limited. It is estimated that the total 
number of Natalians who served in the war as soldiers did not exceed 2,500. 119 Of 
these, approximately 1,000 were in Ladysmith,120 and would not have been in direct 
working contact with the Indian stretcher bearers. This would all suggest that the Indian 
Ambulance Corps had minimal contact with soldiers from Natal. 
However, there were individual whites who were impressed by the Indians' work. 
A positive and descriptive account was given by a 'European' who had taken part in the 
Ladysmith campaign. He gave his extravagant impression of Gandhi and the Indian 
stretcher bearers in the Illustrated Star of Johannesburg, writing: 
Every man in Buller's force was dull and depressed and damnation was heartily 
invoked on everything. But Gandhi was stoical in his bearing, cheerful and 
confident in his conversation and had a kindly eye. He did one good. It was an 
informal introduction, and it led to a friendship. I saw the man and his small 
undisciplined corps on many a field of battle during the Natal campaign. When 
succour was to be rendered they were there. Their unassuming dauntlessness 
cost them many lives, and eventually an order was published forbidding them to 
go into the firing line. 
As has been mentioned, it is not clear if any Natal Indians died in the danger zone. It is 
intriguing to question why this man believed 'many' Indians to have been killed and that 
they ceased to go into the danger zone, when the opposite is true. These inaccuracies 
imply that this man's understanding of the Indians' circumstances was largely based on 
hearsay and imagination. It is also interesting that in the apparent growth of stories 
surrounding the Indians' work, their deeds were presented in an increaSingly heroic light. 
118 Dominy, 'The Making of the Rough and the Respectable'. p. 51. 
119 Stirling, 1. The Colonials in South Africa, 1899-1902. cited in Brookes and Webb, A History a/Natal. 
pp. 202, 203. 
120 Brookes and Webb, A History o/Natal. p. 207. 
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This same correspondent drew a graphic pen-picture of the work of the Ambulance 
Corps which was published in the same newspaper.121 
On the other hand, there were also some complaints registered against 
indentured Indians describing cases of so-called unsuitability and desertion. These 
seem to relate mainly to the periods when the indentureds were working without the 
volunteer Indian Ambulance Corps. Of the indentured men working at Fort Napier 
Hospital, sixteen were returned on 10 December because they were found to be 
'undesirable'. According to Gallwey, fourteen of them refused to work on Sundays while 
two had taken their wives along and there was nowhere to accommodate them. 
However, the returned men informed the Protector that they had not refused to work on 
Sundays but rather that the man who had been appointed Sirdar was a 'Madras man' 
and had told them that as they 'were Calcutta men they were of no use and had better 
go.' The men also complained that they had received insufficient food. 122 Another 
bearer, Firman, is reported to have left because he was not paid as much as he had 
been promised. 123 On 19 January, Clarence wrote to the Protector that three 
indentureds: Ramsamy, Munsamy and Arunachellan had returned home as they were 
'missing their families.' He urged the Protector that the functions of the Corps be 
explained properly to the new men being engaged. They should be told that they had to 
remain with the Corps until it was disbanded since 'just when they are becoming efficient 
and begin to know their stretcher drill they leave. ,124 Apart from the possibility that 
descriptions may have been distorted, this behaviour does indicate less of a conviction 
for the war cause on the part of the indentureds. 
Gandhi asserted that the overall contact between Indian and European recruits 
was positive. The two Ambulance Corps worked side by side, and for him 'at the 
moment the white man's attitude seemed to have changed.,125 The Indians, he claimed, 
did not feel that they were being treated with contempt or even with discourtesy126 and 
he concluded that 'the knowleqge that the Indians ... were out to help them in the hour of 
121 Natisan, Mathatma Gandhi - the Man and his Mission cited in Pyrelal, Mahatma Gandhi, Vol II, The 
Discovery ofSatyagraha On The Threshold p. 288, see Appendix 1, p. 5, picture 10 
122 Natal Archives, PAR II, Protector's Letter Book: General, 15 August 1899 7 May 1900, 1921199 
Correspondence between Protector ofIndian Immigrants and Gallwey, Sen. Medical Officer, 7 - 20 
December 1899 cited in Vahed, 'Natal's Indians, the Empire and the South African War, 1899 - 1902', p. 
3. 
123 Vahed, 'Natal's Indians, the Empire and the South African War, 1899 - 1902', p. 6. 
124lbid, p. 5. 
125 Gandhi, M.K. An Autobiography or the The Story of My Experiences with Truth. p. 266. 
126 Narayan, (ed.), The Selected Works of Mahatma Gandhi. p. 106. 
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their need, had melted their hearts for the time being.'127 It is conceivable that since the 
Indians were responsible for the lives of the wounded soldiers they were transporting, an 
empathy for one another would have developed during that period. However, the 
phrases 'for the time being' and 'at the moment' were accurate, perhaps more sober 
than even Gandhi realised, because whilst the Indians enjoyed a brief period of 
recognition and respect, their war efforts would have a very limited long term political 
impact. 
Gandhi summarized the Indian stretcher bearers' work as follows: 
This contribution of the Indians in South Africa to the war was comparatively 
insignificant. They suffered hardly any loss of life. Yet even a sincere desire to 
be of help is bound to impress the other party, and is doubly appreciated when it 
is quite unexpected. Such a fine feeling for the Indians lasted during the 
continuance of the war.' 128 
Newspapers are a useful indication of the interest that the civilian population took in the 
war. In the Natal Advertiser there were three articles on the 29 January 1900, after the 
Battle of Spion Kop, that would have pertained to the Indians' involvement. 129 The first 
was entitled 'Last Week's Battlefield Reviewed', and spoke of General Botha's 
resistance to having the wounded and the dead removed. The second was called 'With 
the Volunteer Ambulance Corps', and finally there was an article named 'Retreat from 
Spionkop', which reported that 'for the greater part of the day the stretcher bearers have 
been busy on top of the hill removing the wounded'. Yet none of these articles made 
any specific mention of the Indians.13o However, in an article, "Ladysmith Relief Column, 
More about the Retreat' on January, 31 190013\ the Indians were given a very positive 
report. Two of the sub-headlines of the report were: 'Splendid Ambulance Work' and 
'Indian Corps in Evidence'. The article praised the Natal Volunteer Ambulance Corps, 
saying their work during the seven days' fighting was 'Simply splendid' and mentioned 
their work within the firing line. It then went to record: 
127 Narayan, (ed.), The Selected Works of Mahatma Gandhi. p. 106. 
128 Ibid .. 
129 Natal Advertiser. January, 29 1900. 
130 Ibid. 
131 Natal Advertiser. January, 31 1900. 
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The transmission of the wounded to the base was accompanied by unusual 
difficulties. Two companies carried the wounded over the pontoon at Trichardt's, 
an arduous bit of work, while the Indian Volunteer Corps did excellent work in 
carrying bad cases all the way by road en route to Frere to be entrained there to 
the hospital down the line. ,132 
Although there were other scattered accounts in newspapers, many people remained 
unaware of the Indians' service. Another prominent white newspaper, the Natal 
Witness, made no reference to the Indians during the period of their service. 
The Experiences of other Indians Directly Effected by the War 
A number of other groups of Indians were also directly affected by the war. Hostilities 
had a severe impact on residents in northern Natal, where the republican commandos 
had laid siege in Newcastle, Charlestown, Elandslaagte and Dundee before the end of 
October 1899.133 When the Boers reached Newcastle they destroyed property and it 
was reported that four Indians were shot by the Boers and a number were allegedly 
taken to Pretoria. 134 Approximately ten Indians died during the Boer occupation of 
Elandslaagte, while another 23 were reported 'missing' and could not be traced. 135 The 
majority of Indians were forced to flee even if they wished to remain under Boer 
occupation. Refugees vacated under trying circumstances and often left behind all their 
possessions, including their documents. Vahed reveals that when it became possible to 
return, the authorities were unsympathetic and made it difficult to obtain passes.136 
Natal Indian storekeepers were also severely affected by the war. In the major 
towns, virtually all the stock in trading stores was removed, and doors and windows 
were broken. Aside from the actual Boer invasions, traders also fled because of panic 
created by rumours of imminent Boer arrivals, a good example being Estcourt. Here, 
the traders closed and left their stores even though the Boers never captured 
Estcourt. 137 
132 Natal Advertiser. January, 31 1900 .. 
133 Vahed, 'Natal's Indians, the Empire and the South African War, 1899 - 1902', p. 7. 
134 Report of the Indian Immigration Trust Board of Natal 1900, 1 cited in Vahed, 'Natal's Indians, the 
Empire and the South African War, 1899 - 1902', p. 7. 
135 Vahed, 'Natal's Indians, the Empire and the South African War, 1899 1902', p. 8. 
136 Ibid. p. 7. 
137 Ibid. p. 10. 
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A well-chronicled story is that of 230 Indians from the Elandslaagte coal mines who were 
instructed by the Boer Commandant Erasmus to leave for British territory. When the 
Boer forces occupied the districts north of Colenso, nearly all the indentured Indians 
working in the Elandslaagte collieries fell into their hands. 138 There were 137 indentured 
Indians, while 93 were free Indians. According to Lutchman, a free Indian who was a 
sirdar at Elandslaagte, and other Indians were detained by the Boers for about a month. 
Thereafter they were released at Modderspruit and told to go to Ladysmith.139 However, 
White, already short of rations, refused to receive them and the Indians were forced to 
return to the Boer camp. The indentured labourers and their families were found on 11 
December 1899 by a Reuters Special Correspondent to the Natal Advertiser, wandering 
on the veld beyond Bulwana. They eventually made their way to Frere Military Camp 
where they were received by Buller and given biscuits. Thereafter, they were sent to 
Durban as refugees. On this basis, they arrived on 11 December 1899, and 63 of the 
indentured Indians then volunteered to return to the front as stretcher bearers.14o 
Breytenbach has made something of this incident, bringing an Afrikaner nationalist 
perspective to the adverse British treatment of their Indian subjects. He suggests that 
'die Indiers het 'n wit vlag na Gen. White gestuur het wat volgens hul beskouing vir die 
Britse onderdane in Noord-Natal moes sorgo White het egter geweier om hulle to 
ontvang en hulle na the Boerelinies teruggesteur aangesien die Boere sulke Britse 
onderdane aan die Britse outoriteite in Suid-Natal kon oorhandig,.141 (the Indians sent a 
white flag to General White, who was responsible for British subjects in Northern Natal. 
White refused to receive them and sent them back to the Boer line on condition that the 
Boers handed over certain British subjects to the British authorities in Southern Natal). 
Breytenbach makes no mention of the British being short of rations, nor the fact that the 
Boers had detained the Indians for an extensive period, thus only emphasising the 
cruelty of the British act. 
There were 'a few stray Indian settlers' in Ladysmith and surrounding areas during the 
siege. These were traders, free labourers and indentureds and whilst there have not 
138 Pyarelal, Mahatma Gandhi Vol II, cited in Tichmann, p. 12. 
139 Natal Archives, PAR, CSO 2925, 18 October 1901, Evidence ofLutchman before the Invasion Losses 
Enquiry Commission cited in Vahed, 'Natal's Indians, the Empire and the South African War, 1899 
1902', p. 8. 
140 Pyarela, Mahatma Gandhi Vol II. cited in Tichmann, p. 12. 
141 Breytenbach, J.H. Die Geskiedenis van die Tweede Vryheidsoor/org in Suid-Afrika, 1899-1902, Dee/IL 
Die Eertse BrUse Offensief, Nov - Des 1899. (Pretoria, 1978), p.425. 
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been thorough accounts of their experiences, some individual stories have been 
recorded. One of the indentured labourers in Ladysmith was Parbhu Singh, and Gandhi 
describes this individual's legendary service as a 'noteworthy incident.' On a hill near 
Ladysmith, the Boers had stationed a field-gun which destroyed many buildings and 
even occasioned some loss of life. An interval of a minute or two passed before a shell 
which had been fired reached the town. If the besieged got even this short two minute 
notice, they could take cover and save themselves. Parbhu Singh sat perched in a tree, 
during all the time that the gun was operating, watching the hill, and rang a bell the 
moment he observed a f1ash.142 Different sources claim that Singh was on a hill rather 
than in a tree, and one says he waved the Union Jack and another the Gordon 
Highlanders flag instead of ringing the bell, which reflects the folklore character that this 
act has assumed. 143 
A ceremony was held later for Singh where he was praised for his bravery by 
Lady Curzon, the Vicereine of India. The officer in charge of Ladysmith, in eulogizing his 
invaluable services, stated that Singh worked so zealously that not once had he failed to 
ring the bell, with Gandhi adding that 'it need hardly be said that his own life was 
constantly in peril.'144 Among those present at the ceremony were Acting Durban 
Magistrate, Roch, the Town Clerk, Cooley, the Town Solicitor, Garlicke, the late Prime 
Minister Escornbe's son-in-law, Mason, Protector of Immigrants, and Gandhi.145 It was 
acknowledged that Singh had put himself in a position of great danger for the protection 
of white townspeople. Gandhi translated the speech for him as well as his response for 
the audience. Singh is reported to have said modestly he had done nothing more than 
his duty. 146 
He also expressed his wish to return to his country and to settle there.147 
Greenacre, the Chairman of the Dundee Coal Company, who employed Singh before 
the war, expressed the gratification of the directors to find that one with whom they were 
associated should have acted so nobly. It was agreed that he should go home and 
arrangements were made to cover the cost and to help finance him to settle back in 
142 Andrews, Mahatma Gandhi: His Own Story. p. 147. 
143 see Hindi, Diwali Number 1923, p. 23 and Shaw's diary 'A Personal Narrative of the Natal Campaign, 
1899 -1902', p. 64.' 
144 Andrews, Mahatma Gandhi: His Own Story. p. 149. 
145 Pyralel, Mahatma Gandhi, Vol II. p. 292. 
146 Ibid. p. 293. 
147 Maharaj, M.B. 'The Ladysmith India Hero, Hindi, Diwali No, 1923. p. 29. 
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India.148 However, there were some who begrudged the monetary acknowledgment and 
thought that too much was being made of his work.149 
Singh's brave deeds were honoured in local newspapers such as the Natal 
Mercury which, on 4 October 1900, included an article entitled 'The Ladysmith Indian 
Hero'.15o When the story of his heroism reached England, several London illustrated 
newspapers published his portrait. 151 Still, despite the initial public reception his selfless 
service received, it was not the type of incident to be more broadly remembered in the 
decades following the war. As was often the case with other black contributions in the 
war, if an event was to receive any form of acknowledgement, it was generally a brief 
shower of accolades which was followed by no significant social improvements. In a 
South African Indian journal, Hindi, the editor, Matabadal Beethasee Mahraj later wrote 
an article, 'The Ladysmith Indian Hero, An Incident ignored by Historians',152 showing 
the editor's frustration with the lack of recognition that this type of Indian contribution 
was receiving. 
Shaw from the Natal Carbineers, was also in Ladysmith during the Siege and observed 
the Indians in the town.153 His record notes that 'The Indians were keen "conchologists" 
and the falling of the shell was a matter to them of intense interest. They would rush 
towards the soil-guper and whoever recovered the body of the shell would sell it that 
evening in camp. ,154 Whilst being quite gentle in its humorous approach, the patronising 
nature of the comment does indicate that for some British soldiers, the Indians, 
especially the indentured Indians, had no understanding of the war and merely exploited 
its consequences for financial gain. 
A list of casualties from Ladysmith on 13 February 1900 reported that 'one Indian coolie' 
had died of enteric.155 The white soldiers, by comparison, were named in the same list, 
which shows a lack of concern for the individual identity of Indians who were also 
trapped. 
148 Pyralel, Mahatma Gandhi, Vol 11 p.293 
149 Ibid. p. 294. 
150 Maharaj, 'The Ladysmith India Hero', p. 27 .. 
151 Pyralel, Mahatma Gandhi, Vol II p.292. 
152 Maharaj, 'The Ladysmith India Hero', p.27. 
153 Shaw, 'A Personal Narrative of the Natal Campaign, 1899-1902', p. 64. 
154 Ibid. p. 65. 
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Lastly, a small and unclear article in the Natal Advertiser on 29 January 1900 reported 
on Indian women in the Intombi Spruit Camp. The Intombi Camp was a British-run, 
neutral hospital camp outside Ladysmith during the siege, from November 1899 to 
February 1900.156 The hospital employed 250 Indians.157 The article, entitled Trouble at 
Intombi Camp', warned: 
There has been more trouble at Intornbi Spruit Camp! On Thursday night 70 
coolie women were sent in from the camp by Mr. Bennett, the ex-Magistrate of 
Ladysmith. With his leg-iron handcuffs, birches, sjamboks and policemen it is 
strange that that peculiar man, Mr. Bennett, is not able to control the coolie 
ladies. 158 
This report poses many more questions than it answers, such as why were the women 
protesting or causing a disruption and why no men were involved. Stanack, who was 
present at the Intombi Camp, spoke of the problems of enteric and rations,159 and 
possibly this female reaction related to deprivation of rations, although there is no direct 
evidence to support this suggestion. However, the reporter's approach has some 
revealing elements. He made no attempt to clarify or follow up on this story which 
shows that neither the newspaper nor its readers placed much importance on the 
Indians' experiences. His sardonic reference to Bennett's equipment also shows that he 
regarded physical punishment for Indian women as acceptable practice. 
155 Natal Archives, CSO 2609, Confidential Minute Papers, Anglo-Boer War, Transcript Telegrams, a list 
of casualties reported by G.O.C.Ladysmith, 13 February 1900. 
156 Pakenham, The Boer War. pp. 353-44. 
157 Vahed, 'Natal's Indians, the Empire and the South African War, 1899 - 1902', p. 9. 
15S Natal Advertiser. Monday, 29 January 1900. 
159 Killie Campbell Africana Library, Dawes Collection, File B. Stranack, E.T. 'Reminiscences of the 
lntombi Camp Hospital during the Siege of Ladysmith, Nov. 1899 to February 1900.' 
115 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
7 
Indians' Attempts to Capitalise on their War Work 
The Work of the Natal Indian Congress 
The Natal Indian Congress arranged a public meeting in the Congress Hall, Durban on 
14 March 1900 to 'demonstrate their loyalty to the Crown'.1 It was attended by about 
1,000 Indians and, Significantly, 60 leading white colonials. The building and vicinity 
were decorated with national imperial colours. 2 The letters of invitation bore the heading 
'Long Live Kaiser-I-Hind' and pictures of Queen Victoria and three British Generals.3 Sir 
John Robinson, former Prime Minister of Natal, presided and white guests included 
B.W. Greenacre, Member of the Natal Legislative Assembly and J Nicol, Major of 
Durban.4 
Sir John Robinson praised the Indian Stretcher Bearers Corps for its role during the war, 
reflecting: 
Though you were debarred from actual service in the field you were able to do 
excellent work in the succouring of the wounded, I cannot too warmly thank your 
able countryman, Mr. Gandhi, upon his timely unselfish and most useful action in 
voluntarily organising a corps of bearers for ambulance work at the front at a 
moment when their labours were sorely needed in discharging arduous duties 
which experience showed to be by no means devoid of peril. All engaged in 
that service deserve the grateful recognition of the community.5 
Robinson added that 'the grand old flag of England beneath whose folds every man 
commands and enjoys full and equal security ... must in future float unchallenged from 
Cape Town to Zambesi.,6 The irony of this statement was to become only too apparent 
in future years. 
The Indians at the meeting unanimously supported the proposal of Abdool Kadir, 
president of the Natal Indian Congress, to send telegrams to Roberts, Buller and White, 
1 Vahed, 'Natal's Indians, the Empire and the South African War, 1899 -1902', p. 12. 
2 Natal Mercury, 15 March 1900 cited in 'Vahed, 'Natal's Indians, the Empire and the South African War, 
1899 -1902" p. 12. 
3 Gandhi, M.K. Collected Works cited in Vahed, 'Natal's Indians, the Empire and the South African War, 
1899 - 1902', p. 12. 
4 Vahed, 'Natal's Indians, the Empire and the South African War, 1899 - 1902', p. 12. 
5 Gandhi, M.K. Collected Works. cited Tichmann 'We are sons of the Empire after all'. p. 14. 
6 Natal Mercury, 15 March 1900 cited in Vahed, 'Natal's Indians, the Empire and South African War, 1899 
-1902', p. 12. 
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congratulating them on their 'brilliant success'. This was in addition to the telegram 
Gandhi had sent on 1 February, congratulating Buller. Pyarelal suggests that they took 
special pride in the fact that both Roberts and White had at one time been Commander-
in-Chief of the Indian forces.7 
After the Relief of Ladysmith, there was a great deal of celebration and festivity in 
Durban in which, according to Vahed, Indians 'vied with Europeans in their patriotic zeal 
to celebrate the occasion by decorating their stores, etc. ,8 This exuberance was carried 
out despite the fact that Deputy-Mayor Ellis Brown had organised a mass meeting in 
front of the Durban Town Hall, in which thirty dignitaries sat on the pedestal, but not one 
Indian was included.9 For the Natal Mercury, however, the event that 'proved the 
greatest attraction' of that day was the procession by Muslims, led by Osman Ahmed, 
assistant priest of the Grey Street Mosque.1o Near the Queen's statue, Osman Ahmed 
delivered addresses in Arabic, Hindi and English. He declared that they had met to 
mark their joy at the brilliant victories of the British army and hoped that the day was 'not 
far distant' when the whole of South Africa 'united under the good old Union Jack'. The 
crowd cheered for the Queen Empress, Lord Roberts, General Buller, General White 
and 'our Governor'. 11 
Despite such outbursts of patriotism, alongside its public snubs, Vahed points 
out that the Government of Natal did not wait for the war to end but continued to 
introduce discriminatory legislation during its duration.12 
Whilst the Indians' actions can be described as selfless and brave, they were also self 
aware, at least for those Indians who volunteered to serve. For free Indians did not allow 
the political motivation of their actions to remain unaddressed. Pyarelal claims that 
'Gandhi shunned publicity', quoting an example when he turned down an interview with 
the editor of the Advertiser. An English friend who had seen Gandhi's notes on the 
Battle of Colenso, felt that there would be very little said by the Indians themselves 
7 Pyralel, Mahatma Gandhi, Vol II. p.290. 
g Gandhi, M.K. Collected Works cited in Vahed, 'Natal's Indians, the Empire and the South African War, 
1899-I902',p. II. 
9 Natal Mercury, 2 March 1900 cited Vahed, 'Natal's Indians, the Empire and the South African War, 1899 
-1902', p. 11. 
10 Vahed, 'Natal's Indians, the Empire and the South African War, 1899 - 1902', p. 11. 
Il Ibid. ,po 12. 
12 Ibid. p. 13. 
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about their work done in the war. Agreeing with his friend that their part was 'merely to 
do without speaking', Gandhi declined the next invitation from the editor of the 
Advertiser to send a similar account of their service at Spearman's Hil1.13 Yet, it is more 
likely that he saw this as an appropriate response at that particular time, for there are 
extensive examples of Gandhi's reflections on the Indians' involvement in local, Indian 
and English newspapers as well as in his own writings. Gandhi in fact acted immediately 
upon the war work, attempting to publicise the Indians' service and taking responsibility 
for publishing material on the Indians' contribution. For example, in a letter to the Times 
of India on 18 April 1900, he emphasised the admirable qualities of the Indians' devotion 
to the Empire and their work. It concluded with the observation that, 'it was freely 
acknowledged by the European Superintendent of the Corps and other Europeans who 
came with it that, without the leaders, the carrying could not be done with satisfaction'. 
Furthermore, 'many Europeans who ought to know have told me than no European 
Ambulance Corps could cover the distance of twenty-five miles, carrying the wounded 
under such difficult circumstances in a single day, which our Indian bearers and their 
leaders did in the face of serious difficulties about food and shelter' .14 
Request for Discharge Certificates 
Gandhi requested discharge certificates for all the men who had served. This was partly 
in response to the fact that European soldiers had received these and Gandhi wanted to 
assert the Indians' rights to equality of treatment. A chief feature of Gandhi's strategy for 
addressing the plight of Indians was to emphasise conSistently the principles of fair play 
and justice that British rule claimed to represent. 15 
Moreover,Gandhi was determined not to compromise on the Indians' services 
being seen as a sacrificial display of voluntary dedication to the British Empire. On 15 
December 1899, he wrote to the Colonial Secretary, Pietermaritzburg, and was 
emphatic that the leaders would not accept the salaries that were being offered.16 
In retrospect, it seems that Gandhi showed much tactical foreSight behind the 
strategy of not accepting salaries because, as will later be seen, the fact that the 
13 Gandhi, M.K. Collected Works cited in Pyrelal, Mahatma Gandhi, Vol IL The Discovery ofSatyagraha 
On The Threshold p. 288. 
14 Meer, (ed.), The South African Gandhi. pp. 755, 756. 
15 Chandramohan, "Hamlet with the Prince of Denmark left out'?', p. 157. 
16 Natal Archives, PWD, 9585/99, Letter to Colonial Secretary, Pietermaritzburg from Gandhi, 15 
December 1899, p.l. 
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indentured labourers received a salary for their work meant that Gandhi struggled to 
have their service recognised as a show of voluntary loyalty. Voluntary sacrifice would 
have carried greater meaning in that it would have claimed no material reward. 
Gandhi wrote to the Chief Engineer, Pietermaritzburg, on 4 July 1900, stating 
that many bearers of the late Indian Ambulance Corps desired a discharge certificate. 17 
It is uncertain whether the Indians ever did request the discharge certificates or if 
Gandhi took the initiative for the request upon himself. There is little upon which to 
gauge the extent to which the indentured Indians regarded the war as an opportunity to 
uplift themselves politically or whether, having been instructed to go to the front, it had 
little lasting individual impact on them. Since there was a lack of literacy amongst the 
indentured Indians, it is unlikely that many Indians would have had a means of writing 
down their memories and there are no known written sources. Furthermore, the lack of 
documentary outlets for the Indian war experience specifically in South Africa has meant 
that obtaining access to those memories has been lost. 
Correspondence passed between Barnes, the Chief Engineer of the Public 
Works Department (P.W.D.), Clarence and Donnelly, District Engineer, regarding 
Gandhi's repeated requests for discharge certificates. The P.W.D. Chief Engineer 
gave Gandhi the impression that he was sympathetic to his cause and wrote on 9 July 
1900 that he considered the proposal 'a very proper one' but was concerned about the 
difficulties of locating the men. 1B 
By contrast to the fairly positive general response that he gave Gandhi, Barnes 
in other correspondence recommended that only 'Mr. Gandhi and the educated Indians 
who in the capacity of Sirdars and otherwise volunteered and gave their services 
practically free,19 should receive some form of official acknowledgment. Gandhi's view 
was clear that he wanted certificates for all the men as a common body and not simply 
for the leaders. Clarence's response to this, in a letter to Barnes on 9 July 1900, was 
'this I think is absurd, the indentured Indians were not Volunteers but were sent by their 
masters,.20 Colonial officials for their part insisted on differentiation. 
17 Natal Archives, PWD 2458/00, Minute Papers, Correspondence regarding discharge papers, Letter to the 
Chief Engineer, Pietennaritzburg from Gandhi, 4 July 1900, p. 23. 
18 Natal Archives, PWD 2458/00, Minute Papers, Correspondendence regarding discharge papers, Letter to 
Gandhi, from Chief Engineer, PWD, 9 July 1900, p.22. 
19 Ibid. Lines of Communication from Barnes, Chief Engineer, PWD, 24 July 1900, pp. 2, 3. 
20 Natal Archives, PWD 2458/00, Minute Papers, Correspondence regarding discharge papers, Letter to 
Barnes, Chief Engineer, PWD from Clarence, Superintendent Indian Ambulance Corps, 9 July 1900, pp. 
20,21.-
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Gandhi tried to justify his demand by pointing out the European Ambulance 
Corps had received certificates. Yet again, his idea was refuted. Clarence's letter, 9 
July 1900 declared that 'Major Wright's men were enrolled for work on the battle field 
and required discharges to enable them to get employment, these discharges being in 
some degree testimonials which Indians do not require. The discharge and character 
certificates the masters they are indentured to give them being all they require,21 
However, Gandhi was not easily deterred and addressed the Chief Engineer, 
Pietermaritzburg, saying, 'I understand from the District Engineer that the General 
Officer Commanding was not inclined to advise the issue of such certificates for the 
bearers. But I respectfully summit that the Indians are entitled to the same as the 
European bearers to their discharge. I beg to draw your attention to the fact that I have 
not asked for certificates of merit. The mere statement that they served as ambulance 
bearers is all I have asked for.'22 
Despite Barnes having given Gandhi the impression that the certificates issue 
would receive proper attention, Donnelly and Barnes each presented in correspondence 
the reasons why they disapproved of the bestowing of such acknowledgment. 
Barnes wrote on 24 July 1900, 'Against the proposal, I would pOint out, that, 
though the services of the Coolies at the time were valuable and welcome, yet, on the 
other hand, the men were unquestionably highly paid, and the Imperial Government is 
consequently under no obligation with regard to them. Again, most of the men were 
indentured Indians, lent to the Imperial Government by Managers or Proprietors of 
Sugar Estates and others; and, as regards the voluntary Indians, there would be 
considerable difficulty in identifying the actual men who served. Moreover, if these 
certificates were granted to all the members of the Indian Ambulance Corps, it is more 
that likely that sooner or later we would have a similar application from the Kaffirs 
forming the Native Labour Corps.'23 For Barnes, war service as wage labour seemed not 
to be deserving of any honour. Moreover, colonial officials were reluctant to create a 
precedent for any African claims. 
Donnelly, who appears to have been adamant that the role of the Indians should 
not be over-emphasised, stated on 12 July 1900, that 'the Indians, in question were not 
21 Natal Archives, PWD 2458/00, Minute Papers, Correspondence regarding discharge papers, Letter to 
Barnes, Chief Engineer, PWD from Clarence, Superintendent Indian Ambulance Corps, 9 July 1900, pp. 
20,2l. 
22 Ibid. Letter to Barnes, Chief Engineer, Pietermaritzburg from Gandhi, 4 August 1900, pp. 11, 12. 
23 Ibid. Lines of Communication from Barnes, Chief Engineer, Pietermaritzburg, 24 July 1900, p. 2. 
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Volunteers, but simply had to go where they were told and received approximately 
seven times the amount of their ordinary wages, and they were only too delighted at the 
opportunity given to them to make such an enormous amount of overpay,.24 
Several of the statements in these letters undermined the goals for which Gandhi 
and the leaders were striving. Gandhi could do little to refute the fact that the indentured 
Indians were paid and this undermined his assertion that the Indians were a collectively 
motivated group, all wishing to display their voluntary loyalty to the Empire. 
The debate over how the indentureds' work should be received extended to the 
Natal colonial public. Referring to the Natal Mercury's homage to the Indian volunteers' 
offer to serve without pay, 'Colonist' wrote to the editor: 'Your surmise is quite wrong. 
The Indians who have gone to the front have done so purely from mercenary motives, 
and quite two thirds of them are indentured Indians from various estates.25 Depreciating 
such narrow-mindedness, the Natal Mercury replied that although the stretcher bearers 
were receiving a remuneration, it did not in the least diminish from the merit of their 
action.26 However, another colonist was incensed by the Natal Advertiser's plea for due 
recognition for the Indian community and made a scathing reference to the 'sugar-estate 
labourers', who 'patriotically threw up their 10s per month and enrolled as stretcher-
bearers at £1 per week and rations'. Charging the journal with 'beating about the bush in 
a dirty underhand Asiatic fashion', he wrote that 'the Advertiser's shrieks of joy might 
have been heard at the North Pole. ,27 The Natal Advertiser commented on this tirade as 
'a specimen of the characteristic inability of some people to appreCiating any but the 
lowest of motives.'28 Such dialogue illustrates that there were strong racial feelings for 
and against the status of Indian war veterans within Natal. 
Still, Gandhi did not slacken in his endeavours to have Indians recognised as 
equal to the European stretcher bearers. He wrote to the Chief Engineer, 
Pietermaritzburg, on 4 July 1900, urging " venture to think that they ought to have some 
writing in their possession to show that they had the privilege of serving the Queen 
during the war. It will be to the men a happy memento they will prize,.29 
24 Natal Archives, PWD 2458/00, Minute Papers, Correspondence regarding discharge papers. 
Correspondence from Donnelly, District Engineer 12 July 1900, p. 16. 
25 Natal Mercury cited in Pyrelal, Mahatma Gandhi, Vol II. p.290. 
26 Pyrelal, Mahatma Gandhi, Vol II. p.290. 
27 Ibid p. 294. 
28 Natal Advertiser, 6 January 1900 cited in Pyrelal, Mahatma Gandhi, Vol II. p.294. 
29 Natal Archives, PWD 2458/00, Minute Papers, Correspondendence regarding discharge papers,.Letter to 
Barnes, Chief Engineer, Pietermaritzburg from Gandhi, 4 July 1900, p. 23. 
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Such efforts seem all to have been in vain. Not only did leading figures like 
Donnelly and Clarence shrug off the idea that the indentured wanted or needed 
discharge certificates, with statements like, 'none of the Indians have applied to their 
employers for discharges, and the majority of them don't care or would not place any 
value on them,.30 There was further weakening of Gandhi's methods of uplifting the 
image of Indians by portraying his attempt to gain political credit as negative. On 12 
July 1900, Donnelly warned, 'Mr. Gandhi, in the future may make political capital out of 
this, and pOint out how the Indians volunteered for service whereas I distinctly state they 
never did,31 Clarence agreed with Donnelly and added further that Gandhi may have 
been trying to 'accrue business advantages,.32 
In this and other correspondence, there is a sense of shifting the emphasis away 
from Gandhi's patriotic contribution in organising the Indian Ambulance Corps towards 
other motives. Barnes, for instance, described how Gandhi 'lent some considerable 
assistance' in the formation and working of the Indian Ambulance Corps,33 which de-
emphasised the centrality of Gandhi's motivational work. However, the issue of 
acknowledgement lingered on for a few years and continued to cause frustrations for 
the leaders of the Corps. The decision had been taken to award the leaders' medals, 
but it seems that only a few received these. Nazar took responsibility for sending in 
unknown addresses of the leaders and also commented on irritation experienced by 
those who had been overlooked.34 Furthermore, Nazar exposed that certain leaders 
also felt unsure about whether to accept the medals and it was generally felt that the 
medals were a poor substitute for greater political acceptance. In a letter to Gandhi on 
21 April 1903, he questioned, 'I don't know what the military officer wrote to you about 
medals. Should they be accepted? Some have taken them already - others are waiting 
for your decision. Perhaps they may be accepted, but in thanking the authorities on 
behalf of the 'Leaders', you may hint that they are more eager to be recognised as 
citizens of the Empire than to have such recognition as medals,,35 
30 Natal Archives, PWD 2458/00, Minute Papers, Correspondendence regarding discharge papers, Letter to 
Barnes, Chief Engineer, Pietermaritzburg from Donnelly, District Engineer, 18 July 1900, p. 19. 
31 Ibid. Letter to Clarence, Superindentant of the Indian Ambulance Corps from Donnelly, District 
Engineer,12 July 1900, p.16. 
32 Ibid. p.17. 
33 Ibid. Lines of Communication from Barnes, Chief Engineer, PWD, 24 July 1900, p. 2. 
34 Bhana and Hunt, Gandhi '8 Editor. p. 56. 
35 Ibid. p. 73. 
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Alongside, the kholwa, who although not united with the politically-conscious free 
Indians, were striving for many of same advancements in the colony, were also bitterly 
disappointed by the lack of official recognition for their services once hostilities had 
ended. They, too, had believed that after the war a new dispensation would arise in 
Natal, as well as in the old republics and their disillusionment was correspondingly great. 
The government refused to allow the War Office to award those who had served as 
Native Scouts silver campaign medals, insisting that inferior bronze medals be cast for 
them. This led to considerable disenchantment and to a refusal to accept the medals.36 
Nazar asked Gandhi in a letter of 7 May 1903, 'What kind of medal did you get? We got 
a silver medal. 37 Although it was probably a minor difference, it is of interest that the 
Ambulance Corps leaders seem to have been given more prestigious medals. 
Apart from the recognition that Gandhi sought for the Indian Ambuance Corps as a 
. 
whole, he also endeavoured to have the leaders' contribution in particular 
acknowledged. Thus, he requested that the leaders be given the 'Queen's Chocolate' 
which had been awarded to the soldiers as a gift, writing to the Colonial Secretary on 22 
February 1903, reinforcing that the leaders had volunteered without pay and that they 
would 'prize it as a treasure,.38 Yet, the Colonial Secretary also turned down this 
request, giving the reason that the chocolate was for non-commissioned officers and 
men only.39 
Little Praise for Indians' War Efforts 
Thus, from the initial period after their work, the Indians received mixed reactions as 
was demonstrated with the handling of the discharge certificates. Yet, as has been 
seen, the Indians also received unambiguous praise, before and during their service, 
and afterwards some of this praise continued. In all, there were a fair number of 
accolades bestowed upon Indians for their bravery and selfless work. 
36 Lambert, Betrayed Trust. p.l83.p. 77. 
37 Bhana and Hunt, Gandhi's Editor. p. 77. 
38 Natal Archives, CSO, Vol. 1641, 1462/1900, Gandhi to Colonial Secretary, 22 February 1900 cited in 
Vahed, 'Natal's Indians, the Empire and the South African War, 1899 1902', p. 6. 
39 Natal Archives, CSO, Vol. 1641, 1462/1900, Colonial Secretary to Gandhi, 9 March 1900 cited in 
Vahed, , Natal's Indians, the Empire and the South African War, 1899 - 1902', p. 6. 
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According to Gandhi, the work of the Ambulance Corps was also all a complete 
revelation abroad.4o As General Sir William Olpherts wrote: 
'While fully sharing the enthusiasm for bravery of our troops fighting in South 
Africa, I think that sufficient attention has not been called to the devotion of the 
Indian dhoolie-bearers who do their work of mercy on the battlefields. Under the 
heaviest fire they seek the wounded, fearing nothing, although without means of 
defence. These Indian fellow-subjects of ours are doing in Natal a work which 
requires even more courage than that of a soldier.41 
In the Indian affairs newspaper, Indian Opinion, which Gandhi organised in subsequent 
years, he reported on 2 December 1905 that 'our note on the subject of Indian 
volunteering, we are glad to notice, has been warmly taken up by the Natal Witness, 
and some correspondence has appeared on the subject. We hope now that the matter 
has been taken up by the Press, that it will not be allowed to die out without an 
expression of opinion from the Government as to its policy,.42 
Doke concludes that there was an initial burst of enthusiasm for the service performed 
by the Indian stretcher bearers. However, soon after the war, the Indians were treated 
as badly as ever in the colony and given less recognition.43 The praise had little direct 
impact on improving their political position and in many respects their position further 
deteriorated under the new Union of South Africa Government. Yet, Gandhi did not 
cease to use the war as a political tool to promote the Indian cause locally and abroad. 
Despite the negative reception that Indians received from the Boers after the war, 
Gandhi continued his pre-war tactfulness and showed he was still capable of regarding 
them with respect. Gandhi referred to the conduct of the Boers during and after the war 
as providing vindication of the law of suffering.44 Despite being defeated, Gandhi 
suggests that the Boers' endurance had earned them the respect of their opponents and 
40 Gandhi, M.K. An Autobiography or The Story of My Experiences with Truth. p. 265. 
41 Huttenback, R. Gandhi in South Africa. cited in Siwundhla, H.T. 'The Participation of Non-Europeans in 
the Anglo-Boer War, 1899-1902'. (Ph.D. thesis, Claremont Graduate School, 1977), p. 57. 
42 Meer, (ed.), The South African Gandhi. p. 761. 
43 Doke, MK Gandhi, An Indian Patriot in Natal. p. 55. 
44 Young India, 16 June 1920 cited Pyralel, Mahatma Gandhi, VallI p. 316. 
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bv 
secured a settlement which kept them as the predominant factor in South Africa. 45 
The deteriorating conditions for Indians fitted into the broader trend of treatment of 
blacks after the war. Throughout South Africa, the hopes and expectations of many 
black groups that the triumph of 'liberal' imperialism would lead to an improvement in 
their position were soon shattered. Once the danger to the imperial and colonial 
interests had passed, narrow settler interests again asserted themselves. Tributes to 
black loyalty continued to be made, but proved to be little more than lip service, and 
government actions were directed to ensuring that no long-term benefits could accrue to 
blacks from the war, particularly benefits which would be at the expense of the settlers.46 
45 Williams, Botha, Smuts and South Africa cited in Pyralel, Mahatma Gandhi, Vol II p. 316. 
46 Lambert, 'Loyalty its own reward'. p. 11. 
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Some Post-1902 Perspectives 
A study of the legislation that impacted on Indians after the war as well as Gandhi's and the 
Indian community's political actions, would be far too detailed and complex to be adequately 
dealt with as a post-war conclusion to a modest study of this kind. Furthermore, the war 
cannot be seen as a starting point, nor as a major turning point for all of these future actions. 
This postscript is therefore an overview of how the Indians' actions in the war had some long 
term consequences, as well as an acknowledgment of the changing circumstances into 
which the South African Indians would have to integrate themselves 
Impact of the War on the Indentured Labour System 
The motivation for Natal Indians to serve as stretcher bearers had been initiated by the free 
Indians as they were predominantly aiming to improve their own conditions. The indentured 
Indians may have hoped for positive repercussions, but it is significant that their inclusion in 
the Indian Ambulance Corps was not as a result of their own dOing. However, it seems that 
the only sector of the South African Indian community that felt some positive impact was the 
indentured population. This took the form of a discussion about the merits of the indentured 
system for the labourers themselves. 
The process was prompted when Gandhi wrote to the Bombay Government on 4 May 
1901, asking for 'some action' towards legislation to improve Indians' conditions in South 
Africa. He declared that 'under the strong and sympathetic Viceroy we have in Lord Curzon, 
the great question .... cannot but be decided favourable.' The Viceroy took no decisive action 
at that stage. 1 
Yet, Gandhi's grasp of things was instinctively right and Curzon was the first Viceroy 
to see that the indentured Indians were merely being exploited by the Empire, and to ask 
why the system should continue.2 At the same time, it is likely that Gandhi was appealing for 
the conditions of all Indians of varying status to be addressed. Curzon called on the 
assistance of his old friend, Sir Arther Godley, the Permanent Under-Secretary for India. 
Curzon was aware that those who knew of the Indians' participation in the South African War 
admired their fortitude. This was the moral basis of Curzon's appeal to Godley, arguing 'now 
that they have assisted so nobly in the defense of the Colony ..... it is impossible that their 
1 Tinker, A New System olSlavery. p. 288. 
2 Ibid. 
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conditions can be allowed to continue.'s Curzon wrote officially to the Secretary of State on 
12 July 1900, demanding a 'just settlement' for the Indians.4 However, he received a 
somewhat sour reply, stating that 'there is a certain amount of unreality and cant about our 
proceedings: for if Natives of India showed any inclination to immigrate into this country 
[England] and to supplant or underbid the small British tradesman or the British working man 
we should behave .... I believe, exactly as Natal has behaved.' Godley made a similar plea to 
the Under-Secretary for the Colonies on 23 August 1900. Receiving no answer, Godley 
wrote again to the Colonial Office, 8 August 1901 and this time elicited a reply from the 
Under-Secretary, 14 August, which explained that Lord Kitchener had set up an Indian 
Immigrants Office in the Transvaal, and intended to take a 'firm line; but no information was 
offered concerning Natal.s 
The attempts to offer greater protection to the indentureds was hindered by an 
enormous demand for cheap manual labour. At the end of the war, industrial activity 
resumed, and for the first few years of the new century, the Natal employers were successful 
in obtaining increased supplies of labour.s Yet, a struggle had begun between the Natal 
Government and its demand for less restricted forms of recruitment, and the Indian 
Government under Curzon, questioning the merits of the system.7 
The moves towards reforming the indentured system happened in the context of the 
entire Empire.s The trying conditions of many Indians abroad had also been forced upon the 
attention of the British Government. It came to realise, however, that addressing emigration 
to the Crown colonies was comparatively Simple, but the self-governing Dominions posed a 
more difficult problem. 9 
The Indian Government was in a strong negotiating position where it had the option 
of stopping the indentured labour system. Yet, on the other hand, it was the only option that 
India had and it had no real power to improve the conditions of the indentured labour 
3 Correspondence with the Secretary of State, Lord Salisbury, and Sir Arther Godley (1900). The Curzon 
Papers:India Office Library and Records. Curzon to Godley (4 July 1900), and Godley to Curzon (27 July 
1900).) quoted in Tinker, A New System o/Slavery. p.288. 
4 Tinker, A New System of Slavery. pp. 288, 289. 
5 Ibid. P 289. 
6 Ibid. p 290. 
7 Ibid. 
s Abstract of the Proceedings of the Council of the Governor-General of India (1901), Assam Labour and 
Emigration Bill, (8 March 1901) quoted in Thompson and Wilson, (eds.), The Oxford History of South Africa, 
11. p. 338. 
9 Thompson and Garratt. Rise and Fulfilment of British Rule in India. p. 541. 
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system.10 To aggravate matters, the Natal Government continued to ask for greater 
concessions for employers in the recruitment of Indian labour.11 There were mixed 
sentiments in India as to how to respond to these demands. Some felt that India was in a 
commanding position and should not give in to the requests, while others believed that 
closure of the system would be 'cut[ting] off the coolie's nose to spite the face of Natal 
Government'12 The first moves came from the Government of India. It agreed to many of 
Natal's requests, including compulsory repatriation, but in a 'Confidential dispatch' to Sir 
Henry McCallum, Governor of Natal, on 25 April 1903, Curzon insisted that 'the change must 
be justified'. He started to make demands, the main ones being the abolition of the £3 tax 
after ten years, an amendment of the Traders Licensing Act and the Vagrancy Act, and 
proper provision for marriage among indentured Indians, entailing the release of one party 
when the other reached the end of indenture. 13 Given these circumstances, Curzon entered 
into controversy with Lord Milner who was High Commissioner in South Africa as well as 
Governor of the Transvaal. Tinker suggests that the two were a formidable pair to engage in 
a clash.14 At that stage, negotiations came to a halt,15 but Gandhi and Curzon had 
succeeded in calling the whole indenture system into question. Tinker emphasises, however, 
that the fate of this issue was decided ultimately by Indian public opinion and as such it was 
the first major Indo-British political and social issue to be decided in dependent India and not 
in metropolitan Britain. 16 
New Racial Circumstances after the War 
Gandhi correctly anticipated that after the war, Indians were going to face increasing 
discrimination, even though Swan notes that this was insufficient insight to keep him from 
returning to India.17 On his arrival in India in 1902, Gandhi addressed people in Calcutta on 
his experiences in South Africa. He told them that 'the policy that was followed by [their1 
countrymen in South Africa in connection with their legal disabilities could be summed up in 
two maxims which guided it, viz., to stick to the truth at all costs and conquer hate by love.' 
He furthermore assured them that 'these [were] no catch phrases, but that [they had] all 
10 Tinker, A New System a/Slavery. p. 292. 
II Ibid p. 293. 
12 Curzon Papers, (27 January 1903) cited in Tinker, A New System a/Slavery. p. 294. 
13 Tinker, A New System a/Slavery. p. 294. 
14 Ibid. p. 295. 
15 Ibid. p. 296. 
16 Ibid. p. 289. 
17 Swan, Gandhi: The Sauth African Experience. p. 90. 
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through these years tried to live up to the ideal.' and claimed that 'the local Indian 
contribution to the present war [was], perhaps, the very best illustration of that line of 
action. ,18 For all that, under the post-war regime the Indians encountered ever more 
restrictive and racist policies. Their was patriotism had counted for nothing in the Union. 
Much of Gandhi's work after the war took place in the Transvaal, especially between 1907-
1908.19 In many respects, Gandhi is renowned for his achievements after the war, once he 
was more established, although the new South African legislation also created an ever more 
restrictive environment. Gandhi came back to South African in 1903 when Nazar made an 
earnest plea for him to return in response to the announcement that Colonial Secretary 
Chamberlain would be making a whirlwind tour of South Africa. Interested parties sought to 
use this event to present their case and Indians wanted to discuss their grievances about 
anti-Indian legislation.20 When Gandhi reached Pretoria, he found all was changed: the 
officials were new and unapproachable. An Asiatic Department had been created which 
apparently had little sympathy with Indians. Gandhi found he was unable to make contact 
with Davidson, the Colonial Secretary. Only after repeated efforts was he able to arrange a 
meeting with this individual who then ended up referring Gandhi to his Assistant. The 
Assistant Colonial Secretary reprimanded Gandhi as well as the resident Indians for having 
invited him to the Transvaal. In effect, he made no effort to understand the Indians' pOSition. 
Gandhi was also disappointed by what he perceived as the local Indians' lack of attempts to 
maintain their rights.21 In this period after the war, Gandhi loosened his ties with the Natal 
Indian Congress when he reSigned as secretary and moved to the Transvaal in 1903. Bhana, 
however, states that he continued to make a contribution to Congress' pOlicies at least until 
1910.22 In the Transvaal he helped to found the British Indian Association in 1903, and again 
became secretary of this organisation.23 
18 Meer, (ed.), The South African Gandhi, An Abstract of the Speeches and Writing ofMK. Gandhi, 1893 -1914. 
p. 757, 758. 
19 Brain, 'Natal Indians, 1860 - 1910 from co-operation, through competition, to conflict, p. 263. 
20 Bhana and Hunt, Gandhi's Editor: The Letters of M'H. Nazar, 1902 -1903 ',po 7. 
21 Doke, MK. Gandhi, An Indian Patriot in South Africa. p. 58. 
22 Bhana, Gandhi's Legacy. p. 16. 
23 Ibid. p. 17. 
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In Bhana's view, Indian leadership preferred to see the whole post-war drama against a 
larger canvas and continued to have faith that Indians' status as British subjects and India's 
strategic position within the British Empire would give Indians a certain leverage in the South 
African situation.24 Between 1900 and 1910 especially, they pleaded for protection against 
increasing racial discrimination.25 This strategy was bound to fail, because the development 
of discriminatory inter-racial politics was taking place within a South African rather than an 
imperial framework. One should also note that the hopelessness of the situation had become 
apparent to some Indians, who consequently were less inclined to see their position in terms 
of India. They were in favour of not resisting the new governing bodies.26 
During the war, the Natal Indian Congress enjoyed some growth and by 1901 they had 723 
paying members and had set up a Congress Hall. However, there were complaints about the 
organisation being too exclusive.27 Bhana argues that while the Congress still held viable 
support overseas, by 1910 it did not enjoy the support of the majority of South African 
Indians.28 The narrow base of the Natal Indian Congress is reflected in the issues they 
continued to focus on most strongly, namely, merchant interests, immigration and trade. The 
crisis in the organisation came to an temporary halt when the satyagraha campaign in the 
Transvaal expanded to incorporate issues and strategies beyond those of the commercial 
elite. Other organisations also started to emerge in the Indian community such as the Natal 
Indian Patriotic Union, the Colonial Born Indian Association and the South African Indian 
Committee which were independent of, and at times challenged, the Congress.29 
In terms of the continuing and increasing discrimination that Indians faced after the war, the 
Peace Preservation Ordinance drastically cut down Indian immigration.30 The British 
Government was anxious to conciliate Boer opinion and they allowed for national 'Home 
Rule' in the Union Act of 1909. This meant they relinquished any residual power to protect 
----~~------
24 Bhana and Hunt, Gandhi's Editor: The Letters ofMH. Nazar, 1902 - 1903. p. 6. 
25 Bhana, Gandhi's Legacy. p. 19. 
26 Bhana and Hunt, Gandhi's Editor: The Letters of MH. Nazar, 1902 - 1903. p. 6. 
27 Bhana, Gandhi's Legacy. p. 11. 
28 Ibid. p. 14. 
29 Ibid. p. 18. 
30 Pillay, B. British Indians in the Transvaal: Trade, Politics and Imperial Relations, 1885 - 1906. p. 103 
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minorities, including the Indians,31although this had never amounted to much. During the 
early years of Crown Colony Government in the Transvaal, there had also been much friction 
between Indians and the Government. They found that they were unwelcome in the 
Transvaal, a stance supported by lord Milner, who claimed the Indians there were 'strangers 
forcing themselves upon a community reluctant to receive them.,32 This view obviously calls 
into question how concerned the British really had been about the treatment of Indians in the 
Transvaal prior to the war. Restrictions on Indians' entry was already in place in the Orange 
Free State and was extended to the Cape Colony in 1906.33 
The shapers of the new South Africa included Boer leaders like Botha and Smuts 
who remembered all too well that in war the Indians had sided with the British. General 
Botha who became Prime Minister of the Transvaal after the war and first Prime Minister of 
the Union of South Africa in 1910, had commanded the Boers forces in northern Natal where 
he saw at first hand the loyalty of Indians to the British. Vahed emphasises that many Boers 
did not disguise their dislike for the Indians, as they treated them with contempt, while the 
British were devious and had no intention of rewarding them for their 10yalty.34 Gandhi's own 
frustration with British unwillingness to ensure the rights of Indians was expressed in the 
following words to lord Elgin: 'Our lot today [1906] is infinitely worse than the Boer regime', a 
sentiment shared by Africans and Coloureds.35 
In these circumstances, Indians adopted a policy of passive resistance in 1907 
against the Transvaal Asiatic Registration Act of 1902. About 2,500 people under the 
leadership of Gandhi marched into the Transvaal from Natal to assert their right to go from 
one province to another. Gandhi and other leaders were arrested and strikes occurred in 
various parts of the country, accompanied by some loss of life in collisions with the military.36 
Still, Gandhi had not reached the point of seriously challenging the whole white-dominated 
system.37 
31 Thompson and Garratt, Rise and Fulfilment of British Rule in India. pp. 586, 587. 
32 Vane, 'The South African Indians, A Plea for Better Understanding'. p. 15. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Vahed, 'Natal's Indians, the Empire and the South African War, 1899 - 1902', p. 
35 Chandramohan, "Hamlet with the Prince of Denmark left out'?: the South African War, Empire and India', p. 
161. 
36 Robert. P.E. History of British India, Under the Company and the Crown. (London, 1958), pp. 575, 576. 
37 Tinker, A New System of Slavery. pp 289, 290. 
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Conclusion 
An assessment of the Natal Indians' involvement in the South African War, 1899 - 1902 does 
not draw any dramatic conclusions. The loss to the Indian community was comparatively 
small and there were no real rewards for their efforts. The promises that the British had 
made to address racial discrimination after the war proved to be disappointing and the brief 
recognition that Indians were given by some for their efforts did not have any impact on the 
laws which effected Indians in a discriminatory way. The pOlicies that were defined in the 
process of establishing the Union of South Africa were intended to protect the white 
population's dominance. This meant that the sacrifice and loyalty of black groups in the war 
was not acknowledged through legislation that promoted the enhancement of all races alike. 
Prior to the war, both the free and indentured Indians were experiencing increasing 
discrimination against them, which in turn impacted on their economic and social 
circumstances. Indentured Indians would have been well aware of their oppressive situation 
but they were highly restricted in their ability to protect and promote their political rights in the 
colony. The indentured labour system was established to benefit the employers and white 
colonists in general and it did not aim to enhance the labourers' position. Added to the 
difficulties of being bound into contracts, indentured labourers lacked the financial resources 
and the means of large-scale communication to effectively resist their exploitation. In these 
harsh circumstances, women were least able to defend themselves and their unwanted 
presence was generally met with hostility by the colonists. Furthermore, the indentured 
Indians did not receive a great deal of support from the free Indian community and to a large 
extent the caste or classist attitudes that organised Indian society were reflected in the Natal 
Indian community. Comparatively, free Indians had much greater leverage to present their 
concerns, although their political campaigns had few more positive repercussions. They were 
in a position where, without recognition of their British status, they had very few political 
options. They were often perceived as an economic threat and were not seen to be bringing 
major contributions to the economy. Thus, in order to protect their ability to settle in the 
colony, they generally adopted a respectful approach when presenting their grievances to 
the Natal and British Governments. Their offer to serve in the war fitted into this tactful 
political strategy, and it was an attempt to reassert their status as citizens of the British 
Empire and their loyalty to Natal and Britain. In response to their pre-war environment, an 
act which reflected devotion and no resentment was a creative approach. However, the 
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success that the Natal Responsible Government had in passing restrictive and discriminatory 
legislation against free Indians, indicated that Indians were losing political ground. It was 
becoming clear that whites had no real intention to work with the Indians in the colony nor to 
protect their rights. This indicates that it is unlikely that the Indians' endeavors in the war 
were going to make a major impression but one can still ask: if the Indians had made no 
effort would this have worsened their position? Furthermore one must remember that the 
circumstances into which Indians had to integrate themselves after the war were not limited 
to the boundaries of Natal as they were in the process of being incorporated into the new 
racial environment of South Africa. 
The Indians' service during the war can be remembered as a heroic deed, and it also 
presented an image of a working degree of homogeneity and co-operation between the 
different sectors of the Indian community. Whilst this mutual support was not forced, it 
perhaps equally does not offer an accurate impression of the social complexities within the 
Indian community. These complexities should not be overlooked in an attempt to protect the 
image of Indians as a monolithic, oppressed group. The political motivation to serve in the 
war came from the free Indians and when the opportunity arose to work with indentured 
Indians, it is hard to know what this long-term experience meant to both groups. 
Furthermore, one cannot measure how long-lasting or far-reaching were the effects of the 
positive impression they made on some of the whites with whom they served. 
Despite the lack of positive political response that the Natal Indian war effort achieved, it is 
significant that on a long-term historical basis their willingness to serve the Empire was 
clearly displayed. Although their actions were not broadly reported, even within the South 
African Indian community the written and few photographic records that were made still 
remain and the Indians' contribution can take its place alongside that of other black 
contributions to the war. Chatte~ee notes that an Indian commentator wrote 'Mohandas 
Karamchand Gandhi remains South Africa's greatest gift to India' for it is 'where the steel 
within him was tempered,1 Whilst Gandhi was to lead many more and arguably more 
important campaigns in South Africa and of course those in India, his leadership role in the 
war reflected one of his earlier attempts to put his current philosophies regarding the Empire 
1 Chatterjee, M., 'Reviewing the Gandhian Heritage' in Brown, J.M. and M. Prozesky (eds), Gandi and South 
Africa: Principles and Politics. (Pietermaritzburg, 1996), p. 95. 
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into practice. He showed his effectiveness as a motivator and his courage as a leader, 
qualities that he would draw on so many later occasions. 
Gandhi came to be remembered for the numerous activities he organised and initiated in 
South Africa. Some of his more noteworthy achievements in South Africa were the 
establishment of the Natal Indian Congress, the foundation of the Indian journal, the Indian 
Opinion in 1903, the passive resistance campaign in the Transvaal in 1907 and the creation 
of the Phoenix settlement. The Phoenix settlement was on a piece of land outside Durban 
that Gandhi had purchased and he used it to develop a community which lived according to 
the philosophies he was developing and teaching. As a legacy, Phoenix provides a way of 
suggesting how the Indians' efforts during the war should be contextualised and given an 
appropriate degree of prominence, and stands as a staging post in the history of Natal Indian 
life in the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
The Natal Indian Congress appears to have become less central in Natal and South African 
Indian politics in the immediate post-war years, especially as it was seen to be too elitist by 
the majority of Indians and other political organisations were emerging. Bhana reports that 
the Congress was left in some disarray in 1914 and not much is know about its activities in 
the next several years until it was revived in the 1920s.2 While it contributed to the war, it 
derived little of lasting value from this brief moment of empire patriotism. Furthermore the 
issue of resolving the tension between 'elite' politics and the needs of its poorer Indian 
constituency would remain a difficult challenge. 
2 Bhana, Gandhi's Legacy. p. 3 J • 
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